

اسناد لائے جاسوسی

شماره ۳۸

((پاریس پناہگاہ جاسوسان آمریکا))

دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام



In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

SECRET 040310Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 488731.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: PARIS 11231

1. BAKHTIAR WAS IN BITTING CONTACT WITH SEVERAL STATION OFFICERS DURING THE EARLY 1980'S. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, WE COULD LIKE TO EXPLORE RE-ESTABLISHING THAT CONTACT AT THE TIME OF ONE OF ANOTHER OF BAKHTIAR'S EARLIER CASE OFFICERS WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET PARIS. WOULD WELCOME STATION'S COMMENT ON HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE BROUGHT ABOUT.

2. HAVE INFORMED STATE OF OUR INTEREST IN CONTACTING BAKHTIAR AND OBTAINED THEIR CONCURRENCE. ACCORDINGLY, AMAS SAVOR MAY BE BRIEFED IF AND AS STATION DEEMS DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 201-00000001. RVW 03 AUG 89 DRV D90 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT

662

3 AUG 79 12 55Z

LS, LONDON, STOCKHOLM.

IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SHAHPUR
SS CONFERENCE GIVEN WIDE FRENCH
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE
FOLLOW KEY EXCERPTS OF
BLISHED IN 1 AUGUST ISSUE OF

US GOV
PRESENTS AT LEGITIMATE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT
AND LEADER IN OPPOSITION TO THE ISLAMIC REGIME. ACCUSED
RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF PLUNGING COUNTRY INTO CHAOS AND SAID
MULLAHS SHOULD GO BACK TO THEIR MOSQUES. HE SAID HE IN
TOUCH WITH SUPPORTERS IN TEHRAN AND WITH HIS OWN INFLUENTIAL
BAKHTIAR TRIBE. CLAIMED HAS SUPPORT IN IRAN BECAUSE OF
GROWING FRUSTRATION OVER POLITICAL INCOMPETENCE OF RELIGIOUS
LEADERS BUT HAS NO INTENTION TRYING REGAIN POWER BY
LEADING UNDERGROUND STRUGGLE, PARTY OR GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.
SAID WOULD NOT PRESENT CANDIDATES IN COUNTRY'S FORTHCOMING
ELECTIONS. PRESENT "RELIGIOUS DICTATORSHIP" CHANGING IDEAS
EVERY FEW WEEKS, BANKRUPTING COUNTRY AND UNDERMINING GOVERN-
MENTAL CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN FACE OF MINORITY REVOLTS.
KHOMEINI HAS NO IDEA WHAT TO DO WITH POWER AND IN ONE YEAR
IRAN HAD NOW SQUANDERED AS MUCH AS IN 25 YEARS UNDER THE
SHAH. ATTACKED IRANIAN POLICIES OF SOVIET UNION WHICH WANTED
TO SEE AN IRAN UNDER MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE OR ELSE TOTALLY
CORRUPT. SUPPORTED DECISION OFF IRANIAN CUT OFF OF
NATURAL GAS SALES TO SOVIET UNION. KURDS SHOULD BE GIVEN
LOCAL AUTONOMY BUT WITHIN NATIONAL UNITY. REPEATEDLY
CRITICIZED FORMER ALLIES INCLUDING KARIM SANJABI OF NATIONAL
FRONT FOR THEIR ALLIANCE WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. IRAN
EXISTED BEFORE ISLAM.

ATE FRENCH AND IRANIAN
SDSLIPPERY/1, SDULTIMATE/1,
ADING/INFORMATION
ADDEES WILL RECALL THAT
MIR, WHO CLAIMED CLOSE
TH BAKHTIAR WHILE HE STILL
24 DTD 30 JAN 79). IF ALAMIR
S HE CLAIMED IN PAST AND HAS
LIBERAL NON DOCTRINAIRE REVOLU-
ED SOME MONTHS AGO, WOULD SEEM
WILL EXPLORE WITH UNSOBER/1
UST.

ENTION TO FACT THAT FRENCH
AND UNKEY) ARE OBVIOUSLY
SURFACING IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE
ON (WITH ASSUMED APPROVAL OF
INCLUDING PRESIDENT), PROVIDING
BAKHTIAR FORUM TO SPEAK PUBLICLY WITH ATTENDANT EXTENSIVE
MEDIA COVERAGE AS KHOMEINI ENJOYED DURING HIS DAYS AT
NEAUPHLE-LE-CHATEAU.

4. NO FILE. RVW 2 AUG 99 DRV D9C1.
S E C R E T
BT
#1231

28 SEP 79
CC O F I D I E M T I A L 271750Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC
CITE LONDON 19198

TO: WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN.

FOR: NE/IRAN INFO R/BC

SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJ JA IRANIAN EXILES

1. WISH TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION STATE TELEGRAM NO. 249710
DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1979. SUBJECT CONTACT WITH IRANIAN EXILES.
WHICH STATES INTER ALIA THAT "IT IS CRUCIAL THAT NO IMPRESSION
BE LEFT THAT THE USG HAS ANY INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN INTER-
NAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS OR OF SUPPORTING GROUPS PLOTTING AGAINST THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. PLEASE MAKE THIS EXPLICITLY CLEAR TO CALLES

2. NO FILE. RVW 27 SEP 79 DRV D9D.6.

S E C R E T

#819

19 OCT 79 04 33z

S E C R E T 190214Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC

CITE WASHINGTON 535504.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RYPAT - RUN-DOWN ON SDRAP/SDPEPPER OPERATIONS

REF: TEHRAN 54496

1. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE STATION A BETTER FEEL FOR THE
SDPEPPER/1 (P/1) AND SDRAP/1 (R/1) OPERATIONS WE ARE PROVIDING
THE FOLLOWING RUN-DOWN.

2. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, P/1 ARRANGED CONTACT WITH
RTACTION INDIRECTLY VIA U.S. MILITARY CONTACTS. P/1 WAS MET BY--
AND IS HANDLED BY CUMMISKY. P/1 IS ONE OF THE UNFORTUNATES
FROM THE PREVIOUS REGIME (HIGH RANKING MILITARY OFFICER,
IMPORTANT EMBASSY JOB, ETC.) WHO APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BASICALLY
FONEST AND AS A RESULT FACED FINANCIAL DISASTER WHEN THE SPAR'S
REGIME COLLAPSED. P/1 NOT ONLY LOST HIS JOB BUT ALSO HIS
RETIREMENT INCOME. HE NOW LIVES IN A MODEST APARTMENT IN THE
WASHINGTON AREA AND LIVES OFF HIS SMALL SAVINGS. HE HAD MAINTAINED
LIMITED CONTACT WITH OTHER IRANIANS UNTIL BAKHTIAR SURFACED IN
PARIS. ACCORDING TO P/1 HE WAS CONTACTED BY BAKHTIAR WHO WANTED
HIM TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN BAKHTIAR AND EITHER HIGH RANKING
USG OFFICIALS OR RTACTION. P/1 CLAIMS BAKHTIAR HAS COMPLETE
TRUST IN HIM BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT ONLY LONG TIME FRIENDS BUT
ALSO CLOSE RELATIVES BY MARRIAGE. AFTER P/1 APPROACHED US WE
ADVISED HIM TO TELL BAKHTIAR THAT HE WAS FREE TO DO AS HE WISHED,
BUT THAT WE RECOMMENDED THAT HE USE P/1 AS A CHANNEL TO FORWARD
WHATEVER VIEWS HE WISHED CONVEY TO RTACTION. WE MADE CLEAR TO
P/1 THAT HE SHOULD TELL BAKHTIAR THAT WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION
TO FUND, ASSIST, OR GUIDE HIS MOVEMENT, BUT WERE PROVIDING THE
CHANNEL AS A MEANS BY WHICH HE COULD PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION
ON HIS INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. THIS WAS THE MESSAGE THAT
P/1 CARRIED TO PARIS WHEN HE TRAVELLED TO SEE BAKHTIAR AT THE
END OF SEPTEMBER. BAKHTIAR'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HE APPRECIATED THE

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 535504 S E C R E T

CHANNEL AND WOULD KEEP US INFORMED. A SUMMARY OF P/1'S MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR WAS DISSEMINATED IN MEMO FORM AND IS BEING FORWARDED TO TEHRAN. WE CONSIDERED BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGE TO US TO BE VERY CANDID. HE IS AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HE MUST OVERCOME WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES. HE FREELY ADMITS HE HAS NO REAL MOVEMENT AND IS ONLY IN THE EARLY PLANNING STAGES. HOWEVER, HE HAS HOPES.

3. P/1'S OWN MOTIVATION IS A COMBINATION OF VENGEANCE AGAINST THE PRESENT REGIME, A DESIRE TO HELP HIS FRIEND BAKHTIAR, THE HOPE THAT A FRIENDLY REGIME WOULD REINSTATE HIS PENSION, AND A DESIRE TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON AS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN. HE APPEARS TO BE BASICALLY A DECENT FELLOW AND NOT ONLY CHANNELS MESSAGES BUT ALSO FREQUENTLY ACTS AS A UNILATERAL ASSET, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT FORMALLY RECRUITED HIM. WE ASSISTED HIM WITH A PORTION OF HIS TRAVEL EXPENSES AND MAY EVENTUALLY GIVE HIM A MONTHLY RETAINER.

4. R/1 WAS CONTACTED BY GLEGOROFF AND COMMISKY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LATE AUGUST 1979. THE ORIGINAL CONTACT WAS TO DETERMINE IF REPORTS OF R/1 BEING INVOLVED WITH THE KURDS WERE TRUE. AT THE TIME WE WERE UNSURE OF R/1'S WHEREABOUTS AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH REACTION OFFICERS. SDENORMOUS/1 WAS USED TO BROKER THE INTRODUCTION AND HAS REMAINED IN THE CASE AS A GENERAL SUPPORT AGENT, INDIRECT CHANNEL BETWEEN R/1 AND HIS CASE OFFICERS, AND AS A USEFUL SOURCE OF FEEDBACK FROM R/1 ON THE RESULTS OF OUR MEETINGS WITH HIM. AT OUR FIRST SESSIONS WITH R/1 HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING COOPERATING WITH BAKHTIAR, BUT MORE RECENTLY HAS BECOME INTERESTED IN RUNNING HIS OWN MOVEMENT. HIS BASIC BELIEF IS THAT THE ONLY MEANS TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS THROUGH SOME FORM OF MILITARY ACTIVITY LED BY OR AT LEAST ORCHESTRATED BY HIMSELF. ONCE THE CHANGE IS EFFECTED AND CONSOLIDATED THE RUNNING OF THE COUNTRY COULD BE TURNED OVER TO A POLITICIAN SUCH AS BAKHTIAR. R/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO TEST SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF AMONG THE EXILES. AGAIN, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO R/1 THAT WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH HIM TO GAIN INFORMATION ON THE IRANIAN SITUATION, AND THAT THE CONTACT SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AN INDICATION OF SUPPORT ON OUR PART. R/1 MAY NOT TOTALLY BELIEVE THIS.

5. UNTIL RECENTLY R/1 WAS IN DIRE FINANCIAL STRAIGHTS AND

PAGE 3 WASHINGTON 535504 S E C R E T

LIVED IN A VERY MODEST HOME IN A SMALL TOWN IN NEW JERSEY. RECENTLY HE HAS MOVED TO BETTER QUARTERS AND IS ABLE TO MAKE ENDS MEET. HE IS NOW BEING ASSISTED FINANCIALLY, IN A LIMITED WAY, BY WELL-TO-DO IRANIANS IN THE U.S. WHO PROBABLY SEE THE SMALL INVESTMENT AS AN INSURANCE POLICY. WE SEE R/1'S MOTIVATION CONSISTING OF A MIX OF PATRIOTISM, SELF-INTEREST, VENGEANCE, DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR, AND RETIREMENT IN THE U.S.

6. WE DO NOT YET KNOW IF AN EXILE MOVEMENT, LED BY BAKHTIAR, R/1, A COMBINATION OF THE TWO, OR OTHERS WILL EVER GET OFF THE GROUND. THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH R/1 IS BASICALLY TO BE IN BETTER POSITION TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION. A POSITIVE SIGN IS THAT BOTH FIGURES APPEAR TO BE REALISTIC IN VIEWING THE DIFFICULTY OF THEIR TASK. IT HAS NOT YET BEEN SHOWN THAT THEY CAN COOPERATE TOWARD A COMMON GOAL, AND ALREADY THERE ARE SIGNS OF THEM DIVIDING THEIR EFFORTS BY OPPOSING ONE ANOTHER. REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME, BCS SEES IN THE EXILE OPPOSITION AN OPPORTUNITY TO GATHER USEFUL INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN. NOTE BAKHTIAR AND R/1 ARE AWARE OF THE NEED TO GATHER INFORMATION FROM INSIDE THE COUNTRY, AND BOTH ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING LINKS INTO THE TRIBAL, MILITARY, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY. WE SEE IN THIS THE CHANCE OF PIGGYBACKING ON THEIR EFFORTS.

7. FILE: 221-962615; 201-106171. RVW 18 OCT 89
DRY D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

BT
#9457

SECRET 022356Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 507357.

O: TEHRAN.

NNINTEL INTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 504036

1. FOLLOWING OBTAINED BY CUMMISKY AND GIBROFF IN REF MEETING 29 AUGUST AND DISSEMINATED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS SUNDERS ONLY AS FIRDB-312/02121-79 31 AUG 80

WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN OPPOSITION PLANNING SDEN REF (SUBJECT) SAID THAT HE ONLY RECENTLY HAD RESUMED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN IRANIAN POLITICS HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAHETI AND INVITED TO PARIS FOR MEETINGS. SUBJECT CLAIMS ALSO TO HAVE RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL TO FRANCE FOR TALKS WITH THAT GOVERNMENT. SUBJECT HAS BEEN IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE U.S. FROM WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE AND HAS BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT CONTACT FROM AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL SERVING IN THE U.S. FROM LONDON ON 1 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS WELL ALONG IN ITS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR IRAN. HE HAS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE ISRAELIS STEMMING FROM HIS DEALINGS WITH THEM AS A MILITARY COMMANDER IN IRAN. SUBJECT DENIES THAT HE HAD ANY CONTACTS OR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SHAH SINCE SUBJECT'S DEPARTURE FROM IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE DID ONCE RECEIVE A PHONE CALL FROM EMPRESS FARAH DIBA.

ADDED FOLLOWING COMMENT FROM SDENOM S/1: SUBJECT WAS HURT THAT THE SHAH NEVER REPLIED TO CONTACT HIM IN THE U.S. AND AS A RESULT HAS BECOME BITTER TOWARD HIM. ACCORDING TO SDENOM S/1, SUBJECT WAS NOT RECEIVING ANY FUNDS FROM THE SHAH OR THE SHAH'S FAMILY. END DISSEM.

ALL DIRECTOR 507357 SECRET

FILE: 201-106171
ET

FWW 04 98 DRV9 -1. ALL SECRET.

20 SEP 79

SECRET 200219Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 517075.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, GENEVA.

UNINTL AUSA FORRES

REF: TDFIED-315/15022-79 (DIRECTOR 512112, NOV 51NT)

1. SEPTEMBER 1 (P/1) (IDEN A) IN LATE AUGUST AND US MILITARY CONTACTS THAT HE DESIRED MEET WITH P/1. P/1'S MESSAGE WAS THAT HE WANTED TO TRAVEL TO PARIS. BAKHTIAR AND WISHED TO BE CERTAIN HE COULD TRAVEL WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS HERE. THIS LED TO HIS THAT BAKHTIAR HAD REQUESTED HIM TO TRAVEL TO PARIS SO THAT TALK TO HIM ABOUT ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH P/1. P/1 EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. P/1 EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS THEN FRIEND AND CONFIDANT OF BAKHTIAR AND HAD A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BY VIRTUE OF IDEN B.

2. TWO ADDITIONAL MEETINGS WITH P/1 HAVE BEEN HELD. ONE WHICH RESULTED IN REF DISSEM. WE HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST P/1 WITH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM SO THAT HE CAN TRAVEL. AND HAVE ADVISED HIM THAT IF BAKHTIAR WISHES CONVEY MESSAGE OR INFO TO U.S. GOVERNMENT HE MAY DO THIS THROUGH P/1. HE HAS BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE SECRET REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD SUCH COMMUNICATIONS AND WILL EXPRESS THE SAME UPON BAKHTIAR. P/1 HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT REQUIREMENTS AND WILL BE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE: STATE OF BAKHTIAR'S FINANCES; INFO ON HIS CONTACTS INSIDE IRAN; RELATIONSHIP WITH GEN JAV; MEMBERS AND DETAILS HIS IMMEDIATE CIRCLE, INCLUDING AVAD ADAMIR; BAKHTIAR'S VIEWS ON ASSORTED INTERNAL MATTERS.

P/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL PARIS LATE THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT WEEK. WILL STAY THERE APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. IF PARIS OR TEHRAN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR P/1, PLEASE PROVIDE PRIORITY.

4. FILE: 231-962615. RVN 155200 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

20 SEP 79

SECRET 200107Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 517145.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, GENEVA.

UNINTL AUSA FORRES

DIRECTOR 517075

1. IDEN A: GEN MOREFATEB RAFFI, FORMER CHIEF OF EMPASSY SECRETARIAT WASHINGTON. IDEN B: HIS SON WHO IS MARRIED TO BAKHTIAR.

FILE: 231-962615. RVN 155200 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET 201344Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54260

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS.

WNINTEL AJAJA

REF: DIRECTOR 517075

1. PARA TWO REF REQUIREMENTS COVER OUR INTERESTS. EFFORTS IN IRAN, WOULD SUGGEST SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON TRIBAL CONTACTS AND THOSE WITH ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY.

2. NO FILE. RMW 20SEP99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
SECRET

SECRET 180720Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 534442.

TO: PARIS INFO LONDON, GENEVA, TEHRAN, FR/WASHINGTON.

WNINTEL AJAJA

REF: A. DIRECTOR 521262 (NOT SENT/NEEDED TEHRAN, FR/WASH)
B. PARIS 12594 (NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON, GENEVA)

1. SDPEPPER/1 WAS MET AND DEBRIEFED ON 5 OCT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE. HE HAD VISITED BAKHTIAR IN PARIS 25-28 SEPT AND GENERAL JAM IN LONDON 29 SEPT-1 OCT. IN SUM, HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH BEING DISSEMED WASHINGTON IN PART IN MEMO FORMAT.

BAKHTIAR ACCEPTED P/1'S ROLE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN HIMSELF AND REACTION. BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGE TO US WAS THAT HE RUNS A SHOTSTRING OPERATION WHICH IS NOT GOING TO GO ANYWHERE UNLESS HE RECEIVES FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FROM THE U.S. HE IS STILL IN THE PLANNING STAGE BUT EXPECTS TO HAVE ALL DETAILS READY IN ABOUT FIVE MONTHS, AT WHICH TIME HE WISHES TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR DIRECT DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HIS MOVEMENT AND HIS COUNTRY WITH USG OFFICIALS. (HE CONFIDED TO P/1 THAT IF HE DOES NOT OBTAIN U.S. ASSISTANCE, HE WILL PROBABLY TURN TO THE GULF ARAB STATES FOR AID.)

BAKHTIAR'S OFFICE IN PARIS CONSISTS OF HIMSELF, DR. YNU ETTEBAR, DR. ABDOR RAHMAN BOROUHAND, AND THE DAUGHTER OF FORMER SAVAK CHIEF PAKRAVAN ACTING AS A SECRETARY. IN LONDON HE WAS GEN JAM WORKING ON MILITARY AFFAIRS ASSISTED BY GEN MOHSEN MOBASSER, A FORMER COMMANDER OF POLICE, AND AMIR HOSEIN AMIR-PARVIZ, NOW A LONDON BUSINESSMAN. BAKHTIAR HAS HAD CONTACT WITH NUMEROUS OTHERS, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MUJAHEDDIN, BUT THE KEY INDIVIDUALS ARE THOSE NAMED ABOVE. BAKHTIAR SAID MANY SPEAK IN HIS NAME BUT WITHOUT HIS AUTHORITY. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS NO PEOPLE ON THE GROUND

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 534442 S E C R E T
IN IRAN, BUT IS WORKING ON IT.

WHILE IN LONDON, IN ADDITION TO SEEING GEN JAM P/1
CALLED ON GEN MOTAZED, FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. MOTAZED
IS A VIRTUAL RECLUSE LIVING UNDER POOR CONDITIONS AND DESCRIBED
BY P/1 AS A SHADOW OF HIS FORMER SELF.

2. PER REF B, P/1 SAID THAT BAKHTIAR HAD BROKEN CONTACT
WITH JAVAD ALAMIR SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE BECAUSE ALAMIR WAS "A BAD
PERSON". P/1 WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY GEN TARIRI-ALI. HE SAID
THAT IN THE TIME HE SPENT WITH BAKHTIAR, WHICH WAS AT LEAST A
TOTAL OF 36 HOURS, NOBODY MENTIONED ORGANIZATION CALLED NATIONAL
UNION.

2. FILE 261-962615. RVW 16OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#6382

4

21 SEP 79

REF T 221922Z SEP 79 STAFF

GENL DIRECTOR 5176200

TO: INFO GENEVA

WANTTEL J 241 AJAJA

REF: TEHRAN 54242 (NOT NEEDED GENEVA)

1. IDENTITIES REQUESTED ARE GENEVA STATION OFFICER
MR. JOSEPH I. SALTSMAN (S) AND AIDE TO BAKHTIAR ABDOL KAH
BOURDAND (S).
2. RELAYING GENEVA 48721 TO YOU FOR INFO AND INCLUDING
TEXT OF DIRECTOR 522244 BELOW. THESE ARE THE PERTINENT
MESSAGES ON THIS TOPIC. ALTHOUGH IN BEGINNING THERE WAS PROBABLY
REASON TO SPARE YOU THE EXCHANGES THAT WENT ON TO BRING ABOUT
THIS CONTACT, WE ARE REMISS IN NOT HAVING BROUGHT YOU INFO
IT SOONER. WILL DO OUR BEST TO SEE IT DOESN'T HAPPEN AGAIN.

3. FOLLOWING TEXT DIRECTOR 522744, 23 AUG 79, FYI:

"1. HQS WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE WITH GENEVA AND PARIS
STATIONS THE POSSIBILITY OF USING GENEVA OFFICER (S) TO
PENETRATE THE ENTOURAGE OF SPAHPOUR BAKHTIAR (S) IS
PARTICULARLY SUITED TO THIS ASSIGNMENT AS HE IS PERSONALLY
ACQUAINTED WITH MANY OF BAKHTIAR'S SUPPORTERS.
2. FOR EXAMPLE, (S) IS IN PARIS SUMMER HOME OF
BAKHTIAR'S PRINCIPAL LIEUTENANTS. (S) WAS BORN IN GENEVA
AND (S) WAS CO-ED IN GENEVA. HE WOULD BE PRIME CANDIDATE FOR
CONTACT BY (S)."

3. HQS SUGGESTS THAT THROUGH CLOSE COORDINATION
THE PARIS STATION (S) SHOULD BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY AND
MEMBERS OF BAKHTIAR'S ENTOURAGE. IF (S) ABLE TO ESTABLISH
DIRECT CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR, SO MUCH THE BETTER. (S) SHOULD
BE ADVISED OF DANGER LAST SENTENCE WAS RECORDED PRIOR
(S) VISITING PARIS).

2 DIRECTOR 317522 S A C R A T

4. FYI: INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US I DI 2. THE
VARIOUS IRANIAN ARMY OR UNIFORM SUPPORT FOR THE
HAVE LITTLE HARD INFORMATION ON THESE ACTIVITIES. THE
INTEL (S) ABLE TO DEVELOP WOULD BE WARMED UP.

5. PARIS: EDS ASSUMES PARIS WOULD BE ABLE TO
SOME ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING WHERE BAKETIAR'S
TAKING IN PARIS.

7. WHITE ADDRESSES COMMENTS ON TIMELY BASIS

221-212149. RVW-23 SEP 99 DIA DGC 1 A C R A T

18 SEP 99 32

111533Z SEP 99 STIFF

TELETYPE 221. SECTION 1 OF 2

2 DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, TEHRAN

NINTEL RUMAT AJAJA SDSTAY

EPS: A. DIRECTOR 302241
B. PARIS 11937 322 493

1. GUNION MET SDSTAY IN PARIS ON 6 AND 7 SEPTEMBER.
INITIAL CONTACT MADE ON 5 SEPTEMBER BY INTERNAL (HOUSE) PEOPLE
AT PARIS SEPARATION WHERE HE STAYING. THE (A) NO OTHER PEOPLE
CONTACT. AT FIRST FACE-TO-FACE MEETING, HE SAID HAD TOLD NO
OR MEETING. NOT EVEN BAKETIAR. HE WAS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR
ON 6 SEPT BUT ON 7 SEPT TERTIARY SESSION WAS HELD IN TEHRAN.
GUNION'S ORIGINAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SDSTAY WAS IN FARSI, BUT LATER
CONVERSATIONS WERE IN FRENCH. SDSTAY FLUENT. HE
IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED GUNION NAME AND WAS DELIGHTED TO
CONTACTED.

2. SDSTAY SAID THAT DURING BAKETIAR PREMIERSHIP HE WAS
LIAISON WITH KHOMENI AND WAS FORCED TO LEAVE WHEN BAKETIAR
GOVERNMENT FELL. HE SAID THAT BAKETIAR HAS FRENCH POLICE
PROTECTION BUT HE, SDSTAY, DOES NOT FEAR ASSASSINATION
ATTEMPT. HE HAS BEEN IN FRANCE SINCE FEBRUARY 79 WITH
AND YOUNG SON WHO LEFT IRA WITH HIM. TWO ELDER DAUGHTERS
WERE ALREADY IN UNIVERSITY IN PARIS AND SON IN UNIVERSITY OF
LAUSANNE. HE HAS VILLA AT CANNES AND HAS LIVED THERE SINCE
FEBRUARY.

3. SDSTAY WAS TOLD THAT GUNION CONTACT WAS OFFERED AT
NOT PERSONAL, BUT CONTACT IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO SUPPORT. HE
TOLD THAT USG IRANIAN POLICE WERE RECEIVING HIGH LEVEL INFO
AND THAT INFORMATION WAS WANTED TO WIN AND ACTIVITY OF ALL
POLITICAL GROUPS. HENCE THIS APPEAL TO HIM.

4. SDSTAY, WHO DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS BAKETIAR COUNCIL
AND POLITICAL STRATEGIST, SAY THAT HE AND BAKETIAR
ANALYZED IRANIAN SITUATION IN TERMS OF ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

REF ID: A3721 S E C R E T
THOSE WHO WOULD OPPOSE BAKHTIAR REGIME
RE:

A. RELIGIOUS LEADERS (I.E. KHOMENI) WHO WANT TO INTEGRATE
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS INTO THEIR OWN
HANDS. THEIR VISION IS SIMPLY DICTATORSHIP.

B. RELIGIOUS FANATICS SUCH AS KHALEH;

C. BEE TUDER;

D. FEDAYIN-KHALL WHO ARE CONTROLLED BY MOSCOW, AND;

E. MOJAHIDIN-KHALL WHO ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY
MOSCOW BUT ARE MARZIST.

5. ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SUPPORTERS OF BAKHTIAR INCLUDE:

A. ALL NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS EXCEPT SANJABI AND
4 OR 5 OF HIS CLOSE FRIENDS. SANJABI REFUSAL OF SUPPORT IS DUE
ON JEALOUSY STEMMING FROM FACT BAKHTIAR RATHER THAN HE WAS
NAMED AS PRIME MINISTER.

B. FORMER MILITARY LEADERS WHO SUPPORTED SHAH. THEY HAD
HOPED FOR A RESTORATION OF MONARCHY BUT NOW REALIZE THIS IS
IMPOSSIBLE AND SEE BAKHTIAR AS THE BEST POSSIBILITY FOR
RESTORING ORDER IN IRAN;

C. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SUCH AS JEWS, ASSYRIANS AND
ARMENIANS;

D. ALL OF THE WEALTHY LANDOWNER CLASS. THE TROUBLE
FAMILIES;

E. THE SMALL MERCHANTS, THE BAZARIS;

F. MANY RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS SHARIAT-MADAR (THEIR
JEOMI AND SHIRAZI FROM MESHEH), KRAHALATI (SHIRAZI) AND NAJAFI
MARACHI (QOM). THESE INFLUENTIAL MULLAHS BELIEVE BAKHTIAR
IS IN THE MOSQUE AND NOT IN POLITICS.

REF ID: A3721 S E C R E T

MOST KURDS EXCEPT THOSE UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE;

THE KHUZISTAN ARABS DON'T ESPECIALLY LIKE BAKHTIAR
WOULD MORE WITH ANYONE AGAINST KHOMENI.

I. A MAJORITY OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS ARE UNDER COMMUNIST
OR KHOMENI INFLUENCE BUT WORKERS IN KHUZISTAN AND LISABAN
SUPPORT BAKHTIAR;

J. ALL TECHOCRATS;

K. TRAPPS - THE ONLY TWO WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO BE
IMPORTANT ARE BAKHTIARI AND QASHQALI. THERE ARE NO RELIGIOUS
FORCE DO NOT SUPPORT KHOMENI. BAKHTIAR HAS SUPPORT OF HIS
TRIBE AND QASHQALI ARE AWAITING APPEARANCE OF SOMEONE WHO LOOK
LIKE A WINNER BEFORE TAKING SIDES;

L. SDSNAY DISCOUNTS FARMERS AND ARTISANS AND CRAFTSMEN
(BAZAR WORKERS) AS A POLITICAL FORCE.

6. BASIC PREMISES OF ABOVE ANALYSIS IS THAT IRAN, AS A
DIVERSE MIXTURE OF CULTURES, RELIGION AND CLASSES, CANNOT
GOVERNED AS AN INTEGRATED DICTATORSHIP IN THE MANNER OF THE
SHAH OR KHOMENI. THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL GOVERNMENT WILL BE A
LIBERAL, DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR REPUBLIC FOLLOWING FREEDOM AND
DIVERSITY FOR ALL SEGMENTS OF POPULATION. THIS IS WHAT
BAKHTIAR OFFERS AND TO THIS END HE HAS RAISED HIS STANDARDS
AND IS NOW WAITING TO SEE WHO WILL GO TO HIS SIDE. BAKHTIAR
COMPLETELY REFLECTS POSSIBILITY OR PROBABILITY OF RESTORATION
OF MONARCHY.

7. AT THE MOMENT THERE IS NO BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION. HE
HAS ANNOUNCED HIS WILLINGNESS TO GOVERN AND, WITH HELP OF
COLLEAGUES SUCH AS SDSNAY, IS TRYING TO DEVELOP SUPPORT OF
INFLUENTIAL IRANIS. AMIR PAVI IS WORKING FOR BAKHTIAR IN
LONDON. SDSNAY SAYS THEY ARE IN CONSTANT PHONE CONTACT WITH
IRAN IN EFFORT GATHER SUPPORT. THEY ARE SOLICITING FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FROM ALL CONTACTS, BUT MOST CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE
BEEN SMALL AND THEIR FINANCIAL CONDITION IS POOR. BAKHTIAR
NOT HAVE ANY PERSONAL FORTUNE. BAKHTIAR HAS NO POLITICAL
BY

GEA 43721 SECRET

THESE GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING FRENCH, HE IS DEALING WITH
ENOUGH TO RE HIS PHYSICAL SECURITY BUT NOTHING MORE. THE
TIOAL FORT NO LONGER EXISTS AS AN ORGANIZATION AND BAKHTIAR
NOT WANTING TO RESURRECT IT AS VEHICLE TO POWER. HE SEES
ED FAR MUCH BROADER POWER BASE THAN PROVIDED BY FORMER
TIOAL FORT.

B. BAKHTIAR SEES NO POSSIBILITY OF WORKING WITH PRESENT
GIME. AZARGAN IS HIS FRIEND BUT BAKHTIAR SEES HIM AS WEAK.
ADECISE TOOL OF KHOMENI INCAPABLE OF DEFENDING THE INTERESTS
OF IRAN. MAJOR INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM IS THAT
AZARGAN IS DEEPLY RELIGIOUS AND THUS BELIEVES IN CONCEPT OF
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WHILE BAKHTIAR FEELS IRAN MUST HAVE A SECULAR
REPUBLIC. BAKHTIAR WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN FORTHCOMING
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM OR SUBSEQUENT MAJLIS ELECTIONS ON
ASSUMPTION VOTE WILL NOT BE FREE. SDSTAY WAS NOT AWARE OF
EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR ENTEZAM TO INDUCE IRANIANS TO RETURN TO
IRAN AND DOUBTS THAT ANYONE HAVING IMPORTANT ROLE IN PRE-
REVOLUTION IRAN WOULD NOW RETURN.

BAKHTIAR BELIEVES, FOR REASONS ALREADY STATED, THAT
KHOMENI REGIME CANNOT LAST. AS IT WEAKENS SOMEONE WILL PROVIDE
A "COUP DE FORCE" TO TOPPLE REGIME; THIS WILL BE EITHER THE
SOVIETS OR THE WEST AND SUBSEQUENT REGIME WILL BE MODELED
GOVERNMENTS SPONSORING THE COUP. BAKHTIAR BELIEVES THAT THE
USA, FRG, UK, FRENCH AND JAPANESE HAVE COMMON INTERESTS IN IRAN
AND SHOULD DEVISE A JOINT PLAN TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS THERE.
USA SHOULD LEAD IN FORMULATION OF OBJECTIVES AND GOAL OF PLAN BUT
BRITISH WHO UNDERSTAND IRAN MUCH BETTER THAN THE USA SHOULD
EXECUTE THE PLAN. ACCORDING TO SDSTAY THE QASHGAI ARE THE BEST
TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COUP DE FORCE. NASSER QASHGAI
IS NOW IN USA SEEKING SIGNAL THAT USG WOULD SUPPORT A QASHGAI
UPRISING. SDSTAY WAS RECENTLY IN USA WHERE HE SOUGHT USG SUPPORT
FOR BAKHTIAR VIA BILL MILLER (SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN). SDSTAY BELIEVES USG SHOULD WEAKEN IRANIAN REGIME BY
WITHHOLDING FOOD, MILITARY SUPPLIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
AND BY MOUNTING MAJOR CAMPAIGN TO PUBLICIZE SHORTCOMINGS OF
REGIME IN AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SDSTAY OF OPINION USG SHOULD DO
MUCH TO IMPROVE AND CHANGE SITUATION BY ASKING FRIENDS IN MILITARY
BUSINESS, TRIBES, ETC., TO SUPPORT BAKHTIAR.

PAGE 3 GEA 43721 SECRET

11. ABOVE REFLECTS PERSISTENT IRANIAN VIEW. DESPITE KHOMENI
EXAMPLE, THAT FOREIGN POWERS CONTROL IRAN AND CHANGE CAN COME
ONLY BY WORKING WITH THESE POWERS. SDSTAY ASKED WITH CONCERN
IF PRES REPORTS OF VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION OF IRANIAN ARMY WERE TRUE
AND WAS ASSURED TO HEAR A CONTRARY VIEW. HE FEELS THAT ONLY
IRANIAN PERSONNEL UNDERSTAND IRAN AND THAT IT IS THE ONLY
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION WORTH CONTACTING. SDSTAY WAS GREATLY
IMPRESSED WITH IRANIAN OMNISCIENCE AS DEMONSTRATED BY FACT
HE HAD LOCATED HIM. HE HAD NO IDEA HOW WE HAD DETERMINED HIS
WHEREABOUTS.

11. COMMENT: SDSTAY WAS CHEERED AND ENCOURAGED TO BE
CONTACTED AFTER LONG HIATUS AND FELT WERE EFFECT OF CONTACT
SIGNALLED CHANGE OF POLICY. HOWEVER, HIS BASIC MOOD WAS SOMEWHAT
DISCOURAGED AND DESPONDENT AND DOUBT HE REALLY BELIEVES BAKHTIAR
WILL RETURN TO POWER. AN EXAMPLE WILL SHOW LACK OF COORDINATION
AMONG IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS WITH SIMILAR VIEWS. PARIS
STATION SHOWED GUNION A FRENCH LANGUAGE NEWSLETTER, IRAN LIAISON
OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN. GUNION READ THIS BEFORE SEEING SDSTAY AND
SDSTAY'S PERSPECTIVE SEEMED COINCIDE ALMOST EXACTLY WITH VIEWS
IN THIS NEWSLETTER. AT CONCLUSION OF SDSTAY-GUNION MEET, HE WAS
SHOWN NEWSLETTER AND ASKED IF IT WAS HIS WORK. HE HAD NEVER
HEARD OF IT AND HAD NO IDEA WHO WAS BEHIND IT. HE PHONED
BAKHTIAR TO ASK IF HE KNEW AND BAKHTIAR GUESSED, BUT DID NOT
KNOW. THAT ITS ORIGINATOR MIGHT BE SAHABJAM NAHAVANDI, FORMER
RECTOR OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AND ADVISOR TO SHABANOU.

12. POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE CONTACT WAS DISCUSSED WITH
SDSTAY. HIS ACTIVITIES AND LOCATION DURING NEXT TWO OR THREE
MONTHS WILL DEPEND ON VIABILITY OF BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT. IF
GAIN ADHERENTS AND SUPPORT, HE WILL BE WITH BAKHTIAR IN IRAN
MOST OF THE TIME. IF BAKHTIAR INITIATIVE FOLDS, HE WILL BE
HOME IN CANNES. SDSTAY WAS GIVEN GUNION HOME TELEPHONE NO.
PROVIDE HIS TELEPHONE IN CANNES. 00-18-13 REPEAT 90-113
AND THE NUMBER OF BAKHTIAR'S RESIDENCE IN PARIS, 548-1662
REPEAT 548-92-62 WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED IF IN PARIS. SDSTAY
SHOULD PROBABLY BE RECONTACTED IN A FEW WEEKS TO DETERMINE
BAKHTIAR HAS SUCCEEDED IN LAUNCHING A CREDIBLE MOVEMENT.

13. FILE: 221-212149. RVW 1 SEP
CROSS COMMIT: RELAYED INFO TEHRAN PER R
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15 SEP 75 262

SECRET 141612Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE PARIS 12390 SECTION 1 OF 2.
TO: DIRECTOR INFO GENEVA, TEHRAN
FM: TEL RYBAT AJAJA SDUPBEAT
REF: PARIS 10828

RECENTLY, CRAMBES RECEIVED THROUGH THE MAIL A COPY
OF A PUBLICATION CALLED "IRAN LIBRE", WRITTEN IN FRENCH
(COPY BEING FOUCHE UNDER TM 562894 AND 562895). ENVELOPE
HAD RETURN ADDRESS, ONLY SDUPBEAT'S NAME. THINKING THAT
SDUPBEAT MAY BE IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR (IN FACT WE AT
FIRST THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BAKHTIAR'S PUBLICATION), STATION
DECIDED TO RECONTACT SDUPBEAT. THIS WAS DONE BY CRAMBES AND
AN HOUR-AND-A-HALF MEETING WAS HELD ON 12 SEPTEMBER.

FIRST, SDUPBEAT'S PERSONAL SITUATION: HE HAS
OFFICIALLY BROKEN AWAY FROM PRESENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.
REFUSE TO RETURN TO IRAN WHEN DIRECTED BY THE
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. AS A RESULT, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR
LOOKED HIM OUT OF HIS OFFICE AND ORDERED HIM TO VACATE
HIS APARTMENT AND RETURN CAR, BOTH PROPERTY OF EMBASSY.
SDUPBEAT, TO DATE, HAS REFUSED TO MOVE AND TOLD CRAMBES HE
INTENDS HIRE LAWYER AND PROCEDURE MAY WELL TAKE YEAR OR
MORE TO SETTLE. HE INTENDS RETURN CAR, EVEN THOUGH
STRIPPED OF HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS. SDUPBEAT MAKES IT A
POINT TO ATTEND MANY MILITARY DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS TO
WHICH HE STILL RECEIVES OFFICIAL INVITATIONS SENT TO HIS HOME.
FOR EXAMPLE, ON 12 SEPTEMBER HE AND HIS WIFE ATTENDED
PARTY GIVEN FOR NEW YUGOSLAV MILITARY ATTACHE. CRAMBES
NOTICED THAT SDUPBEAT WAS GIVEN A VERY COOL RECEPTION BY
THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY PROTOCOL OFFICE, BUT OTHER DIPLOMATS
SEEMED TO ENJOY TALKING TO HIM. HE ADMITTED THAT FINANCES
WAS A BIG PROBLEM. EVEN IF HE DOES NOT MOVE OUT OF APARTMENT,
HE WILL HAVE TO PAY RENT, MUST BUY NEW CAR, AND AS HE PUT
T HIS FRIENDS WHO HAVE BEEN HELPING HIM FOR PAST SIX
MONTHS MAY BE GETTING TIRED OF LOANING HIM MONEY. HIS

PAGE 2 PARIS 12390 S E C R E T

TWO OTHERS CONTINUE ATTEND FRENCH PRIVATE SCHOOL, BUT FOR PRESENT DO NOT HAVE TO PAY ANY FEES.

3. SDUPBEAT TOLD CRAMBES THAT HE IS HEAVILY INVOLVED WITH AN IRANIAN EMIGRE GROUP WHICH WHILE NOT YET IN TOUCH WITH BAKHTIAR, MAY EVENTUALLY CONTACT HIM. THIS GROUP RECEIVED SOME FINANCIAL BACKING, ENOUGH TO PUBLISH FIRST ISSUE OF "IRAN LIFE" IN FRENCH (EIGHT-PAGE PUBLICATION PRINTED ON GOOD PAPER, BUT CARRIES NO NAME OR ADDRESS AND ALL ARTICLES ARE UNSIGNED). AND ENOUGH TO PUBLISH SECOND ISSUE SOON WHICH, ACCORDING TO SDUPBEAT, WILL BE PUBLISHED IN FRENCH, ENGLISH AND FARSI. THIS ISSUE WILL INCLUDE AN EDITORIAL WRITTEN BY SDUPBEAT AND ADDRESSED TO THE IRANIAN MILITARY REMINDING THEM OF THEIR OATH MADE TO IRAN AND NOT TO KHOMEINI. ALSO, CASSETTES WILL BE SENT TO SELECTED IRANIAN IN IRAN. THIS GROUP ALSO DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF IRANIAN CONSULATE ON 12 SEPTEMBER IN SUPPORT OF THE KURDS.

4. SDUPBEAT ALSO SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS ACTIVE AND WAS ORGANIZING ITSELF EVEN BEFORE BAKHTIAR'S FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE SOME MONTHS AGO. IT ALSO HAS GOOD CONTACTS INSIDE IRAN AND IS IN DAILY CONTACT WITH SELECTED IRANIAN IN IRAN, INCLUDING SOME KURDS. SDUPBEAT FELT THAT BAKHTIAR DOES NOT HAVE MUCH SUPPORT IN IRAN AND THE SUPPORT, SUCH AS IT IS, COMES ONLY FROM SEGMENTS OF MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASS WHICH LOST THE MOST WHEN THE SHAH FELL. BUT HAS LITTLE SUPPORT EITHER AMONG THE WORKING CLASSES AND EQUALLY LITTLE AMONG IRANIAN MILITARY. IT WAS THE OPINION OF SDUPBEAT AND HIS GROUP, AND IN THIS THEY AGREE WITH BAKHTIAR, THAT KHOMEINI'S REGIME CANNOT LAST. IN ORDER NOT TO BE SUCCEEDED BY A LEFTIST COALITION, TWO THINGS MUST TAKE PLACE. THE ARMY MUST SUPPORT A WESTERN-SUPPORTED MOVEMENT (SDUPBEAT WAS FUZZY ON WHO WOULD LEAD THE MOVEMENT, BUT IN HIS USUAL "MODESTY" ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER). USG'S SUPPORT OF SUCH A MOVEMENT IS ESSENTIAL, NOT ONLY MATERIALLY, BUT ALSO BY REDUCING RELATIONS WITH PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME. SDUPBEAT SAID THAT HIS GROUP DOES NOT ENVISION THE RETURN OF THE SHAH, BUT DOES NOT RULE OUT RETURN OF MONARCHY BY ONE OF

PAGE 3 PARIS 12390 S E C R E T

THE SHAH'S SONS. THE GROUP HAS COMMUNICATED WITH THE SHAH, BUT SO FAR HAS NOT RECEIVED A DIRECT RESPONSE. HOWEVER, SDUPBEAT AND OTHERS MET WITH FORMER AMBASSADOR ZAHEDI ON 14 JULY, WHO GAVE THE GROUP HIS TACIT APPROVAL.

5. WHEN CRAMBES RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER SDUPBEAT OR HIS GROUP HAVE ANY CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS, SDUPBEAT REPLIED THAT HE AND HIS GROUP ARE TOTALLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF SOLICITING SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION. SDUPBEAT ADDED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, HE WAS ASKED TO DINNER BY THE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE (GENERAL KAPALIN), BUT NEVER ACCEPTED. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THIS TURN-DOWN OF KAPALIN'S, HE HAS BEEN INVITED, AND HAD DINNER, WITH THE CZECH MILITARY ATTACHE (COLONEL VALEBRACH) AND THE POLISH MILITARY ATTACHE (LTC DUNAN). BOTH GENTLEMEN WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THE SITUATION IN IRAN, BUT DID NOT (IF ONE CAN BELIEVE SDUPBEAT) PRESS FOR ANY COLLABORATION.

6. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, CRAMBES STRESSED THAT HIS CONTACT WITH SDUPBEAT WAS IN NO WAY TO BE TAKEN AS SUPPORT BY USG, THAT CRAMBES WAS IN TOUCH WITH HIM AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHOSE JOB WAS ONLY TO COLLECT INFORMATION FOR PASSAGE TO HIGHER LEVELS. CRAMBES AGAIN (AS WE HAVE DONE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE PAST) SAID THAT IN ORDER FOR USG TO BE WELL INFORMED, IT NEEDED SPECIFIC INFORMATION OF WHO, WHAT, WHERE AND WHEN, AND ANYTHING LESS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. FURTHERMORE, IF SDUPBEAT WERE UNWILLING TO, FIRST OF ALL, PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION, AND SECONDLY, TO HOLD OUR CONTACTS CONFIDENTIAL, THERE WOULD BE NO SENSE IN MEETING AGAIN. CRAMBES SAID THAT IF WE WERE TO CONTINUE, SDUPBEAT WOULD HAVE TO COME UP WITH NAMES, POSITIONS, ORGANIZATION, ETC. ALSO, NAMES OF THOSE IRANIAN WITH WHOM THEY ARE IN CONTACT INSIDE (UNDERSTANDABLY SDUPBEAT BACKED AT THIS ONE RIGHT AWAY), AND OTHER INFORMATION OF VALUE.

7. NOW, WHAT WOULD WE HAVE TO DO IN RETURN? SDUPBEAT ADMITTED THAT HE IS IN SOMEWHAT TIGHT FINANCIAL STRAITS SEE PARA 2). CRAMBES REPLIED THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF WITHOUT HIS HQS APPROVAL TO ANY FINANCIAL

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SUPPORT, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COME TO SOME UNDERSTANDING.
IN A TYPICAL MANNER, SDUPBEAT AT FIRST SAID THAT HE
CANNOT BE BOUGHT (HE ADDED THAT HE HAD REFUSED HELP OFFERED
BY GRAMBES BEFORE), BUT IT SEEMED OBVIOUS TO GRAMBES
THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT SOME PAYMENT IF OFFERED. THE ONLY
PROBLEM WE ENVISAGE IS THAT SDUPBEAT, WITH HIS VISION OF
GRANDUR, MAY NOT COME CHEAP. CERTAINLY IF HE FEELS THAT
WE WOULD SUPPORT HIS PRESENT LIVING STANDARD, HE WILL BE
DISAPPOINTED WITH WHATEVER WE CAN OFFER.

8. FOLLOWING IS STATION'S RECOMMENDATION AND REQUEST
FOR VIEWS AND EVENTUAL APPROVAL. IF THERE IS AN INTEREST
IN CONTINUING CONTACT WITH THE EMIGRE GROUPS AND SPECIFICALLY
WITH THE ONE THAT SDUPBEAT IS ASSOCIATED WITH, WE PLAN TO
OFFER SDUPBEAT 2,500 FRANCS (CIRCA \$600) A MONTH FOR A
TRIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, TO BE RENEGOTIATED AT THE END
OF THAT PERIOD. IF SDUPBEAT FEELS THIS IS TOO LITTLE, WE
WILL THANK HIM FOR HIS TIME AND LEAVE. PLEASE REPLY BY
03 25 SEPTEMBER.

9. FILE: 201-959108, RVW 13 SEP 99, DRV 09C1, CL
7277, ALL SECRET.

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21 SEP 73

S E C R E T 201-959108 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR S 7420

TO: PARIS INFO CNEV, TEHRAN.

MINTEL AJAJA SDUPBEAT

REF: PARIS 12390

1. BELIEVE ADEQUATE COVERAGE OF IRANIAN WILE OF OSITION
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE IS DEVELOPING AND SDUPBEAT (U/I) HAS NO
ROLE IN OUR PLANNING THUS FAR. THEREFORE WE ARE DISINTERESTED
IN CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT WITH U/I CENTERED ON THIS TARGET.
APPROPRIATE GRAMBES EFFORTS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE PERIODIC
MAINTAINED THAT WOULD PERMIT U/I TO PASS UP WHATEVER INFO
ARISES.

2. THIS OVERSI HAS INFORMED EOS OFFICERS THAT HE PLANS TO
TRAVEL SDUPBEAT AND U/I DURING A PLANNED TRIP TO PARIS IN
SEVERAL WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201-959108, RVW 13 SEP 99 DRV 09C1, ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

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CITE DIRECTOR 493333.

PO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO TEHRAN, PARIS, DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

INTEL AJAJA GNSIGHT GNGRAPH

1. DCD SOURCE HAS PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT IRANIAN GEN. (RET) HASSAN TOUFANIAN, FORMER TOP LIEUTENANT OF SEAR AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, CURRENTLY IN LONDON WERE HE HOLDING MEETING OF IRANIAN MILITARY LEADERS PLOTTING OVERTHROW OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. STATION WILL RECALL THAT SD-PRETEXT/1 HAD INFORMED ADLESICK OF 9 AUGUST MEETING SCHEDULED IN LONDON OF IRANIAN EXILES FROM EUROPE. IMPLICATION WAS THAT REAPPEARANCE OF EX-PRIME MINISTER SHAPOUR BAKHTIAR IN PARIS HAD STIMULATED EUROPEAN-BASED ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES.

2. A SEPARATE SOURCE, SDEETLE/1, TRAVELED TO LONDON ON 5 AUGUST FOR WHAT IS PROBABLY THE SAME MEETING. SDEETLE/1 SAID THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH VARIOUS EUROPEAN EXILES IN AN ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY AGAINST KHOMEINI AND THAT AMONG SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FORMER PM ALI AMINI AND IIAF BRIG GEN MEHDI MIR-HOSSEINI. THIS GROUP WAS PLANNING TO ATTEMPT TO MEET WITH BAKHTIAR CIRCA 10-12 AUGUST 1979.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE QUERY GNGRAPH FOR FURTHER INFO ON ALLEGED MEETING OF IRANIAN EXILES AND FOR CONFIRMATION OF TOUFANIAN'S PRESENCE UZ.

4. NO FILE. RVW 10AUG99 DR D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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LONDON 1728Z

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, TEHRAN.

INTEL AJAJA SDFACE INTEL

LONDON 17051

1. ON 31 AUGUST, SDFACE/1 REPORTED THAT HE HAD IDENTIFIED A LEADER OF BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION IN LONDON. THIS IS TWO-STAR GENERAL NASTIR DJAHANBANY. SDFACE/1 STATED THAT DJAHANBANY WAS SELECTED BY WHAT SDFACE/1 CALLS THE "HOTEL GROUP", DESCRIBED

2. ACCORDING TO THESE SAME SOURCES, BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATIONS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED IN SWEDEN, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, AS WELL AS IN THE U.K. AND FRANCE. BIG MONEY IS BEING MADE. A BANK ACCOUNT HAS BEEN OPENED IN PARIS AND AN APPEAL HAS BEEN MADE TO WEALTHY IRANIAN EXILES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE "HOTEL GROUP". SOURCES THAT FORMER WIFE OF AMBASSADOR ZAHEDI WENT TO SEAR AND ASKED HIM TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE "HOTEL GROUP". SHE REPORTEDLY REFUSED TO MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION.

3. AS RESULT OF MONEY PROBLEM, THE "HOTEL GROUP" HAS BEEN POSTPONED. AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY AVA TO BACK UP ANNOUNCEMENT WITH PROBABLY BEING POSTPONED. FOR SAME REASON, LONDON REPORTED IN REF SPEECHES. HOWEVER, (DJAHANBANY ATTEMPTED TO ATTEND THE PAR SUNDAY) SDFACE/1 HAS ALSO HEARD RUMOR THAT (UNIDENTIFIED) ON 2 AUGUST.) THE CURRENT IRANIAN REGIME ARE TALKING TO OPPOSANTS OF IRANIAN EMBASSY HERE. THIS TALK SOUNDS LIKE AN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT. PEOPLE NEWLY CAUGHT UP IN ORGANIZING ACTIVITY.

4. DESPITE THE MONEY PROBLEM, THE "HOTEL GROUP" IS STILL GOING. A SMALL-SCALE CHARITY PROGRAM WAS ASKED BY ONE OF THE HOTEL GROUP IF HE COULD PROVIDE HIMSELF WAS IRANIAN RESPARATELY TO PROVIDE

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CITE DIRECTOR 542726.

TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO THERAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFACE GNSIGHT

REFS: A. LONDON 18960
B. LONDON 19113

1. IN VIEW OF CONTINUED NEED TO MONITOR EXPATRIATE ACTIVITIES, CONCUR STATION SUGGESTION TO RETAIN SDFACE/1 ON PAYROLL AT 150 POUNDS STERLING PER MONTH THROUGH END OF JANUARY 1980.

2. IN ABSENCE OF RECORD, SINCE OPERATION INITIALLY ONLY REQUIRED HAND HOLDING, KILTIGER BELIEVES COM PROBABLY NOT INFORMED. LEAVE IT TO STATION DISCRETION WHETHER COM SHOULD BE BRIEFED NOW.

3. FILE 201-077924. RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323

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CITE LONDON 170889

TO: DIRECTOR INFO THERAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDPRETEXT INTEL

1. ON 4 SEPTEMBER, ADLESICK ASKED SDPRETEXT/1 ABOUT WHAT HE HAD LEARNED ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF A PRO-BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT WHAT ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN DONE HAD BEEN DONE BY MOJINZADEH AND A FEW OTHERS. THEY HAD BEEN DEVOTING ALL OF THEIR TIME TO ORGANIZING THE YOUNGER IRANIANS IN GREAT BRITAIN. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT THEY ARE HAMPERED BY THE LACK OF FUNDS. HE SAID THAT TO DATE NO BIG GUNS HAD COME FORTH TO DECLARE FOR, OR OPENLY SUPPORT, BAKHTIAR.

2. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT TO DATE ALL THE ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF BAKHTIAR WERE PROPAGANDISTIC IN NATURE AND NOT PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE OR WIDESpread. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE WHEREWITHAL WERE AVAILABLE, BAKHTIAR WOULD BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE SOMETHING BECAUSE HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR BEING A GOOD ORGANIZER. SDPRETEXT/1 WAS UNABLE TO STATE WHETHER THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES IN ENGLAND WAS BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUNDS, OR INDIFFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE IRANIAN COMMUNITY.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY, SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRANIAN MILITARY WAS TOO MUCH UNDER THE THUMB OF THE MULLAS TO ORGANIZE A COUP AGAINST BAZERGAN. HE HAS HEARD THAT MADANI IS GOING TO BE MOVED BACK TO TEHRAN FROM KHUZISTAN, BECAUSE BEING BOTH THE GOVERNOR AND MILITARY LEADER GIVES HIM AN EFFECTIVE BASE TO MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IF HE SO CHOOSES. SDPRETEXT/1 DID NOT THINK MADANI WAS DOING ANYTHING, IT WAS JUST A QUESTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTING WITH CAUTION.

4. SDPRETEXT/1 SAID THAT HE SEES A LOT OF PEOPLE AND MERELY LISTENS. HE IS DEFINITELY STAYING ON THE SIDELINES WITH REGARD TO THE BAKHTIAR BOOMLET. HE SAID THAT, FROM HIS OBSERVATIONS, IF BAKHTIAR ACCEPTS SUPPORT FROM FORMER ASSOCIATES OF THE SHAH, ETC., IT WILL BE A PRACTICAL MISTAKE BECAUSE SHAH IS STILL ROUNDLY DESPISED BY MOST IRANIANS AND FOR BAKHTIAR TO ACCEPT SUPPORT FROM THIS QUARTER WOULD BE A MISTAKE.

PAGE 2 LONDON 17329 SECRET
 5 ON 2 SEPT, ADLESICK AND KILTIGER WENT TO HYDE PARK TO SEE
 THE PRO-BAZETIAR DEMONSTRATIONS. ACCORDING TO SDPRTEXT/1 THERE
 WERE ABOUT 3,000 AT THE DEMONSTRATIONS. ADLESICK AND KILTIGER
 ESTIMATED THAT CROWD MAY HAVE NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND. MOST OF
 CROWD APPEARED TO BE INDIFFERENT. THE HIGH POINT OF THE AFTER-
 NOON CAME WHEN A YOUNG WOMAN WAS RAISED TO SPEAKERS BOX AND BEGAN
 CALLING KEOMINI ALL KINDS OF NAMES. A WOMAN IN THE CROWD REQUESTED
 THAT KHOMENI WAS ALSO AN AMERICAN SPY. (FROM ADLESICK AND
 KILTIGER'S OBSERVATIONS OF THE CROWD, SDPRTEXT/1'S COMMENTS
 MADE ABOVE WERE SUBSTANTIATED.)

6. FILE: 201-215177. RVM 05 SEP 99 DRV D9C1.
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 (#7599)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-716-311

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SECRET 191258Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BERN 39543

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GENEVA, ZURICH, TEHRAN, PARIS.

UNINTEL AXAJA INGT INK

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF INGT REPORT 78594,
 15 SEP 79 SOURCED IRANIAN TRAVELER IN EUROPE WITH DOI
 106/SEP 79; WHICH MAY BE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST
 TO HQS.

"AT THE END OF AUGUST DIFFERENT IRANIANS, WHO HAD
 OCCUPIED IMPORTANT POSTS UNDER THE SHAH, TRAVELLED SINGLY
 TO EUROPE TO VISIT FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES. AMONG THE
 TRAVELERS WERE THE FORMER RECTOR OF TEHRAN POLYTECHNIC SCHOOL
 AND THE MINISTER OF WATER AND ENERGY OFFICE OF AHMAZ;
 DURING THEIR EUROPEAN STOPOVER THEY HAD PERSONAL CONTACTS
 WITH FORMER MINISTER-RESIDENT BAZETIAR. IT IS CERTAIN THAT
 THE FORMER RECTOR OF THE POLYTECHNIC SCHOOL WENT BACK TO
 IRAN."

2. FILE: DEFER. RVM 19 SEP 09, DRV D9B1.
 S COMMENT: RELAYED INFO TEHRAN, PARIS DIRECTOR 518694
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O: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

NINTEL AJAJA SDJANUS

EF: PARIS 9 03

1. MASSA GHAZI, IRANIAN LEFTIST WHO ST I ARCHITECTURAL OFFICE PARIN WHILE IN PARIS AND WHO HQS INDICATED HAD CONNECTION WITH DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH AMERICA. CURRENTLY IS LIVING IN TEHRAN. PER REF, GAZI WENT TO TEHRAN OR HOME MAY BE TO OBSERVE SITUATION THERE BUT NEW PROLONGED HIS STAY.

2. ACCORDING TO GHAZI'S FRIEND, PAUL BALTA LE MONDE NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT, GHAZI HAS DECIDED TO RETURN TO TEHRAN BECAUSE HIS SON IN HIS LATE TEENS INSISTS ON LIVING IN TEHRAN. BALTA TOLD THIS TO GIGRENADE/1 IN MID JULY 1979 WHILE GHAZI WAS IN PARIS. BALTA SAID THAT HE SAW GHAZI IN PARIS AND THEN RETURNED TO TEHRAN AFTER ONLY FEW DAYS.

3. BALTA SAID THAT GHAZI PREFERRED LIVING IN TEHRAN BECAUSE HE WANTED HIS SON TO RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR SCHOOL. GHAZI, HOWEVER, AS HE DESIRED BEING INVOLVED IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES, HE WANTED TO RETURN TO PARIS. BALTA SAID THAT GHAZI CAN RENEW CONTACT WITH GIGRENADE/1 VIA PARIS IF STYMIED.

4. FILE: 201-0960213. RVW 24 SEP 99 RV 3.1

OS COM ST: DELAYED INFO T ERAN PER DIR 5122

N C
BT
9563

2 SEP 79

E C R E T 221422Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE PARIS 12539

O: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN. POKN.

NINTEL AJAJA SDJANUS

REFS: A. TEHRAN 55879 (NOT NEEDED BONN)
B. TEHRAN 55855 (NOT NEEDED BONN)

1. ON 12 SEPTEMBER SDJANUS/38 SAID HE JUST RETURNED FROM TURKEY WHERE HE HELPED EXFILTRATE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SAVAK FOR TEHRAN. GENERAL FA R N I A N F A P. SDJANUS/38 SAID THERE ARE STILL A FEW SAVAK OFFICERS IN HIDING IN TEHRAN BUT THE BAT LINE USING KURDS IS STILL WORKING WELL. HE PLANS ANOTHER TRIP TO TURKEY IN SEVERAL WEEKS.

2. SDJANUS/38 HAS NOT YET CONTACTED HIS COLLEAGUES CONNECTED WITH BAKHTIAR GROUP BUT SAW FNU TIA B A T A B A I. WHO PROTECTOR OF BAKHTIAR'S LAWYER. TABATABAI LEFT SDJANUS/38 WITH IMPRESSION BAKHTIAR GROUP ON DEAD CENTER AND THEY "HOPING" FOR SUBSTANTIAL AID FROM USG TO OVERTHROW KHOMEINI, OTHERWISE WITHOUT US SUPPORT, BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT DEAD.

3. STATUS SDJANUS/38'S HOUSE REVIEWED AGAIN AND HE STILL WANTS SETTLE MATTER ASAP. SAID HE PERHAPS RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENT SITUATION BY ASKING US TO STOP PAYMENTS. HAD STOPPED, OF COURSE, THAT WE WOULD PAY HIM DIRECTLY. WITHOUT COMPLICATIONS. IN PARIS. PRESTERAU EXPLAINED WE DEALING WITH ANOTHER U.S. AGENCY AND WE DO NOT WISH TO ENDANGER HIS SECURITY. SDJANUS/38 TRANQUIL AND AGREED RECEIVE CHECK FOR TOTAL AMOUNT STILL OWED HIM PER REF. PLEASE OBTAIN CHECK AND POUCH TO PARIS. IF THERE ANY WAY WE CAN GIVE US DOLLARS, HE WOULD PREFER IT TO RIALS.

4. COULD TEHRAN PLEASE OBTAIN NAME OF MRAG ADMIN OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTER SO THAT SDJANUS/38 CAN ADVISE HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW WHO TO CONTACT. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO WRITE SHORT LETTER TO THE ADMIN OFFICER ASKING FOR A FINAL DETAILED ACCOUNTING. CAN STATION PASS THIS LETTER (WHICH WE WOULD POUCH TO YOU) TO THE ADMIN OFFICER? PLEASE ADVISE.

37

CITE DIRECTOR 521399.

WNINTEL AJAJA SD:JANUS

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1957 594 595

2. HQS DESK CARDS INDICATE SUBJECT WAS CHIEF OF TEHRAN SAVAK OFFICE IN APR 75 AND HAD BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. SUBJECT WAS SELECTED AS AN ASSASSINATION TARGET BY QAZVIN TERRORIST. NO FURTHER HQS INFO AVAILABLE.

3. FILE: 201-962197. RVW 25SEP99 DRV D96.1 ALL SECRET.
SECRET
BT
#9861

SECRET
#3539

11 AUG 79

SECRET 110536Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 493295.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

NNINTEL AJAJA SDR00F

REF: PARIS 11450

1. CHAHLLA KIA ASSIGNED 201-962245. ONLY TRACES SOURCED TO PAST PARIS CABLES. DFOB: CIRCA 1943, TEHRAN, SECOND SECRETARY IRANIAN EMBASSY, PARIS. WORKS IN CONSULAR SECTION ON IRANIAN STUDENT AFFAIRS. (PARIS 87080, 23 MAR 78). IRANIAN EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER KNOWS SEVERAL AMERICAN DIPLOMATS (PARIS 96756, 5 MAR 79).

2. CONCUR STATION PLANNING OUTLINED REF

3. FILE: 201-962245. R/W 8 AUG 99 DRV 9C.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET

11 AUG 79

514

SECRET 110537Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 493297.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

NNINTEL AJAJA SDR00F

REF: PARIS 11418

1. WHILE DEFER TO TEHRAN RE REF LEAD, WE BELIEVE WE NEED BETTER ASSESSMENT SDR00F/1'S (C) ID BROTHER'S ACCESS TO PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE BEFORE SETTING UP CONTACT IN TEHRAN. BELIEVE BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOR PARIS AT THIS TIME IS TO ATTEMPT SEE R/1'S PURPOSE OF BROTHER WHEN HE RETURNS PARIS IN NOVEMBER WITH PURPOSE OF NEED TO DETERMINE ACCESS AND IF HE HAS ACCESS TO NEEDED INFORMATION, BEGIN DEVELOPMENT/ VETTING PROCESS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO OUR TURNING OVER TO TEHRAN STATION FULLY RECRUITED AND TESTED ASSET.

2. THERE ARE NO HQS OR TEHRAN TRACES RE IDEN.

3. WE CONTINUE APPRECIATE PARIS' EFFORTS AGAINST IRANIAN TARGET AND ARE GRATEFUL FOR AGGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAM BEING PURSUED.

4. FILE: 201-0083145. R/W 10 AUG 99 DRV 9C.1 ALL SECRET

SECRET

21 SEP 79
SECRET 2014027 SEP 79 STAFF
CITE PARIS 12540

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

1. ON 18 SEP SDROOF/1 CONTACTED PRT TEHRAN AND REQUEST MEETING. DURING 19 SEP SESSION, SDROOF/1 SAID THAT HIS CLOSE FRIEND AND RELATIVE, LT. GENERAL SIAVOUCH BEHZADI, IS NOW IN PARIS. BEHZADI ESCAPED FROM IRAN ABOUT 2 MONTHS AGO AND WORKED HIS WAY THROUGH TURKEY. HE IS NOW "HIDDEN AWAY" AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO REACTION. SDROOF/1 INQUIRED IF WE WERE INTERESTED IN TALKING TO HIM. FI: GENERAL BEHZADI IS RELATED TO SDROOF/1 THROUGH MATERNAL SIDE OF FAMILY.

2. IN ADDITION, SDROOF/1 SAID THAT HIS NIECE GHALLA SIA DEPARTED PARIS ON 16 SEP FOR TEHRAN.

3. REQUEST FOR AND TEHRAN STATION TRACES ONE GENERAL BEHZADI AS WELL AS EXPRESSION OF OPS INTEREST. ACCORDING TO SDROOF/1 GENERAL BEHZADI SPEAKS ENGLISH AND SOME FRENCH AND PARIS STATION TRACES BEHZADI.

4. FILE # 201-0085145. RVW 20 SEP 79 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET
#2542

SECRET 251830Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 520403.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDROOF

REF: PARIS 12540

1. ONLY TRACES WE HAVE ON SUBJECT REF IS PROBABLE IDEN SIAVOUCH BEHZADI, DESCRIBED IN 1959 AS LIAISON OFFICER (PROBABLY BETWEEN ARMY AND SAVAK) TO WHOM SAVAK IDENTITY CARD ISSUED AT REQUEST OF ARMY JUDICIAL SECTION.

2. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DEBRIEF OF BEHZADI WITH GOAL OF SECURING SUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA, WORK HISTORY, LEVEL OF ACCESS TO TARGETS OF INTEREST AND WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE TO ALLOW US TO LEVY MORE SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL AND FI REQUIREMENTS.

3. FILE: DEFER. RVW 24 SEP 79 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT

#7987

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976. 501-358

6 OCT 79 01 09Z

SECRET 052100Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUG

FROM BRUSSELS 7044

TO WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN

INFO: NE/IRAN INFO F/BNL/B

SUBJECT: UNINTL INTEL AJAJA SDPRAWN

MEETING: SDPRAWN/1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT 3 OCTOBER

A. P/1'S FORMER BRUSSELS COLLEAGUE AMIN KARDAN WHO WAS ASSIGNED PARIS HAS BEEN RECALLED TO TEHRAN. P/1 SPOKE OF WITH KARDAN AND SAID RECALL WAS SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTED, BUT SAID THOUGH HE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE REASSIGNED OVERSEAS, HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN ARE STILL IN EUROPE BECAUSE CHILDREN ARE ATTENDING SCHOOL. PER P/1, KARDAN PLANS TO LEAVE FAMILY IN EUROPE UNTIL HE IS REASSIGNED.

B. P/1 SAID HE LEARNED FROM FRIENDS THAT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS SENDING SECURITY TYPES TO EMBASSIES TO MONITOR DIPLOMATS' ACTIVITIES. P/1 SAID THEY EASILY RECOGNIZABLE BECAUSE THEY USUALLY STAND AND APPEAR OUT OF PLACE AT EMBASSY. P/1 COULD NOT CONFIRM SECURITY TYPE HAS ARRIVED BRUSSELS. DOES NOT HAVE ANY INDICATION IRANIAN GOVT HAS SENT SUCH INDIVIDUALS OVER SEAS.

C. SHAHOUR BAKHTIAR HAS ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT IRANIAN KING IN BELGIUM (THOUGH NOT P/1) FOR SUPPORT. P/1 EXPLAINED BAKHTIAR NOT LOOKING FOR MONEY AS HE RECEIVING FUNDS FROM SHAH BUT WANTS MORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT. P/1 UNAWARE OF BAKHTIAR'S FUTURE PLANS ARE.

D. MEHDI CHAMRAN, NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, HAS LONG-TIME IS WITH PLO. PER P/1, CHAMRAN SPENT TEN YEARS BEFORE REVOLUTION IN PLO MILITARY CAMPS IN MIDDLE EAST BEFORE RETURNING TO IRAN AFTER SHAH DEPOSED. P/1 LABELLED HIM LEFTIST, BUT COULD NOT SAY HIS POWER BASE OR RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMENI. P/1 DID NOT KNOW CHAMRAN'S BROTHER, MOSTATA.

11 SEP 1979

SECRET 1101Z SEP 79 STAFF

PARIS 1236

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

TEL RYB AJAJA

PARIS 7827

1. HAMDAD AMIN KARDAN (201-957081) COUNSELOR
STER OF IRANIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS, DEPARTED PCS FOR
PARIS EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979. SINCE MAY, CRAMBES HAD
GENERAL SHORT CONTACTS WITH HIM, BUT KARDAN WAS UNWILLING
ENTER INTO ANY SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION AND REFUSED TO
HAVE ANY LONG MEETINGS. HE DID CALL CRAMBES PRIOR TO
S DEPARTURE TO SAY GOODBYE. HE SAID THAT HIS FAMILY
WOULD NOT RETURN AND WILL REMAIN IN BRUSSELS FOR THE
TIME BEING. CRAMBES ASKED THAT KARDAN LET CRAMBES KNOW
IF HE SHOULD RETURN TO PARIS OR ANOTHER WESTERN CAPITAL.

2. FILE: 201-957081. RVW 11 SEP 79, DRN D901, C

SECRET
SECRET

EXILED OPPOSITION

TEHRAN STATION.

IN SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER, SDROTTER/4 SAID THAT BAKHTIAR WAS SOLICITING HIS SUPPORT. R/4 SAID HE HAD RECEIVED MESSAGES (NUMBER NOT SPECIFIED), DELIVERED BOTH IN WRITING AND ORALLY. R/4 DID NOT IDENTIFY THE PERSON OR PERSONS WHO DELIVERED THE MESSAGES. HE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR OFFERED IMMEDIATE, UNLIMITED FINANCIAL SUPPORT. R/4 SAID HE HAD NOT REPLIED TO BAKHTIAR'S MESSAGES. WE SAID WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT MIGHT BE BROKE AND ABOUT TO COLLAPSE, AND R/4 SAID HE ALSO DOUBTED THAT BAKHTIAR HAD THE RESOURCES HE CLAIMED.

HQS AND OTHER STATIONS.

1) THERE WAS DIRECT CONTACT WITH GENERAL JAM IN LONDON, PROBABLY IN SEPTEMBER. THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN THAT THIS WAS A ONE-TIME INTERVIEW, WITHOUT ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR FUTURE CONTACTS, BUT THIS IS NOT RECALLED WITH CERTAINTY. DETAILS OF JAM'S REMARKS ARE ALSO NOT RECALLED, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE SAID HE WAS AVOIDING, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, ANY COMMITMENT TO BAKHTIAR. IT IS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT CERTAIN, THAT HE SPOKE OF HIMSELF AS A POSSIBLE OPPOSITION LEADER IN HIS OWN RIGHT.

2) SDPEPPER/1 IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN REPORTING ON THE BAKHTIAR GROUP WITHOUT BAKHTIAR'S KNOWLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT P/1 PROVIDED THE REPORTING ACCORDING TO WHICH BAKHTIAR WAS ALMOST BROKE AND HIS MOVEMENT ABOUT TO COLLAPSE. NO OTHER INFORMATION ON P/1 IS RECALLED BEYOND THAT CONTAINED IN THE TELEPOUCH SEEN IN EARLY MARCH.

3) SDSLIPPERY/1, THE LEBANESE BUSINESSMAN IN PARIS, REPORTED IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER THAT AN OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION WAS BEING CREATED IN PARIS BY REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, MUJAHEDIN,
FEDAYAN, AND TUDEH. THE REPRESENT-
ATIVES WERE NOT IDENTIFIED BAKHTIAR
WAS TO BE THE CHIEF OF THE NEW
COMMITTEE, THOUGH EACH CONSTITUENT
ORGANIZATION WAS TO PURSUE ITS OWN
PROGRAM (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).
(SOME OF THIS INFORMATION SEEMED
IMPLAUSIBLE.)

15 SEP 79
SECRET 131728Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 123731

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHENS.

WMINTEL RYBAT AJAJA INTEL SDSLIPPERY

REF: PARIS 12374 (DFA-471)

1. REF WAS OBTAINED BY TIMKEN FROM JAWAD AL-AMIR, SPOKESMAN FOR SHAPOUR BAKHTIAR, OVER LIGHT LUNCHEON SERVED BY SDSLIPPERY/1 IN HIS OFFICE ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1979. SDSLIPPERY/1 INVITED AL-AMIR TO MEET SYMPATHETIC SENIOR OFFICIAL WITH MIDDLE EAST BACKGROUND WHO COORDINATES MATTERS INVOLVING UNITED NATIONS AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT FOR PARIS EMBASSY.

2. DURING LUNCHEON, SDSLIPPERY/1 MADE CLEAR THAT HE SEE COOPERATION BETWEEN HIS OWN SHI'ITE SUPPORTERS IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS AND COORDINATING GROUP CITED REF. ON THE GROUND THAT PALESTINIANS (ARAFAT) WITH SYRIAN BACKING NOW HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER THE LARGE MASS OF UNEMPLOYED AND UNDEREMPLOYED SHI'AS IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS TO DETRIMENT OF LEBANESE UNITY AND NATIONALISM. SDSLIPPERY/1 AND AL-AMIR BELIEVE IRANIAN SECURITY OFFICIAL MUSTAFA SHAHRIAN, WHO IS PALESTINIAN, TO BE AN INSTRUMENT OF ARAFAT. SHAHRIAN HAS BEEN KEY MAN IN ORGANIZING TRAINING AND DIRECTING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S SECURITY APPARATUS. THEREFORE, SDSLIPPERY/1 CONCLUDES THAT ALL THE SHI'AS SHOULD WORK TOGETHER AGAINST THIS KHOMEINI/PLO AXIS ON AS WIDE A FRONT AS POSSIBLE.

3. AL-AMIR TOLD TIMKEN THAT BAKHTIAR WAS NOT IN FRANCE, BUT WAS EXPECTED WEEK OF 10 SEPTEMBER FOR MEETING WITH HEDAYATOLLAH MAHDI IN DAFNIAH OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. SEPARATELY, AL-AMIR TOLD SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT MEETING WOULD BE ARRANGED AT WHICH SDSLIPPERY/1 COULD DISCUSS LEBANESE SHI'AS COOPERATION WITH BAKHTIAR. AL-AMIR TOLD TIMKEN THAT BAKHTIAR TRAVELS ON HIS IRANIAN PASSPORT WHICH WILL NOT EXPIRE UNTIL FEBRUARY 1980.

PAGE 2 PARIS 12373 S E R E T

4. SDSLIPPERY/10 SERVED PRIVATELY TO TIMKEN THAT, SINCE BAKHTIAR'S SON IS A FRECH SECURITY OFFICIAL, THE SON COULD EASILY ARRANGE TO KEEP BAKHTIAR HIDDEN IN FRANCE AT TIME WHEN HE OSTENSIVELY GUT OF COUNTRY. (COMMENT: SDSLIPPERY/1 COULD NOT BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S SON'S POSITION, BUT AS REPORT IN PARIS-11785, EDJANUS/38 SAID THE SON IS A POLICE OFFICER IN PARIS, AND "L'EXPRESS" OF 11 AUGUST 1979 CITED HIM AS AN INSPECTEUR OF POLICE IN THE 13TH ARRONDISSEMENT. ALSO, PER PARA 4 PARIS-12103, UNVIT/1 REPORTED SON WORKS AT UNDERRID. THUS, SON IS SOMEWHERE IN POLICE ESTABLISHMENT, BUT WE ARE UNABLE CONFIRM WHERE EXACTLY.)

5. FILE: 201-0962-27. INDEX AL-AMIR. RVW 13SEP99 DRV

DPC.1.

S E C R E T

BT

#2373

20 SEP 79 12 12

C R E T 201340Z SEP 79 S E A F

E ATHENS 60808

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS, TEHRAN.

INTEL AJAJA INTEL

PS: A. ATHENS 60400 (NOT SELECTED: PARIS)

B. ATHENS 60400 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. FOR TEHRAN: REF IT ADVISED THAT SHOLROLLAH ALAMIR (SUBJECT A) HAS AGREED TO INFORM JENS STATION OF EVERYTHING HE HEARS CONCERNING BAKHTIAR'S PARIS BASED ANTI-KHOMENI ACTIVITIES. IT ALSO ADVISED THAT ALAMIR, AN IRANIAN JOURNALIST WORKING IN PARIS FOR LE MONDE IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF SUBJECT AND BAKHTIAR AND THAT ALAMIR IS IN POSITION TO HELP SUBJECT ADVISED OF BAKHTIAR'S ACTIVITIES.

2. ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1979, SUBJECT PROVIDED FOLLOWING TWO ITEMS OF INFORMATION. THE FIRST (ITEM A) HE SOURCED TO J ALAMIR WITH WHOM HE TALKED BY TELEPHONE MORNING OF 19 SEP. SUBJECT CALLED ALAMIR. SUBJECT REFUSED TO IDENTIFY SOURCE. SECOND BIT OF INFORMATION (ITEM B). HE SAID THAT INFORMATION CAME FROM FRIEND IN TEHRAN WHO IS MEMBER OF IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. FRIEND WAS ON RECENT TRIP TO HOLY CITY OF BOM EXCORT FOR VISITING SUDANESE LEGATION. SUBJECT'S FRIEND SELECTED TO ESCORT SUDANESE LEGATIONARY BECAUSE HE IS ARAB AND WAS TO SERVE AS TRANSLATOR FOR TALKS WITH KHOMENI. FRIEND LEARNED INFORMATION FROM ONE OF ISLAMIC SERVING AT KHOMENI'S RESIDENCE. SUBJECT LEARNED ITEM B DURING TELEPHONE CALL FROM FRIEND IN TEHRAN TO SUBJECT ON 16 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT COULD NOT ELABORATE ON EITHER OF PIECES OF INFORMATION. HE BELIEVES INFO IS RELIABLE. HE WAS NOT ABLE TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS ON THIS INFORMATION BECAUSE THEY WERE USING RELAY PHONES.

3. ITEM A, ALAMIR STATED THAT IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WAS TO BE REPLACED WITHIN NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS.

PAGE 2 ATHENS 60808 E C F T THAT REPLACEMENT WOULD BE
 CIRCA 21 OR 22 SEP (FOREIGN MINISTER) OR AHMED BANI SADR
 EITHER IBRAHIM YAZD (TICIA). SUBJECT DID NOT KNOW HOW
 (ISLAMIC PARTY THE INFORMATION.
 ALAMIR LEARNED THIS HOLY CITY OF QOM, ISLAMIC GUARDS ARE
 ITEM B, AT TACTICS TO BE USED IN SUPPORT OF ANTI
 TRAINED IN GUERRILLA BANISTAN. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ISLAMIC
 REGIME ACTIONS IN ARE ALREADY IN AFGANISTAN SUPPORTING
 GUARDS TRAINED AT FORCES ENGAGED IN OPPOSITION FIGHTING.
 THE AFGHAN ISLAMIC USED BY IRANIAN ISLAMIC GUAR
 INGRESS ROUTE TO AFGHANISTAN FOR FAZL KHAJAN'S RECENT VIS
 IS VIA BALUCHISTAN FOR FAZL KHAJAN'S PURPOSES ON PROBLEMS
 TO BALUCHISTAN WAS ISLAMIC GUARDS ACROSS THE BORDER INTO AFGH
 IN MOVEMENT OF ISLAMIC GUARDS ACROSS THE BORDER INTO AFGH

5. FILE: 2 196264 RVW 20 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1
 SECRET

21 SEP 79 2/72

SECRET 21 SEP 79 STAFF

SITE PARIS 594

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, FR/WASHINGTON.

MINI EL AJAJA FORRES

REF: DIRECTOR 117075

1. JAMAL AL-AMIR TOLD PARIS C/O AND SD SLIPPERY/1 ON
 20 SEPTEMBER THAT GENERAL TARINI ALI HAD ARRIVED PARIS
 19 SEPTEMBER AT REQUEST OF AL-AMIR'S COORDINATING GROUP,
 WHICH NOW CALLS ITSELF THE NATIONAL UNION (KUTIBAH E MELLI),
 TO DIRECT MILITARY PLANNING FOR THE GROUP. AL-AMIR DESCRIBED
 GENERAL JAMAL AS THE MOST POPULAR WITH TROOPS AND GENERAL ALI
 AS THE MOST PROFESSIONALLY RESPECTED OF THE OLD-LINE IRANIAN
 GENERALS. AL-AMIR DESCRIBED ALI AS HAVING BEEN CHIEF OF
 GENERAL STAFF LEADER MOSSKDEGH, LATER AMBASSADOR IN MADRID,
 AND AS HOLDER OF MATHEMATICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEGREES FROM
 UNIVERSITIES IN EUROPE AND U.S.

2. IT WOULD BE USEFUL OPERATIONALLY IF PARIS STATION IF
 SD SLIPPERY/1 COULD VERIFY INFO PARA 1 ABOVE AND DEFINE ALI'S
 RELATIONSHIP TO BAKHTIAR AND AL-AMIR WHO REPRESENTS SELF AS
 GENERAL COORDINATING FIGURE WHOSE CREDENTIALS DERIVE FROM
 EARLY DAYS OF OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH. BAKHTIAR AS FIGURE-
 HEAD, AND JAMAL AND SHARIAT-MADARI AS MEN WHOSE POPULARITY WAS BUILT
 BY AL-AMIR AND OTHERS IN THE OLD OPPOSITION.

3. AL-AMIR HAS NOW MET PARIS C/O, UNDER POLITICAL SECTION
 COVER IN FOUR NAME, TWICE AT MEETINGS BROKED BY SD SLIPPERY/1.
 IN SECOND MEETING, AL-AMIR REFERRED TO POLITICAL SECTION
 CONTACT WITH SOMEONE DURING NEAUFUE LE CHATEAU EXILE AND
 IDENTIFIED MR. WARREN ZIMMERMANN ERRONEOUSLY AS RTACTION COS.
 PARIS C/O CLAIMED MR. ZIMMERMANN AS HIS BOSS, AND CLARIFIED
 THAT HE WAS NOT, WHILE DENYING KNOWLEDGE OF ZIMMERMANN CONTACT
 WITH KHOMINI. WE HAVE, AS YET, NO CONTROL OVER WHAT SD SLIP-
 PERY/1 MAY SAY TO PRINCIPALS (SUCH AS AL-AMIR AND C/O) WHOM HE
 WISHES TO BRING TOGETHER IN ORDER TO BUILD THEM UP TO EACH
 OTHER. SD SLIPPERY/1 SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE DEIFIED ON OUR
 CONTACTS WITH AL-AMIR WHICH HAVE BEEN UNSOLICITED AND MAY NOT

PARIS 22 SEP 99 SECRET
 NEEDED BUT CANNOT DEBRIERS HIM AFTER TRIP SHOULD BE AL-
 Y INDICATION THAT SDSLIPPERY/HAS BECOME AWARE OF THE
 TRY TO DISCOVER WHAT AL-AMIR MAY HAVE SAID ABOUT THEM.

4. FILE: 22 SEP 99 201-962615; 201-962067. RW 21 SEP 99 DRV

SECRET

SECRET UNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
 UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO CONTACT AND ACTIVITIES OF IRANIAN OPPOSITION
 MOVEMENT IN FRANCE (DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

ONE NON-IRANIAN-SHIAITE BUSINESSMAN ABROAD WHOSE
 RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE SPOKE TO
 A MEMBER OF THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT.

THE PARIS COORDINATING GROUP OF IRANIAN
 OPPOSITIONISTS UNDER THE NOMINAL GUIDANCE OF FORMER IRANIAN
 PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR HAS NAMED ITSELF INTIHAD-E-MELLI
 (NATIONAL UNION). THEY PUBLISH A FARSI PUBLICATION CALLED
 IN PARIS ON A WEEKLY BASIS. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR AL-
 BAY, CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL, BAKHTIAR ALL TO BE THEIR
 MILITARY PLANNER, AND HAVE THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL
 AYATOLLAHS IN IRAN. THEY MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH
 EMPLOYEES OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION
 WHO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPORADICALLY INTERRUPT SPEECHES BY
 US. THEY PLAN TO CONTINUE SAESTAGE OF POLITICAL AND
 US BROADCASTS ON AN OCCASIONAL BASIS. THE NATIONAL
 SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-
 DETERMINATION, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BAKHTIAR, FAVORS
 THE STATUS FOR IRANIAN MINORITY NATIONALITIES. THE
 NATIONAL UNION HOPES CURRENT IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER MEDEH
 CAN WILL RESIGN AND RETURN AT A LATER DATE AS THEIR
 CANDIDATE TO HEAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ONCE KHOMEINI IS
 DEPOSED. THEY HAD GNF CONTACT WITH A SOVIET OFFICIAL IN PARIS.
 THEIR ATTEMPT TO GET THEIR PARTY SUPPORT HAS TO NO AVAIL.

SUMMARY:
 1. THE PARIS COORDINATING GROUP OF IRANIAN OPPOSITIONISTS
 MINIMALLY HEADED BY FORMER IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SHAPOUR
 BAKHTIAR AND COMPOSED OF MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL
 FRONT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT, MUJAHEDIN AND FEDAYEEN
 ORGANIZATIONS, HAS NAMED ITSELF THE INTIHAD-E-MELLI (NATIONAL
 UNION). THEY SPONSOR A WEEKLY FARSI LANGUAGE PUBLICATION
 UNENTITLED NAMEH, WHOSE MANAGING EDITOR IS A. A. B. I. / G. S.
 ONE OF NAMEH'S PRINCIPAL ORGANIZERS, IRANIAN JOURNALIST
 AND FORMER TELEVISION PRODUCER JAVAD A. L. - A. M. I. R. IS CURRENTLY
 IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A WORLDWIDE LIST OF POTENTIAL
 IRANIAN SUBSCRIBERS.

TRYING TO LINE UP SUPPORT FOR ITS EFFORTS. THE
 ION HAS ASKED GENERAL TAHIRI A L I, WHO SERVED AS
 CHIEF OF THE IRANIAN ARMY UNDER THE REGIME OF
 MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH, TO BE THEIR CHIEF MILITARY
 ADVISOR. HE CAME TO PARIS ON 19 SEPTEMBER IN RESPONSE TO
 REQUEST. NATIONAL UNION LEADERS CONSIDER GENERAL TAHIRI
 A PATRIOTIC AND BOLD, AMONG OTHERS, A DEGREE FROM
 UNIVERSITY, THE RETIRED GENERAL WHO COMMANDS THE
 100,000 MAN ARMY IN THE ARMY; WHEREAS THEY REGARD
 AN IRANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FAYZULLAH D A M AS THE
 LAR OF THE RETIRED GENERALS. (FIELD COMMENT:
 RDB-315/15877-79, 11 SEPTEMBER 1979, FROM AN OFFICIAL
 SERVICE, WHICH STATES THAT FORMER IRANIAN PRIME
 MINISTER BAKHTIAR AND APPROACHED GENERAL JAM FOR HIS SUPPORT.
 GENERAL JAM DECIDED TO REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES FOR THE
 TIME BEING.)

THE NATIONAL UNION IS IN REGULAR COMMUNICATION WITH
 ENLISTED THE SUPPORT OF AYATOLLAH SAYED KHAMEINI
 I A T. M. A. D. R. I. HASSAN, THE TABATABAEE, Q. O. M. I. AND
 LAH SEYED ABDOLEH, S. P. I. R. A. Z. A. THE NATIONAL UNION IS
 IN CONTACT WITH AYATOLLAH M. O. T. A. H. A. B. I. AND IS OPTIMISTIC
 IN GAINING HIS SUPPORT. AYATOLLAH M. H. A. I. ALSO
 MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH THEM, BUT THEY CONSIDER HIM AN
 OPPORTUNIST WHO WILL BACK THE POLITICAL ELEMENT WHICH SEEMS TO
 BE WINNING AT THE MOMENT. RUHANI IS CURRENTLY A LUKER-
 IN ADHERENT OF KHAMEINI. (SOURCE COMMENT: RUHANI IS
 VASTLY OPPOSED TO KHAMEINI BUT CURRENTLY RELIES ON HIS
 POSITION AS AN OVERT SUPPORTER AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO ATTACK
 THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, PRIMARILY FOREIGN MINISTER ABRAHIM
 A. Z. D. I. RUHANI PRESUMABLY PLACES THE GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING
 TO SUPPORT THE POSITION OF RUHANI'S YOUNGER BROTHER, WHO
 RESIDES IN PARIS, AS PREEMINENT MULLAH OF THE SPIRIT COMMUNITY
 IN EUROPE.)

THE NATIONAL UNION HAS CONTINUING CONTACT WITH A GROUP
 OF EMPLOYEES OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION (NRT)
 WHO, ON 16 SEPTEMBER, CAUSED THE INTERRUPTION OF A KHAMEINI
 SPEECH BEING RELAYED TO ONE OF THE IRANIAN PROVINCES AT 2100
 HOURS, FOR THE THIRD TIME IN A TWO-WEEK PERIOD. THE NATIONAL
 UNION ESTIMATES THAT NINETY PERCENT OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE
 NRT ARE OPPOSED TO THE KHAMEINI REGIME, AND ANTICIPATES NO
 DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING A PLAN FOR THE OCCASIONAL SABOTAGE

FOR RELAYING OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS BROADCASTS
 OF THIS IS A TECHNIQUE WHICH WAS EMPLOYED BY THE
 WHICH PUT KHAMEINI IN POWER. THE NATIONAL UNION
 BOTH KHAMEINI AND THE GENERAL POPULACE WILL VIEW
 ACTIONS AS A SIGN THAT THE OLD REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS
 AGAINST KHAMEINI AS THEY WERE AGAINST THE SHAH.

POLICYMAN, THE NATIONAL UNION HAS NO CONTACTS WITH
 IRANIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (FLO), BUT ITS POLICY
 SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-
 DETERMINATION. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BAKHTIAR, THE NATIONAL
 UNION'S THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY VERSUS OF SEPARATION FOR
 IRAN MINORITY NATIONALITIES. BAKHTIAR FAVORS
 UNION OF THE MINORITIES.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, THE NATIONAL UNION HOPES THAT
 PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN WILL RESIGN
 AFTER A SUITABLE INTERLUDE, BE ABLE TO INFILTRATE FROM ISRAEL
 THE NATIONAL UNION CANDIDATE FOR INSTALLATION AS
 AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO PREPARE ELECTIONS AFTER THE
 FALL OF THE KHOMENI REGIME. THE NATIONAL UNION BELIEVES
 BAZARGAN RESIGNS, KHOMENI WILL REPLACE HIM WITH EITHER
 AN MINISTER YAZDI OR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ADVISOR ABOL HASAN
 I S A D R I.

THE NATIONAL UNION HAS HAD ONE CONTACT WITH A SENIOR
 IRANIAN DIPLOMAT IN PARIS. THE NATIONAL UNION REPRESENTATIVE
 ADVISED THE SOVIET TO PREVAIL UPON THE TUDER COMMUNIST PARTY
 TO JOIN THE COORDINATING GROUP OR, AT LEAST, TO COME OUT
 ONLY IN OPPOSITION TO KHOMENI. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL
 REFUSED, CLAIMING THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NO CONTROL
 OVER THE ACTIVITIES AND POLICIES OF THE TUDER.

2. LCR: FRANCE, PARIS (21 SEPTEMBER 1979). FIELD
 NO: CFA-4723.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT PARIS. SENT TO TEBAN.
 APPROX CLASS S/E/C/R/E/T /WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
 AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
 RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINA-
 TION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
 RVT 210CT99 DRV DDCI BY RECORDING REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
 CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
 BT
 #2899

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

THE DIRECTOR 528726

di LONDON, PARIS INFO TERTIAN.

MI NEEL WALA BUNGLOW INTEL 703

FILE NO. 97A-1766 PARIS 12898 ZRVAHDOV

3. LONDON 11/24

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1. CSWS ARE OBTAINING DISSEMINATION TO MEMBERS OF CERTAIN
 2. MEMBERS OF SUBSTANTIATION FROM A LEADING FRANKS OPPOSITION
 3. WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE IN CONTACT, WHETHER OTHER CONCURRENCE IN
 4. QUEST BEING RESIDING THAT MEETING.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 01-01-99 BY 60322 UCBAW/DSE. 1 ALL SIGNS

11-11-11

57

22 SEP 79
SECRET 2115 72 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12610

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO AHE 3, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA INTEL

REF: A. ATHENS 98808
B. PARIS 12594

1. ULTIMATE SOURCE OF ITEM A PARA 2 REF TOLD PARIS STATION C/O AND SDSLIPPERY/1 ON 20 AUGUST THAT, IN SOURCE OPINION, BAZARGAN WOULD BE THE BEST MAN TO HEAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO REESTABLISH PUBLIC ORDER AND PREPARE ELECTIONS AFTER KHOMEINI FALLS OR IS REMOVED FROM POWER. SOURCE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO PERSUADE BAZARGAN TO RESIGN FROM PRIME MINISTRY AND AWAIT FAVORABLE (TO THE OPPOSITION) EVENTS. C/O ASKED SOURCE WHO KHOMEINI WOULD PUT IN BAZARGAN'S PLACE, WHERE THE LATTER TO RESIGN. AN SOURCE REPLIED PROBABLY NAZDI, POSSIBLY BAKHT SADR. SOURCE COMMENTED THAT NAZI WANTED TO PLAY THE AMERICAN GAME, AND BAKHT SADR MIGHT PROMOTE HIS THEORY OF MONOTHEIST ECONOMICS WHICH, IN A NUTSHELL, IMPLIES DISPOSSESSION OF THE WEALTHY.

2. SOURCE AND SDSLIPPERY/1 CLAIM, PROBABLY CORRECTLY, THAT SOURCE IS IN TOUCH WITH A STEADY STREAM OF IRANIANS COMING AND GOING FROM IRAN AND FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES, SO IT USELESS TO SPECULATE WHETHER ONE OR WHICH ONE OF THEM MAY HAVE PREDICTED BAZARGAN FALL IN TWO OR THREE DAY TIME FRAME. HOWEVER, SOURCE DID SAY THAT MOST RECENT SIGNIFICANT ARRIVAL FROM IRAN, AT BEHES OF NATIONAL UNION, WAS GENERAL TARIHI ALI. PER REF B.

3. FILE 201962067. RVW 21 SEP 99 DAY D9C1.

SECRET
BT
2610

5 Oct 79 05 52Z

SECRET 41734Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12609

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL LITE AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

REF: A. PARIS 12594
B. PARIS 12432
C. PARIS 12373
D. PARIS ENBTAL 026015 OF 17 AUG 79
E. PARIS 97163
F. PARIS 95826
G. PARIS 95824

1. REQUEST FULL TRACES AND ASSIGNMENT 201 AND CRYPT FOR AMIR (AKA DJAWAD ALAMIR) (AKA DJAWAD ALAMIR DAWALLOU) PDOS IRAN, TEHRAN, 5 APRIL 35; CIT. IRAN; OCC. BUSINESS, COMMUNICATIONS ENTREPRENEUR; RES. FRANCE, PARIS, 3 BOULEVARD HENRI IV, SIXTEENTH ARRONDISSEMENT, TEL. 329 66 52; FATHER'S NAME MAHMUD AL-AMIR QADJER OF EMTESEAM-OL-SALTANEE. MOTHER'S NAME MA'SUMA LNU. OF ASHAR-OL-ZAMAN. SUBJECT ATTENDED INSTITUT DUPUIGE IN BRUSSELS, INSTITUT D'ETUDES POLITIQUES IN PARIS; FACULTY OF LETTERS, UNIVERSITY OF PARIS (SORBONNE). SUBJECT SPEAKS FRENCH AND ENGLISH AT LEVEL 4. CLAIMS EQUAL FLUENCY IN FARSI, SPANISH AND GERMAN. SUBJECT IS MARRIED AND HAS FOUR CHILDREN.

2. SUBJECT EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, DATES NOT SUPPLIED: POLITICAL EDITOR, FETRA AT NEWSPAPER; CHIEF EDITOR, JOURNAL DE TEHRAN; PUBLISHER, JAME JAHAN-NEMA, IN HAFTER, THIS WEEK IN TEHRAN; REPRESENTATIVE, ORTF (IRAN); CORRESPONDENT, LE MONDE (PARIS); NEWSWEEK (NEW YORK); ADVISOR ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, PRODUCER, NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO-TELEVISION (NIRT). CURRENTLY: PRESIDENT, TELEPRESS INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY.

3. INFO PARAS 1 AND 2 SUPPLIED BY SUBJECT TO SDSLIPPERY/1 WHO FURNISHED COPY OF PARIS C/O. SDSLIPPERY/1, AT C/O REQUEST, OBTAINED FOLLOWING FROM SDULTIMATE:

2 Nov 79 11 38z

S E C R E T 020040Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 544703.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL AJAJA SDSLIIPPY

REF: PARIS 13009

1. SUBJECT REF ENCRYPTED SDLEADER/1, ASSIGNED 201-963116.
TRACES CONTAINED DIRECTOR 508655, 6 SEP 79.

2. FILE: 201-963116. RVW 01NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT
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1

SECRET 311927Z JAN 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 465989

PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEHRAN, R.I. UT

INTEL BYBAT ALJAN

REF: PARIS 11296

1. POLSKY SLIM ENCRYPTED IDEN A, ASSIGNED 201-963116
AND HAS BEEN ISSUED ONE VICE PDA FOR OPERATION. USED BY SLIM TO
CONTACT AS POSITIVE. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HIS A FIDELITY
CHECKING MANDI ALJAN HAS BEEN ENCRYPTED IDEN

2. REF CASE CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTING AND WE BELIEVE
PARA 7 PROPOSAL WOULD BE FOLLOW THROUGH. MUCH PER LATE
PARIS EFFORTS THIS CASE AND OUR DEVELOPMENT. IN TO INT HERE
WE BEGINNING TO MAKE HEADWAY TOWARD ACQUIRING I SLIP AND ASSETS
IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE WE MUST SOME NOT CAUTION
CONCERNING OUR DEALINGS WITH SLIM. WHO WE LEAD. IN IRAN.
LESS THAN FAVORABLE KNOWN TO OFFICERS AND SERVED TO
WILL NOT RECOMMENDING THAT WE NOT WORK WITH SLIM. COULD INTEREST
PENETR. STATION OFFICER RECOMMENDED THAT WE VERY RISKY
AND THAT IT LIKELY SLIM WAS IN CONTACT WITH ENGRAPHERS IN TEHRAN.
PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE REMAINED HIS TRACTI. COULD
SERVICE. IN SHORT, SLIM COMES ACROSS AS A SURVIVOR. AN
CERTAIN WORLD WHO COULD, WHEN PROFITABLE. SUCCESS. GOES
CONTACT WITH STATION TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE. HIS FLUENCY
IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH US IS TO INCREASE HIS ABILITY TO PROTECT
AMONG HIS LEBANESE CONTACTS AND INCREASE HIS ABILITY TO PROTECT
ARABY PROPER POLITICAL ACTION AMONG THE LEBANESE IN IRAN AND
IRANIAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON AT EUROPE.

3. ACCORDINGLY, IN AGREEMENT TO PARA 7, REF CASE AL. 2
LIEVE PRUDENCE WOULD DICTATE THAT WE PER A MORE CAUTIOUS AND
REF PROPOSAL CALLS FOR. CAREFULLY MONITORING SLIM'S SURROUNDINGS
INFORMATION AS WE TRACK TOWARD ESTABLISHING A TRIP TO IRAN.
IN IRAN. BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO BE PLANNING TO SIS. EARLY
CONTACT WITH THESE ASSETS. CARRYING SLIM. T OF T GA. EARLY

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 485999 SECRET
ON. FULLY AGREE WITH STATING PROPOSAL
AND IT IS ESSENTIAL. KNOWING FO, AND WPA
WILL BE ESSENTIAL. AND AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

4. FILE: 201-2961724 201-2962067

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SECRET 312025Z JUL 79 STAFF

TO DIRECTOR 486047.

: PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEFREN, BEIRUT.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA

TO DIRECTOR 485999

1. IDEN A IS SDBLEPER /1.
IDEN B IS SDBLIMAT /1.

2. FILE: 201-0061724; 201-0962067 RVW 31 JUL 79 DRV D9C.1

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SECRET 180922Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE PARIS 12432 SECTION 1 OF 2

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

RENTAL RYBAT AJAJA SDSLIPPERY

IFS A. DIRECTOR 485999

B. PARIS 11078

C. PARIS 11096

D. PARIS 12269

E. PARIS 12374

F. PARIS 12373

G. PARIS 11096

H. PARIS 11078

1. SDSLIPPERY/1 RETURNED FROM BEIRUT 31 AUGUST; MET C/O 4 SEPTEMBER; LUNCHEON NESSIM KHURI, JOURNALIST WITH PARI-RABIC PAPER AL-MUSTAGBAL, AND HIS FRIEND KENISE MOURAD OF NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR ON 5 SEPTEMBER; MET JAWADH AL-AMIR AND SDSLIPPERY/1 ON 6 SEPTEMBER; SERVED LUNCH TO C/O AND JAWADH AL-AMIR ON 8 SEPTEMBER; MET C/O ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

2. AT 4 SEPTEMBER MEETING, SDSLIPPERY/1 ASKED FOR WASHINGTON REACTION TO HIS PAPER DESCRIBED PARA 7 REF C. SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT WASHINGTON HAD FOUND HIS ANALYSIS GENERALLY SOUND, SO FAR AS THE LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US PERMITTED EVALUATION; THAT C/O WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING WHETHER, WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY OUR POLICY OF AVOIDING ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS AND SEVERE BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH ANTENNAE (AS HE, SDSLIPPERY/1 CALLS THEM) IN THE KEY AREAS OF QOM, NAJJAF, KVICE TEHRAN, ERONE, LYSLISTED REF G) AND BEIRUT, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE CURRENT, POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ AND ADJACENT AREAS WHERE SHI'A COMMUNITIES HAVE POLITICAL ACCESS AND INFLUENCE; AND THAT WE MIGHT BEGIN BY SPONSORING AN SDSLIPPERY/1 VISIT TO IRAN TO ASSESS AND DEBRIEF SDSLIPPERY/1.

PAGE 2 PARIS 12432 SECRET
DATE 1 BROTHER AT QOM, AND SUBJECT REF H. SDSLIPPERY/1 INSISTENTLY ACCEPTED THIS, THEN ASKED WHETHER C/O COULD OFFER SOME ASSISTANCE TO SDSLIPPERY/1 WHO MIGHT BE THE KEY TO OBTAINING HIS BROTHER'S COOPERATION AND WOULD BE USEFUL AS SPOTTER, ELUCIDATOR AND SOURCE OF INTRODUCTION TO KNOWLEDGEABLE IRANIANS RESIDING IN OR PASSING THROUGH PARIS. C/O REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO MAKE HIS FIRST FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO SOMEONE MORE DEMONSTRABLY ABLE AND WILLING TO REPORT USEFUL POLITICAL INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH SDSLIPPERY/1 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT POTENTIAL WAS NOT TO BE DISCOUNTED. C/O DECLINED TO MEET SDSLIPPERY/1 AGAIN DIRECTLY FOR TIME BEING. SDSLIPPERY/1 REPORTED THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO MEET MOURAD AND AL-AMIR, RECOMMENDED THAT HE SET UP C/O MEETINGS WITH THEM. SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID MOURAD, PAUL BALTA OF L'EXPRESS, AND ERIC ROULEAU OF LE MONDE, WERE THE ONLY FRENCH JOURNALISTS WITHIN OPINION MAKING ARTICLES ON IRAN - AND THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT MET BALTA, HE THOUGHT MOURAD MIGHT BE SOFTEST TARGET FROM POINT OF VIEW OF EXTRACTING OR (IN HIS CASE) PLANTING INFO. C/O REPLIED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SDSLIPPERY/1 DEAL WITH MOURAD WITHOUT INVOLVING C/O, POSTPONED RESPONSE RE AL-AMIR, LATER ADVISING SDSLIPPERY/1 THAT HE DID WISH MEET AL-AMIR.

3. SDSLIPPERY/1 ASSESSMENT OF MOURAD REPORTED IN PARA REF D. HE RECOMMENDS THAT SHE, BALTA AND ROULEAU (WHOM HE HAS KNOWN FOR YEARS) BE CULTIVATED AS SECONDARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SDSLIPPERY/1, OF COURSE, WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS WITH OUR MONEY (SEE BELOW) AND COLLECT, FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES, A BY-PRODUCT IN TERMS OF THEIR AVAILABILITY TO HIM AS COBUILT FOR INFO HE MAY WISH TO PLANT.

4. REFSE AND F COVER SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF DISCUSSION WITH AL-AMIR. CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS WASTED DISCUSSING IMAM MUZA AL-SADR BECAUSE MEETING TOOK PLACE DAY AFTER ALITALIA HIJACKING BY SHI'A GROUP. AL-AMIR CLAIMED THAT HIS ORGANIZATION HAD LOCATED MUSA SADR'S MANSERVANT WHO HAD IDENTIFIED MUSTAFA SHAMRAN AS THE LAST MAN TO SEE SADR BEFORE HE WENT TO LEBYON. SDSLIPPERY/1 EXPRESSED CONVICTION SADR DEAD. BOTH AGREED THAT SADR HAD BEEN SAVAK AGENT OF INFLUENCE. AL-AMIR IMPLIED IT MORE LIKELY THAT PALESTINIANS HAD PROBABLY DONE SADR IN AT BEHEST OF KHOMEINY THAN THAT LIBYANS HAD KILLED OR

GE PARIS 12432 SECRET
 PRISONED HIM. IN RESPONSE DIRECT QUESTIONS, AL-AMIR SAID
 E SADR QUESTION WAS OF NO POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN IRAN.
 CAY, AND SDSLIPPERY/1 SAID THAT SADR WAS IMPORTANT TO THE
 BANESE SHIA PRIMARILY BECAUSE HE HAD DISAPPEARED. (SDSLIP-
 RY/1 HAS BEEN A LONGTIME OPPONENT OF SADR.) AL-AMIR PREDICTED
 AT KHOMEINY REGIME WOULD CONTRIVE TO EXPLOIT TRIAL OF HI-
 CKERS TO LAUNCH CANARD THAT SAVAK HAD KILLED SADR, BECAUSE
 COMPANY HAS FOUND OUT THAT THE OPPOSITION NOW KNOW THAT SHAM-
 AN WAS SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN SADR DISAPPEARANCE.

5. DURING PAST TWO WEEKS, SDSLIPPERY/1 HAS OFFERED
 FOR SOCIAL CONTACT FOR C/O WITH LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO
 NESO, WITH RAYMOND EDDIE, AND WITH A FRENCH NEWSMAN WHO
 SDSLIPPERY/1 SAYS IS BEING COURTED BY PLO. C/O HAS DEFERRED
 THESE INTRODUCTIONS AS NOT OF CURRENT INTEREST.

6. AT 11 SEPTEMBER MEETING, SDSLIPPERY/1 REINTRODUCED
 HE SUBJECT OF MONEY BY EXPLAINING THAT SDULTIMATE/1 WAS
 AVERAGE TROUBLE COVERING THE 25,000 TO 30,000 FRANC (5,813 TO
 6,977 DOLLARS) MONTHLY PRINTING COSTS FOR AN ISLAMIC REVIEW
 E DITS IN FRENCH. C/O FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THIS CHALLENGE
 ED SDSLIPPERY/1 TO ENQUIRE AS TO WHAT SORT OF SOURCES IN PARIS, BEIRUT
 XPRIED TO BE GIVEN TO COVER COSTS OF SOURCES IN PARIS, BEIRUT
 MAJAF, AND QOM IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY'S COST OF LIVING,
 SECURING VALUE OF DOLLAR, ETC. IN COURSE OF THIS EXPOSITION,
 SDSLIPPERY/1 LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE PAYS 6,000 FRANCES (1,395
 DOLLARS) MONTHLY FOR HIS OFFICE IN PARIS (PROBABLY TRUED) EXCLUD-
 ING UTILITIES, PHONE, TELETYPE, XEROX, AND SECRETARY, AND THAT
 HE SPENDS ABOUT 30,000 FRANCES MONTHLY INCLUDING THE RENT ON
 PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ENTERTAINMENT AND OTHER LIVING
 EXPENSES WHEN HE IS IN PARIS. SDSLIPPERY/1 COOPERATED IN
 PREPARATION OF PRO 1, WHICH WE ARE POUCHING, BUT C/O OMITTED
 THE FINANCIAL QUESTION IN ORDER NOT TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE.
 THIS, THE NEXT MOVE WILL BE TO HAVE A FRANK TALK WITH SDSLIP-
 PERY/1 ABOUT HOW HE FINANCES THAT WHICH HE IS ALREADY DOING AS
 PREREQUISITE FOR DETERMINING HOW MUCH, NOW, AND UNDER WHAT
 COVER WE CAN PAY HIM FOR SERVICES TO US. THEN, WE WILL HAVE TO
 MAKE HIM AN OFFER. BELIEVE IT SHOULD CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING
 ELEMENTS:
 A. PAYMENT FOR SERVICES ALREADY RENDERED TO INCLUDE

PARIS 12432 SECRET RECEIVED FROM SDULTIMATE/1
 PRODUCTIONS TO AND INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SDULTIMATE/1
 AL-AMIR, ASSESSMENT OF MOURAD, SUBJECT TO
 B. PAYMENT FOR PAST AND FUTURE USE OF HIS OFFICE AS A
 ENOUSE, IN SUPPORT OF SDSLIPPERY OPERATION, LOCATED AND
 MINATION WITHOUT NOTICE. IF WE BUY IN, WE CAN CONTROL THE
 GOOD SECURITY AUDIO POSSIBILITIES, AND VARIOUS POINTS IN
 TIME AND DEFENSIVE TRAVEL BETWEEN BEIRUT AND TRADITIONAL
 C. COST OF OPERATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT, TRADITIONAL
 AN, PER DIEM AND OPERATIONAL TRAVELERS, FOR TRIP CITED
 ITS PRESENTED BY MIDDLE EASTERN TRAVELERS, TO HELP DEFRAY
 RA 2 ABOVE.
 D. ANNUAL RETAINER (SINCE HE IS LAWYER) TO HELP DEFRAY
 STS OF CULTIVATION OF CONTACTS OF INTEREST TO HIMSELF AND
 OF WHOM WE MAY OR MAY NOT DERIVE BENEFIT FROM TIME TO TIME.
 E. REIMBURSEMENT OF ACTUAL OPERATIONAL EXPENSES
 APPROVED BY C/O IN ADVANCE FOR AGREED ACTIVITIES LEADING TO
 ACQUISITION OF SIGNIFICANT, SECRET INFORMATION OR SOURCES BY
 C/O.

PARAS D AND E SHOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLE-
 TION OF SUBPARA C TRIP. FINAL MOA SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE
 PROVIDE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONAL TRAVEL. THIS, IN TURN, SHOULD BE
 NEGOTIATED AFTER SDSLIPPERY WHICH SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED AFTER
 TRIP TO IRAN.

7. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH TRIAL
 OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 BY PAYING HIM 1,000
 DOLLARS FOR SERVICES (INCLUDING USE OF HIS OFFICE) RENDERED
 AND COMMITTING OURSELVES TO PAY 1,000 DOLLARS MONTHLY, OCTOBER
 THROUGH DECEMBER, TO ASSIST SDSLIPPERY/1 WITH COSTS OF HIS
 PARIS OFFICE AND ENTERTAINMENT. BEIRUT/TEHRAN/BEIRUT ECONOMY
 AIR FARE AND NON-ACCOUNTABLE OPERATIONAL EXPENSES UP TO 1,000
 DOLLARS IN LIEU PER DIEM, GIFTS AND ENTERTAINMENT OF CONTACTS
 FOR PARA 1, C TRIP, AND ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL EXPENSES IN
 PARIS DURING TRIAL PERIOD IF APPROVED IN ADVANCE OR EXPENDIT-
 URE BY STATION. PAYMENTS WILL BE MADE IN CASH, ACCOUNTED TO
 BY C/O IN REVOLVING ACCOUNT. RECEIPTS FOR BY SDSLIPPERY/1
 IN PSEUDO. WE ASSUME THAT SDSLIPPERY/1 WILL INITIALLY DECLIN-
 OFFER AS INADEQUATE AND FAILURE TO APPRECIATE HIS STATUS.
 THIS WILL PROVIDE OPENING FOR C/O TO INSIST ON THE FINANCIAL

AGE 5 PARIS 12432 SECRET
CLOSURES NECESSARY TO INITIATE INVESTIGATION OF SD SLIPPERY
OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME, AND ESTIMATE WHAT CONTROL WE CAN
AND AT WHAT PRICE, IF WE DECIDE WE REQUIRE HIS SERVICES

8. SD SLIPPERY/1 IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT ON
22 SEPTEMBER. WILL VISIT IRAN ON WAY BACK TO PARIS CIRCA
16 OCTOBER. WIDE RANGE OF IRAN REQUIREMENTS IS AVAILABLE
STATION, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FROM
HEADQUARTERS AND TEHRAN AS TO REQUIREMENTS WHICH WOULD BENEFIT
US CONFIDENTLY TO EVALUATE SD SLIPPERY/1 ACCESS AND RELIABILITY

9. FILE: 201-962067. RVW 17SEP98 DRW D9C1.
SECRET

SECRET 198751Z SEP 79 STAFF

CRTE TEHRAN 54247

TOX PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SD SLIPPERY

REF: PARIS 12432

1. DO NOT BELIEVE WE ARE SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH
ESSENTIALLY LEBANESE OR IRAN BACKGROUND OF THE SD SLIPPERY/1
CASE TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF TAILORED REQUIREMENTS
REQUESTED REF. THEREFORE REFER TO HQS.

2. STATION HOLDING DO NOT INCLUDE IDENTITIES OF EITHER
ULTIMATELY OF HIS BROTHER. REQUEST PARIS PROVIDE.

3. NO FILE. RVW 13 SEP 99 DRW D9C1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

1
E CR T 2224 SEP 89 START
CITE DIRECTOR 51122

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRS LEFT ROUTE TEHRAN

WNINTEL AKAJAS DISLIPPERY

REF: A. LIRAL 5444
B. TARS 14432
C. DIRECTOR 49545

1. RE-STATE PAR 6 AND TIMKEN'S PROGRESS AGAINST IRANIAN
BEYOND PAR 6 RE-STATE PROPOSAL GOES CONSIDERABLY
WHILE WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER, HOWEVER.

2. WHILE WE ARE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHMENT FI REPORTING
SHIRAZ COMMUNITY AS COM OR NAJAF AND AMONG LEBANESE
TRAINED PERSONNEL WOULD BE NECESSARY DO SO UNDER VERY CON-
(S) AS LONG AS THIS WOULD NOT INCLUDE SDSLIPPERY/1'S
OPERATION IS THAT HE WILL ACT AS SPOTTER TO TARGETS OF INTEREST
WHICH WE WILL MEET, ASSESS, VET AND DEVELOP AS FI SOURCES.
WE ARE WILLING TO COMPENSATE HIM FOR THIS WORK WHEN SUCH LEADS
INTELLIGENCE OR INFORMATION HE PROVIDES IS USABLE
RE-STATE PROPOSAL, OF COURSE, RECOGNIZE THAT SECURING S/1'S
REAR AND SUCH LIMITED COMMITMENT ON OUR PART EASIER SAID
(AND FOR THE) ARRANGEMENT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IN OUR BEST
INTERESTS NOW TO ENTER INTO SUCH COMMITMENT.

3. HQS WILLING TO PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT TO S/1 FOR SERVICES
DURING PAST THREE MONTHS SUCH AS INTRODUCTIONS TO SD-
SLIPPERY/1 AND JAVAD AL-AMIR AND APPROVE PARA 7, REF B PROPOSAL
FOR \$1,000 FOR THIS WORK. WE ALSO WILLING APPROVE SIMILAR
FOR FUTURE SERVICES OF SAME NATURE. REMAINDER OF PARA 6
REF B PROPOSAL NOT APPROVED. WE ARE ALSO UNABLE APPROVE AT THIS
TIME S/1'S PROPOSED TRIP TO MID-EAST UNTIL S/1 ABLE PROVIDE US
WITH IDENTITIES PROSPECTIVE CONTACTS AND REASON BELIEVE THAT
THOSE CONTACTS WILL DEVELOP INTO PRODUCTIVE ASSETS. AGAIN,

JCN

AGE 2 DIRECTOR 19892 S/E CR E
RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS FULL CODE, BUT WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY
WITH INDIVIDUAL OF S/1'S BACKGROUND

4. WE HAVE NO FURTHER REQUIREMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY
PROVIDED STATION. WE ARE PREPARING REQUIREMENTS ON LEBANESE
HITITE COMMUNITY AND THEY WILL BE FORWARDED ASAP AND SHOULD BE
SETUP.

5. WE DO NOT MEAN SOURCE TWO NEGATIVE OUR REACTION REF B
PROPOSAL, BUT S/1 HISTORY AND HIS, AS PERCEIVED HERE, CURRENT
STYLE OF OPERATING, MAKES US VERY CAUTIOUS IN COMMITTING OUR-
SELVES IN ANY WAY TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS MUCH MORE TO GAIN IN
MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH US THAN WE FROM HIM.

6. FOR TEHRAN: SDULTIMATE/1 IS IDEN A AND HIS BROTHER IS
IDEN B

ALL SECRET FILE: 201-2962267 201-2961724. RTW 21SEP99 DRY T
SECRET
BY
#4459

26 SEP 79 5 3.2

S E C R E T 260342Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521028.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, BEIRUT.

FROM: CNE/IRAN INFO CNE/SLJ

SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJAJA SDSLIPPER INTEL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 518662
B. DIRECTOR 458600

1. AS PROMISED REF A, FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE FOR USE WITH SDSLIPPERY/1 (S/1) TO COLLECT FROM HIS LEBANESE SHI'ITE CONTACTS IN EUROPE AND, IF A TRIP FOR S/1 TO BEIRUT SHOULD EVENTUATE, FOR USE IN TALKING TO CONTACTS IN LEBANON. PARIS SHOULD ALSO SEE REF B WHICH LEVIES STILL VALID REQUIREMENTS ON SHI'ITE TARGET IN MIDDLE EAST.

2. REQUIREMENTS ARE:

A. THERE IS A VIRTUAL DEARTH OF INFO ON THE "AMAL", THE SHI'ITE PARAMILITARY GROUP IN LEBANON. STRENGTH, LEADERSHIP, ARMS INVENTORY, WHAT SUPPORT FROM IRAN? AMAL SECTY/GEN WAS IN IRAN IN MID-APRIL AND AGAIN IN EARLY JULY PER PRESS REPORTS AND MET WITH IRANIAN LEADERS. PURPOSE/RESULTS THESE MEETINGS? WHAT DOES S/1 KNOW ABOUT HUSAYNI'S BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN LEADERS. S/1'S INFO IN PARIS 11096 THAT THE SHI'ITE FORCE IN LEBANON IS PAID FOR BY THE SYRIANS; TRAINED, COMMANDED AND LARGELY STAFFED BY PALESTINIANS IS THE FIRST WE HAVE HAD ON EITHER SYRIAN OR PAL INVOLVEMENT. A SUBSTANTIVE EXPANSION OF THIS WOULD BE VERY DISSEMINABLE INFO.

B. ALSO PER PRESS, KHOMEINI'S GRANDSON (HUSAYN MUSTAFA KHOMEINI) ARRIVED BEIRUT 2 SEPT. WAS S/1 IN BEIRUT AT THE TIME. WHAT DOES HE KNOW OF THE PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT? THE HIGHER ISLAMIC SHI'ITE COUNCIL AND THE AMAL MOVEMENT WERE TO ORGANIZE A SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR HIS VISIT.

C. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE HIGHER ISLAMIC SHI'ITE

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 521028 S E C R E T COUNCIL (WHICH OVERSEES SHI'ITE AFFAIRS IN LEBANON), CAN S/1 PROVIDE BACKGROUND ON EACH OF ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR SYMPATHIES/ALIGNMENTS, DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AMONG THE SHI'ITES EACH HAS. WHO IS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL. S/1 REPORTED IN PARIS 10911 THAT SHIA CLERGY NO LONGER EXERT MUCH INFLUENCE OVER SHIAS AND THAT COMMUNITY WAS IN PROCESS OF TRYING TO DEVELOP NEW LEADERSHIP. AN EXPANSION OF THIS WOULD BE OF GREAT INTEREST. WHY HAVE CLERGY LOST INFLUENCE, WHICH IS IN SUCH CONTRAST TO SITUATION IN IRAN? ANY SUCCESS IN DEVELOPING NEW LEADERSHIP?

D. ALSO OF INTEREST TO US IS HIS CONTACT WITH SALAH BITAR, WHO IS CO-FOUNDER OF BA'TH PARTY (WITH MICHEL AFLAQ) AND AN OLD LINE SYRIAN OPPOSITION LEADER. DOES HE KNOW WHETHER BITAR IS STILL POLITICALLY ACTIVE. CAN HE ELICIT BITAR'S COMMENTS ON HOW BITAR SEES THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SYRIA AND ASSESS THE VIABILITY OF THE ASAD REGIME THERE IN VIEW OF THE ESCALATING SECTARIAN CLASHES?

3. WE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT S/1 MAY BE IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. S/1 HAS SAID THAT HE WAS SYMPATHETIC W/TH CAUSE OF ISRAELI-BACKED MAJOR SAAD H A D D A D, WHO NOW IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF MUCH OF SOUTH LEBANON AND HE HAS ADMITTED CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

4. FILE: 201-0962067. RVW 25SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
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#9019

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E C T 241833Z OCT 79 STAFF
 ITC PARIS 13023 SECTION 1 OF 2
 O: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN
 NINTH AJAJA SDSLIFFERY

REFS: DIRECTOR 518662
 WASHINGTON 521029
 PARIS 12452
 DIRECTOR 486658
 DIRECTOR 485999
 DIRECTOR 455576

REFS A AND B DID NOT ARRIVE PARIS PRIOR TO SDSLIFFERY/1
 DEAR E ANTICIPATED REF C, WHICH AFFORDS US CONVENIENT INTER-
 VIEW ASSESSMENT DATA AND REVISE OBS PLAN. BELIEVE
 HQ CORRECT TO LABEL SDSLIFFERY/1 PROPOSAL AS REFER TO
 HIE AS PRINCIPAL AGENT. WE HAVE NOT YET MADE COUN-
 TER-PROPOSAL TO HIM WHICH WOULD ALTER PRINCIPAL AGENT ROLE TO
 TEAM SPOTTER AND ELICITOR, AND FIX FAIR RATE OF PAY.
 BEFORE WE DO SO, WE SHOULD CLARIFY PARAMETERS OF SDSLIFFERY/1
 ROLE, SETTLE ON FAIR COMPENSATION, AND, ABOVE ALL, DECIDE
 WHETHER WE TRUST HIM SUFFICIENTLY TO ENTER INTO CANDIDINE
 RELATIONSHIP EVEN ON TRIAL BASIS. REF A EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDES
 FORWARD MOTION IN DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND
 WHILE WE ARE IN NO HURRY, WE CANNOT REMAIN ON DEAD CENTER
 IN DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT RECOGNIZING THAT WE ARE FORFEITING
 ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL WE NEED TO PLACE RELATIONSHIP ON
 MORE SECURE BASE.

REF A REFERS TO SDSLIFFERY/1 "HISTORY" AND "BACKGROUND"
 INFORMATION WHICH INFERS THAT HIS BACKGROUND IS SINISTER. REVIEW
 OF REF D, E, AND F (ALL THE RELEVANT INFORMATION ON SDSLIFFERY/1
 BACKGROUND AVAILABLE TO US) REVEALS:

A. THAT, IN JUNE 63, PESSECULAR/1 SAID SDSLIFFERY/1
 WAS EXCITING THE LEBANESE SET A LEADERS TO BE PRO-SHAW, AND
 THAT HE WAS A SECOND RATE BRITISH AGENT. THE LATTER ALLEGA-
 TION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN UNSUBSTANTIATED BY PESSECULAR/1 AND

PAGE 2 PARIS 13023 SECRET
 WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE FITNESS RATING WITHOUT ENDORSEMENT BY EM-
 PRO-SHAW INCITEMENT. IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF 63, CANNOT BE
 REGARDED AS DEROGATORY. WHAT WAS PESSECULAR/1'S ACCESS, RELIA-
 BILITY, AND MOTIVATION IN REPORTING THE INFO?

B. PETEAK, IN JANUARY 65, SAID THAT SDSLIFFERY/1 WAS
 PAID AGENT OF HIS OWN NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE. WE CANNOT
 REGARD THIS AS DEROGATORY BUT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEAD-
 QUARTERS EVALUATION OF PETEAK ACCESS, RELIABILITY, AND MOTIVA-
 TION IN REPORTING THE INFO. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO PESCOFF/
 REPORTS THAT, IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, SDSLIFFERY/1 WORKED FOR HIS
 OWN GOVERNMENT'S POLICE AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THESE
 THREE ALLEGATIONS, TAKEN TOGETHER, GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF A
 MAN WIDELY SUSPECTED OF REPORTING TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES BUT
 NOT KNOWN TO DO SO - HENCE THE CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH SERVICE
 IT WAS. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS HIS OWN COUNTRY'S SERVICE, IF ANY.

C. PESCOFF/1, HOWEVER, ALSO ALLEGED THAT LEBANESE G-
 ARCHIVES SHOWED SDSLIFFERY/1 WAS WORKING FOR SAUDI ARABIA (N
 SERVICE, NOT EVEN THE EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, SPECIFIED) AS
 COOPERATING WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, AND AS HAVING A FRIEND
 WHO WAS A BRITISH OFFICIAL. CERTAINLY THERE IS NO NEED TO
 PLACE A DEROGATORY INTERPRETATION ON ANY OF THESE ALLEGATIONS
 AND, AGAIN, WE WONDER NOT ONLY ABOUT THE EVALUATION OF THE INFO
 BUT WHETHER THE ENTRIES THEMSELVES MIGHT HAVE BEEN PUT IN THE
 C-2 ARCHIVES WITH THE INTENTION OF COVERING THEIR OWN AGENT
 IT, INDEED, SDSLIFFERY/1 WAS ONE.

D. FINALLY, AND AGAIN IN SIXTIES, SDSLIFFERY/1 IS
 ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD A CONTACT, LASAR SIVULJ, WHO WAS A YUGO-
 SLAV FIRST SECRETARY. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHETHER
 SIVULJ WAS INTELLIGENCE CONNECTED, A COMMUNIST, AND THE
 FREQUENCY AND NATURE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO.

IN OBTAINING PRO I FROM SDSLIFFERY/1 C/D ASKED HIM WHETHER HE
 HAD EVER ENJOYED CONTACT WITH PERSONNEL OF ANY INTELLIGENCE
 SERVICE, THEN PRODDED HIM CONCERNING THE ISRAELI EMBASSY. C/D
 HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED, AND CONTACTS WITH ANY SAVAK OFFICERS.
 SDSLIFFERY/1 FIRMLY ASSERTED THAT HE HAD HAD NO INTELLIGENCE
 CONTACTS, ALTHOUGH AMONG HIS MANY ARAB OFFICIAL FRIENDS THERE

PAGE 3 PARIS 13023 S E C R E T
MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS LURKING UNDECLARED TO HIM. WE HAVE, THUS, DEFINED AN AREA TO BE EXPLORED BY SCSWIRL. SDSLIPIPERY/1 HAS TOLD US THAT HE IS ABLE TO PRACTICE LAW AND MAINTAIN A STUDIO IN PARIS WITHOUT FRENCH PARTICIPATION THANKS TO THE INTERVENTION OF EDGAR FAURE. WE HAVE TASKED UNUSY/1, A PROTEGE OF FAURE, TO GET US A RUNDOWN ON WHO SDSLIPIPERY/1 IS, HOW HE SUPPORTS HIMSELF, AND WHAT HIS POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ARE IN FRANCE AND THE ARAB WORLD. MEANWHILE, COULD HEADQUARTERS BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT SUCH REF E COMMENTS AS THAT "SDSLIPIPERY/1 WAS WELL AND LESS THAN FAVORABLE KNOWN TO OFFICERS WHO HAVE SERVED IN BEIRUT" AND THAT HE IS LIKELY TO BE IN CONTACT WITH GNGRAPH, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT HAVE REVEALED HIS STATION CONTACT TO THEM. SUCH REMARKS IMPLY THAT THERE ARE FACTS ABOUT SDSLIPIPERY/1 WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN MADE KNOWN TO US AND WHICH MIGHT FACILITATE FIELD INVESTIGATION OF THIS POTENTIAL ASSET. TO KNOW SDSLIPIPERY/1 IS TO MISTRUST HIM, BUT ONE MUST ASK ONESELF WHAT ONE REALLY KNOWS. HIS PERSONALITY IS REMINISCENT OF A ONCE GREAT AGENT, OPPOSED, WHO WAS UNIVERSALLY SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR THE ISRAELIS AND FOR MOST OF THE WESTERN POWERS, INCLUDING US, AND WHO FINALLY DIED FOR IT.

3. ALTHOUGH SDSLIPIPERY/1 HAS PROPOSED HIMSELF IN THE PRINCIPAL AGENT ROLE, HIS COMPORTMENT TO DATE HAS INDICATED NO RELUCTANCE TO INTRODUCE US DIRECTLY TO DESIGNATED INFORMANTS, AS IN THE CASES OF AL-AMIR, SDULTIMATE, AND SEVERAL OTHERS WHOM C/O HAS DECLINED TO MEET. DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO EXTEND THIS PATTERN BUT WE CANNOT TRANSFER IT TO QOM AND MAJAP UNLESS WE FIRST SEND SDSLIPIPERY/1 TO PICK UP EXISTING CONTACTS (THOSE WHOM HE WOULD HAVE MET ON REF C TRIP WERE DESIGNATED IN PARA 2 REF C) AND MAKE SOME OTHERS. ONCE THE SPOTTING IS DONE, GIVEN WHAT WE ASSUME TO BE THE RELATIVE OPERATIONAL INACCESSIBILITY OF THESE AREAS, IT WOULD SEEM THAT SDSLIPIPERY/1 WILL HAVE TO DRAW THOSE HE HAS SPOTTED ELSEWHERE TO BE MET, ASSESSED, AND DEVELOPED BY US. IF WE HAVE SECURITY RESERVATIONS ABOUT SDSLIPIPERY/1, WE ASSUME THAT CANDIDATES WILL NOT BE DRAWN TO SOME PLACE WHERE WE HAVE LESS AT STAKE AND MORE CONTROL OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT THAN WE BELIEVE TO BE THE CASE IN TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, OR BEIRUT. THIS WILL REQUIRE A PRETEXT AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, FUNDS. WELCOME HEADQUARTERS VIEWS.

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#3023

PAGE 4 PARIS 13023 S E C R E T
4. WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT, IN DISPLAYING C/O'S OWN SENSITIVITY TO SDSLIPIPERY/1'S "ARAB IN PARIS" VIEW OF LIFE AND ITS COSTS, AND TO THE IMAGE HE PROJECTS AS A SLIGHTLY SLEAZY PROMOTER, WE MAY HAVE OBSCURED SOME OF HIS MORE PROMISING OPERATIONAL GIFTS AND UNDERPLAYED WHAT STATUE HE HAS, IN OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH SECURITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS. SDSLIPIPERY/1 IS A JURIST OF SOME STATUE IN HIS WORLD. HE HAS A HOST OF POTENTIALLY USEFUL CONTACTS, AND ENOUGH BRASS TO MEET ANYONE WE ASK HIM TO MEET. THE OBSERVATION THAT HE DOES NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE IN EVERYONE HE MEETS MAY WORK IN OUR FAVOR, SINCE HE HIMSELF MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF THIS, AND IT MAY ACCOUNT FOR HIS READINESS TO INJECT HIS CASE-OFFICER INTO RELATIONSHIPS WITH INFORMANTS. HE IS MORE AVARICIOUS THAN MANY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN, BUT NOT EXCEPTIONALLY SO - AND HAS PROVEN HIMSELF WILLING TO RISK A LITTLE MONEY TO MAKE SOME MORE. HE IS NICELY INTELLIGENT, A SKILLFUL ELICITOR AND SEPERATE ASSESSOR OF HIS FELLOW MAN. HE REPORTS, WHEN REMINDED OF OUR WESTERN PREOCCUPATION WITH FACTS, ACCURATELY, IN DETAIL, AND IN WRITING WHEN THIS IS REQUIRED. AT THIS MID-POINT IN OUR FIELD INVESTIGATION, HE SEEMS DISCREET AND LOYAL. WHILE HE IS CONCERNED WITH SELF AGGRANDISSEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, HE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO FURTHER THE INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON WHICH IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR INTERESTS. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, THEREFORE, OUR WORKING HYPOTHESIS IS THAT SDSLIPIPERY/1 CAN BE CONTROLLED AND THAT IT IS PROBABLY WORTH A SERIOUS INVESTMENT OF TIME AND MONEY TO DO SO, OR TO DETERMINE THAT OUR HYPOTHESIS IS WRONG.

5. OUR FIGURE OF US \$1,000 IN REF C WAS PRECIPITATED ON THE CONCEPT THAT IT WOULD BE OFFERED AS PART OF A TRIAL PERIOD OFFER WHICH WOULD INCLUDE, AT LEAST, SOME TEMPORARY SALARY AND OPERATIONAL EXPENSES. THE INTENT WAS TO SAVE MONEY BY MAKING A PACKAGE DEAL. SDSLIPIPERY/1 HAS SPENT AT LEAST \$422 ON OPERATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT OF AL-AMIR AND SDULTIMATE/1 IN THE PROCESS OF BRINGING THEM TOGETHER WITH THE C/O. SDSLIPIPERY/1 IS A SUCCESSFUL ATTORNEY AND, IN FRANCE, EVEN A TYRO LAWYER MAKES US \$50 PER HOUR. AT THIS RATE, SDSLIPIPERY/1 WOULD BE ABOUT US \$2,000 FOR TIME SPENT IN OPERATIONAL MEETINGS. IF DO NOT SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD PAY SDSLIPIPERY/1 AT LEGAL RATES, THOUGH

PAGE 5 PARIS 130223 SECRET
A GLANCE AT THE LIFE STYLE OF THE PLO'S ABRAHAM SUSS WOULD
SUFFICE TO ESTABLISH THE ROUGH EQUIVALENCE OF AFFLUENCE
BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS OF THE LAW AND THOSE OF FAIRER PROFES-
SIONS. HE WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE AS LONG AS WE CAN WITHOUT
COMING TO FINANCIAL TERMS, AND THEN TERMINATE THE RELATIONSHIP
AMICABLY RATHER THAN MAKE SO UNFAIR A GESTURE AS SUGGESTED
IN REF A PARA 3. SDSLIPPERY/1'S DIGNITY MAY REST ON SHANTY
FOUNDATIONS IN OUR OPINION, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO HIM AND WE
SHOULD NOT ASSAIL IT WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT
HE MIGHT HAVE A VINDICTIVE REACTION. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS
RECONSIDER WHAT WE MIGHT OFFER SDSLIPPERY/1 WHICH MIGHT
INDUCE HIM TO SUBJECT HIMSELF TO OUR CONTROL. THE
EXTENT OF DISCUSSING HIS SOURCES OF INCOME FRANKLY WITH US
SUBMITTING TO SGSIRL THEN FUNCTIONING AS SPOTTER AND SOURCE
OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, WITH POSSIBILITY THAT WE WILL ALSO
USE HIM AS SOCIAL BRIDGE TO TARGETS, NOT NECESSARILY IRANIAN,
IN PARI AND AS CONDUIT TO FEED MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF RI'ANN
PERSPECTIVES ON NEAR EAST TO LOCAL JOURNALISTS. BELIEVE THE
FIGURE WE FINALLY ARRIVE AT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION
THAT IT IS AS REASONABLE FOR A MAN TO ASK FOR A FAIR WAGE FOR
ESPIONAGE AND COVERT ACTION SERVICES AS IT IS FOR ANY OTHER
TYPE OF SERVICE, MAKING ALLOWANCE FOR THE FACT THAT SPIES DO
NOT PAY TAXES ON COVERT INCOME. LEVEL AND TYPE OF PAYMENTS
SHOULD NOT REFLECT OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT SECURITY, THE SINE
QUA NON OF CONTINUING THE RELATIONSHIP AT ALL.

6 FILE: 221-962067. RW 40CT99 DRV DDC1.
SECRET
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10 Oct 79 03 54Z

PARIS 130223 OCT 79 STAFF

TE PARIS 1303

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA RANNER SDULTIMATE

RE: PARIS 13099

1. SDULTIMATE/1 WAS CONTACTED PARIS C/O TO REPORT THAT
MUTOLLAH SAHIQ AD-RUHANI'S PUBLIC THREAT TO INSTIGATE SHI'A
REVOLT IN BAHRAIN WAS MADE IN RESPONSE TO CALL FROM RUHANI'S
FOLLOWERS IN BAHRAIN FOR SUPPORT IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO OBTAIN
WHAT THEY REGARD AS THEIR RIGHTS FROM AMIR OF BAHRAIN.
SDULTIMATE/1 SAID THE POPULATION OF BAHRAIN IS EIGHTY-FIVE
PERCENT SHI'A AND THAT A VAST MAJORITY OF SHI'A ARE FOLLOWERS
OF RUHANI. SDULTIMATE/1 REPORTED THAT BOTH PRIME MINISTERS
AZARGAN AND AYATOLLAH KEHOMEINI HAD URGED RUHANI TO SOFTEN
HIS ATTACKS ON BAHRAINI AUTHORITIES. RUHANI WILL REFLECT
ON A WEEK OR SO A.D. MEANWHILE, HAS ASKED SDULTIMATE/1 TO
CHECK THE EXTERNAL REACTION TO RUHANI'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST
BAHRAIN. SDULTIMATE/1 ASKED C/O FOR NVBLAZON REACTION AND
OFFERED TO COUNSEL RUHANI IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHATEVER GUIDANCE
NVBLAZON GIVES.

2. C/O TOLD SDULTIMATE/1 THAT REQUEST OF THIS NATURE
COULD HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY BUT THAT PENDING
C/O COULD CONFIDENTLY ASSURE SDULTIMATE/1 THAT A REVOLT IN
BAHRAIN AT THIS TIME MIGHT HAVE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF A
MAGNITUDE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT OR CONTROL AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
COULD NOT BE LIKELY TO FAVOR THE INTERESTS OF NVBLAZON OR OF
ANY OF BAHRAIN'S NEIGHBORS. C/O OPINED THAT WHAT THE AREA
SEEMED TO NEED MOST WAS A PERIOD OF STABILITY IN WHICH TO
DIGEST RECENT CHANGE. C/O PROMISED TO FURNISH OFFICIAL
NVBLAZON RESPONSE TO SDULTIMATE/1 THIS WEEK. REQUEST HEAD-
QUARTERS GUIDANCE.

3. C/O SUGGESTED TO SDULTIMATE/1 THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFI-
CULT IN ANY CASE FOR RUHANI TO CONTINUE HIS CAMPAIGN AT THE
PRESENT LEVEL IN THE FACE OF KEHOMEINI AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
OPPOSITION WITHOUT RISKING POLITICAL ISOLATION AT BEST.

AG 12 PARIS 13133 E R E T
 SDULTIMATE/1 REPLIED THAT AN AYATOLLAH OF RUHANI'S STATURE
 COULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM HIS RELIGIOUS FOLLOWING WHICH
 CONSTITUTES HIS POLITICAL BASE.

4. IN DISCUSSION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN, A
 THE EXTERNAL OPPOSITION. SDULTIMATE/1 SAID THAT ALTHOUGH
 RECEIVING APPROXIMATELY ALMOST DAILY FROM IRANIS IN DEAPORA
 REGARD HIMSELF IN OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI, HE FELT THE TIME
 WAS NOT YET RIGHT. SDULTIMATE/1 OPINED THAT IN ANOTHER FIVE
 MONTHS THE SITUATION IN IRAN MIGHT BECOME SUFFICIENTLY
 FAVORABLE BECAUSE OF KHOMEINI REGIME'S INABILITY TO WORK
 EFFECTIVELY AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND NATIONAL
 DISSENTMENT. TO PERMIT ORGANIZATION OF EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION
 IN SDULTIMATE/1 OPINION, THE LACK OF VIABLE POLITICAL INSTI
 TUTIONS IN IRAN DICTATES THAT NO OPPOSITION MOVEMENT CAN SUCCE
 ED WITHOUT RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. FOR THE SAME REASON, NO VIC
 IOUS RELIGIOUS LEADER WILL BE ABLE TO ENSURE THE INSTAL
 LATION OF A SOUND GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF IRAN
 NE TERN TRAINED INTELLIGENTSIA AND GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM
 THE WESTERN INDUSTRIAL POWERS, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES.
 SDULTIMATE/1 MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO P
 LAY UNDER NUBELION GUIDANCE IN SUCH AN EFFORT TO RESTOR
 STABILITY IN IRAN, AND IMPLIED THAT UNDER NO OTHER CIRCUM
 STANCES WOULD HE TAKE ON KHOMEINI. SDULTIMATE/1
 EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS FULLY EMPOWERED TO SPEAK FOR RUHANI
 IN THE MATTER OF IRAQ AND IMPLIED THAT RUHANI FEARED THE
 FOLLOING ANALYSIS OF HOW TO PLAY THE POLITICAL SITUATION
 IN IRAN.

5. FILE 11 26 961724. RVN 900199 DRV DDC1.
 C R E T

BT
 33

19 Oct 79 00-2

S Z C P F T 182341Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 535287.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WMINTEL AJAJA SDSLIIPPY SDULTIMATE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54496
 B. PARIS 13023
 C. PARIS 12959
 D. PARIS 12699
 E. PARIS 12333
 F. TEHRAN 54353
 G. DIRECTOR 518662
 H. PARIS 12612
 I. PARIS 12594
 J. DIRECTOR 517075
 K. PARIS 12432
 L. DIRECTOR 528655

1. HQS APPRECIATES REF B SUMMARY OF PARIS THOUGHTS AND
 CONCERNS OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN SDSLIIPPY/1 (S/1) AND SDULTIMATE/1
 (U/1) CASES. AS REF A NOTES, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A GREAT DEAL
 OF INTEREST OVER INABILITY OF BAKHTIAR MOVEMENT TO GENERATE ANY
 DEGREE OF ENTHUSIASM AND ACTIVITY. NONETHELESS, THE MOVEMENT RE-
 MAINS A VALID INTELLIGENCE TARGET AND ONE, WE BELIEVE, ON WHICH
 BOTH S/1 AND U/1 MAY BE ABLE COLLECT VALUABLE FI. ANALYSTS HAVE
 EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SCOPE OF S/1 REPORTING, DESPITE ERRORS, AND
 WHILE MUCH OF INFORMATION TO DATE REMAINS UNSUBSTANTIATED, THEY
 CONSIDER HIS REPORTING POTENTIALLY USEFUL. THEREFORE, BELIEVE
 PARIS CORRECT IN ITS ASSESSMENT THAT S/1 COULD CONTRIBUTE AGAINST
 WIDE VARIETY OF TARGETS.

2. HAVING SAID THIS, WISE REASSERT THAT WE ARE STILL VERY
 UNCERTAIN AS TO RELIABILITY, VERACITY, AND MOTIVATIONS OF BOTH
 S/1 AND U/1 AND THAT WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE CONTACT WITH BOTH OF
 THESE SOURCES IS WORTHWHILE AND MAY EVEN BE PROMISING, CONTACT
 SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITH LEAST POSSIBLE COMMITMENT ON OUR PART.
 OUR CONCERNS ABOUT EXTENT OF REACTION COMMITMENTS TO S/1 OR U/1

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973-50-148

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 535297 S E C R E T
ARE REFLECTED IN SPECIFIC REPORTING PROBLEMS OUTLINED BELOW.
UNLESS PROVEN OTHERWISE, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT S/1 AND U/1
WOULD USE ANY COMMITMENT OR FORMALIZED RELATIONSHIP WITH RTACTION
TO FURTHER THEIR OWN INTERESTS WITH RESULTING COMPLICATIONS BEYOND
ANY ADVANTAGE WHICH WOULD ACCRUE TO US.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT S/1 AND U/1 VIEW THEIR RELATIONSHIP
WITH RTACTION AS ONE IN WHICH THEY HAVE "PRODUCT" TO SELL,
NAMELY, THEIR PARTICULAR FACTION OF ANTI-KHOMENI
MOVEMENT AND THAT
THEY DESIRE AVELAZOV BACKING, FOR WHICH THEY VIEW RTACTION AS
SOURCE OR INSTRUMENT OF THAT BACKING. WHILE THESE CASES NOT
UNIQUE IN THIS REGARD, THEY HAVE PRODUCED SOME INFORMATION WHICH
WOULD SEEM INDICATE THEIR ACCESS NOT RELIABLE. OF PARTICULAR
CONCERN IS S/1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH JAVAD ALAMIR D A V A L U, WHO
HAS EXTENSIVE CHECKED BACKGROUND, IS SUBJECT REF 1, AND WHOSE
REPORTS ON BAKHTIAR'S BEHALF HAVE, ACCORDING TO SDPEPPER/1, BEEN
DISAVOWED BY BAKHTIAR HIMSELF (DIRECTOR 528726). MOREOVER,
NEITHER BAKHTIAR NOR ANY OF THOSE IN HIS IMMEDIATE ENTourage
KNOW OF FETEHADI-E MELLI NOR TARIRI ALI.

4. RECENT REPORTS HAVE ALSO SURFACED SEVERAL QUESTIONS
REGARDING ACCURACY S/1-AVALU REPORTING AS FOLLOWS:

A. AS NOTED REF 1, MISIDENTIFICATION OF FETAYAN-E CHAL
FOR FUJABEDI-E CHAL IN REF D REPORT.

B. REF D IDENTIFICATION OF AYATOLLAH MOTAVARI AS ONE
OF IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS WITH WHOM FETEHADI-E MELLI IN CURRENT
(SEPTEMBER 79) CONTACT. MOTAVARI WAS ASSASSINATED IN APRIL 1979
BY PARASTAN GROUP IN TEHRAN.

C. REF C'S DESCRIPTION OF MUSTAFA GHAMRAN'S POLITICAL
VIEW, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH NFAC ANALYSTS' UNDER-
STANDING HIS IDEOLOGY. NOR IS ASSASSINATION HIS PALESTINIAN HERITAGE
CLAIMED BY OUR RECORDS (TAKEN LARGELY FROM MUGANOPY DOCUMENTARY
190079) WHICH SHOW HIM BORN IN TEHRAN AND HIS FIRST CONTACT WITH
PLO AND LEFANES CA. 1977.

D. AS NO INFORMATION DEVELOPED DURING MEETINGS WITH U/1.

PAGE 3 DIRECTOR 535297 S E C R E T
WE REMAIN CONCERNED THAT U/1 HAS AYE TO GRIND IN TERMS HIS TOP-5
TO ASSUME POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ANTI-KHOMENI MOVEMENT.
TO DATE U/1'S PRIMARY VALUE HAS STEMMED FROM FACT THAT HIS BROTHER
PLAYS PROMINENT ROLE IN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN TEHRAN; HE IS
VERY INTERESTED IN EXPLOITING AND EXPLOITING THAT RELATIONSHIP
FOR INTEL COLLECTION. U/1'S ACCESS TO EUROPE-BASED IRANIAN DIS-
SIDANT OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES HAS NOT PROVEN PRODUCTIVE.

6. WE REMAIN WILLING TO REIMBURSE S/1 \$1,200 FOR HIS PAST
SERVICES AND TO REIMBURSE HIM FOR FUTURE SERVICES. HOWEVER,
BECAUSE OF CONCERNS NOTED ABOVE, PREFER TO REMUNERATE S/1 ONLY
FOR SERVICES ALREADY RENDERED. WHILE FIGURE OF \$1,200 DOES NOT
FULLY COMPENSATE S/1 AT GOING RATE FOR LAWYERS, WE IN FACT CON-
TACTED US AND CONTINUES TO HAVE HIS AND U/1'S REASONS FOR MAINTAIN-
ING THAT CONTACT. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT REJECTION ALLES-
AND Z STATION OPS PROPOSALS WILL PROBABLY PRECLUDE ESTABLISH-
MENT OUR CONTROL OVER S/1, WE NOT PREPARED MAKE COMMITMENTS
DESCRIBED AS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH SUCH CONTROL. ACCORDINGLY,
IF STATION BELIEVES \$1,000 REIMBURSEMENT FOR PAST SERVICES WOULD
IN END BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, BELIEVE BEST COURSE WILL BE THAT
SUGGESTED PARA 5 REF A, WHICH IS TO CONTINUE CONTACT AS LONG AS
POSSIBLE ON NON-REIMBURSATIVE BASIS.

7. SOURCE OF "WELL AND LESS THAN FAVORABLY KNOWN" COMMENT
(DIRECTOR 485999) IS MOS OFFICER WHO SERVED IN BEIRUT AND NEW
THAT S/1 WAS IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS EMBASSY OFFICERS AND HAD
RATHER UNSAVORY REPUTATION AS INFLUENCE BROKER. THERE NO
SPECIFICS AND NOTHING CONCERNING S/1 IN RECENT MOS RECORDS TO
CONFIRM OR REFUTE ADMITTEDLY SUBJECTIVE RECOLLECTION.

8. JOSEPH W. ADLESICZ, WHO WILL BE TRANSITING PARIS CIRCA
22-OCT 79 ON ANOTHER IRANIAN CASE WILL BE HAPPY DISCUSS S/1, U/1
AND OTHER CASES WITH STATION OFFICERS.

9. WE ARE RESEARCHING ANSWER TO PARA TWO A, REF 5 QUESTION
AND WILL ADVISE.

10. FILE 201-962867; 201-961724. PVP 190079 DEV LSC.1 ALL
SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#0155

S F C R I T 231131Z OCT 78 STAFF

CITE PARIS 13712

TO: DIRECTOR INEC TTTT

WINTER AJAJA SDSLIPTV/1 BUSY

REF: PARIS 13700

1. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975-256-314

1. ON 2 OCTOBER, UNUSY/1 WAS ASKED TO DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIP OF SDSLIPTV/1 TO ARAB PALESTINE. UNUSY/1 WAS TOLD THAT SDSLIPTV/1 WAS A LEBANESE EX-PARLIAMENTARIAN WHO MAINTAINED A LAW OFFICE IN PARIS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF FRENCH CITIZENSHIP AND WHO SAID HE WOULD DO SO THANKS TO INTERVENTION OF LEBANESE. UNUSY/1 WAS ALSO ASKED TO DETERMINE (WITHIN LIMITS IMPOSED BY A HEALTHY REGARD FOR HIS OWN SECURITY) WHAT SDSLIPTV/1 PRINCIPAL BUSINESS, CLIENTS, CONTACTS, SOURCES OF FUNDS AND REASON FOR ASSISTANCE WERE.

2. ON 19 OCTOBER UNUSY/1 REPORTED, AFTER TALKING TO PAURE AND UNDESIGNATED ASSOCIATES OF PAURE, THAT:

A. PAURE ONLY SEES SDSLIPTV/1 ABOUT ONCE A WEEK, AND IS NOT FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE REASON FOR THEIR RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER,

B. PAURE ASSOCIATE MICHAEL ANTOINETT SEES SDSLIPTV/1 FREQUENTLY;

C. SDSLIPTV/1 PUTS IT ABOUT THAT HE HAS CLOSE TIES TO THE AMERICANS;

D. SDSLIPTV/1 SPENDS A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY;

E. SDSLIPTV/1 IS CLOSE TO MUHAMMAD SHAERI, A TUNISIAN CITIZEN WHO FUNCTIONS AS A CULTURAL ATTACHE OF THE TUNISIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS. UNUSY/1 SAID THAT SHAERI IS A LEFTIST WHO WAS ONCE CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN TUNIS; WHO TRAVELS ON AN IRAQI PASSPORT; AND WHO IS CLOSE TO HIS FIGURES PAURE, PAURE, SALAH, UNUSY, AND SAID IT-ESSAM. UNUSY/1 ALSO SAYS THAT SHAERI WORKS WITH A CHINESE GROUP MOBILE IN FRENCH FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS GROUP IS HEADED BY UNUSY/1, MOST PRINCIPAL ENVOY TO PERSIAN GULF PORTENDS IS NICOLAS LANG (IDEN) FRENCH WORKS EMPLOYE.

late by

1

PAGE 2 PARIS 13712 S F C R I T
AND DIRECTOR OF THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE PERSIAN GULF. LANG, WHO FORMERLY WAS ACTIVE IN NEGOTIATING FRENCH ARMS SALES TO LIBYA IS NOW TRAVELLING REGULARLY TO SAUDI ARABIA ON SOME PROJECT HAVING TO DO WITH THE PERSIAN GULF UNIONS IN WHICH HE IS ASSISTED BY SHAERI.

3. ON 17 OCT IN SDSLIPTV/1'S OFFICE, C/O ASKED SDSLIPTV/1 IF HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF A PERSONNAGE NAMED UNUSY/1 WHO RESPONDED TO REPORTS THE INTERESTS OF THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SDSLIPTV/1 SAID NO, DUG UP THE P-ONE AND IMMEDIATELY BOSS THE QUESTION TO SOMEONE WHO'S NAME IS IDENTIFIED AS NICOLAS LANG. SDSLIPTV/1 SAID THAT LANG HAD ASSURED HIM THAT NO SUCH PERSON WHO REPRESENTS THE ELYSÉE OR THE CHAI D'ESAY AND SAID HE WOULD CHECK THE FOREIGN COMMERCE MINISTRY. SDSLIPTV/1 SAID THAT LANG WAS A MAN WHO HAD REPRESENTED THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, WHO WAS ASSOCIATED WITH UNUSY/1 AND THE PAURE GROUP, AND WHO PROBABLY WAS CONNECTED WITH THE S.D.I.C.E.

4. PARIS HAS NO IMAGES ON SHAERI AND SHAERI NOT LISTED IN FRENCH GOVERNMENT MINISTRY DIPLOMATIC LIST AS OFFICIAL OF TUNISIAN EMBASSY.

5. FILE: 211-262267; 211-304722; 211-72554. AND 1000099 DRV-TPC1.

S F C R I T

#3712

1

S E C R E T 271171Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 17711

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IRAN.

WIKIPI AJAJA DISMISSED BY STAFF

REF: PARIS 13712

IDEN IS UNDESPOND (BORN 17 MAR 1947) WHO IDENTIFIED
IN MID-1979 BUT HIS REFUSAL TO PROVIDE IDENTITY OF
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED IN PARIS AND LRAI.
TRAVELS TO MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA.
BY 10 OCT 79 DRY D-C.1.

C O P Y

1
#0712

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1978-258-344

12 SEP 79 13 22

C R E T 111644Z SEP 79 STAFF

PARIS 13712

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWILNER

1. PARIS STATION OFFICER TIMKEN (IDEN A FOR TEHRAN)
FUNCTIONALLY INTEGRATED AS (IDEN B FOR TEHRAN) HAS BEGUN
ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDEN C AS POTENTIAL CONDUIT
FOR SHELL TREATMENT OF NEWS ON IRAN, NAM, AND OTHER
EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN TOPICS. PARIS STATION ASSET
IDEN D FOR HEADQUARTERS) TOLD A FRIEND WHO IS CULTURAL
EDITOR OF IDEN C'S MAGAZINE THAT PERSON COVERING THIRD
WORLD FOR THIS MAGAZINE SHOULD MEET ASSET'S FRIEND TIMKEN
WHO COVERED SAME BEAT AND WAS A KNOWLEDGEABLE MAJERICK TYPE
CONSTANTLY DEPLORING THAT PROFESSIONAL ETHICS PRECLUDED
HIM FROM WRITING FOR PRESS WHICH, AT LEAST IN FRANCE, WAS
APPARENTLY UNINFORMED ABOUT THIRD WORLD. OUR TENTATIVE
PLAN IS TO INDUCE IDEN C TO CULTIVATE TIMKEN AS POTENTIAL
SOURCE. TIMKEN HAS HAD ONLY ONE ENCOUNTER WITH
IDEN C, A DRINK AT HER PLACE WHICH WAS INTERRUPTED AFTER HALF-
HOUR BY ARRIVAL OF AFP CAMERAMAN WHO SHOT TV FOOTAGE IN IRAN
DURING REVOLUTION. (HIS SISTER IS CULTURAL ADVISOR TO
FRENCH SERVICE OF RADIO PEKING.) TIMKEN WILL LUNCH IDEN C
ON 14 SEPTEMBER, AND SHE WILL DEPART FOR TEHRAN O/A
15 SEPTEMBER.

2. ACCORDING TO SDSLIPPERY/1, IDEN C BEGAN COVERING
IRANIAN OPPOSITION TO SHAH SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
AND REMAINS ONE OF THREE FRENCH JOURNALISTS WHO WRITE OPINION/
MAKING ARTICLES ON IRAN. HE ASSESSES IDEN C, WHOM HE HAS
MET ONLY ONCE HIMSELF, AS PROFESSIONALLY OBJECTIVE AND POLITI-
CALLY NOT NEARLY SO FAR TO THE LEFT AS THE RAG FOR WHICH SHE
WRITES. IDEN C CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY
EMBASSY PREVIOUSLY IN IRAN, BUT BELIEVES EVERYONE SHE KNEW
HAS LEFT. TIMKEN HAS GIVEN HER NAME OF PAO SHELLBERG AND
HAS SAID HE WOULD SEE WHAT HE COULD DO TO FACILITATE CONTACT
FOR IDEN C AT EMBASSY. GIVEN IDEN C LEFT WING CREDENTIALS

REF 2 PARIS 12269 S E C R E T IT SEEMS JUST POSSIBLE THAT.
 PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN IRAN IT SEEMS JUST POSSIBLE THAT.
 UNDER CURRENT ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES, STATION MIGHT
 AND CONTACT WITH IDEN C. IF SO, ADVISE PARIS
 IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE WITH NAME AND COVER OF OFFICER. IF
 ST. IT WOULD FACILITATE OR DEVELOPMENT OF IDEN C. IF
 TEHRAN COULD ENSURE THAT HELLMANBERG OR OTHER APPROPRIATE
 OFFICER SEES HER AND CONFIRMS TO HER THAT TIMKEN
 CONTACTED IDEN B AND DID SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY RECEIVE HER.

3. PARIS STATION HAS NO TRACES IDEN C. REQUEST HEAD
 QUARTERS AND TEHRAN TRACES.

4. FILE DEFER. RTW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C1.

S E C R E T
 28 SEP 79

REF 111645Z SEP 79 STATE

REF PARIS 12270

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR.

REF PARIS 12269

1. IDEN A REF IS EDWIN (TED) ATKINS. IDEN A REF IS
 POLITICAL SECTION OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR UNITED NATIONS AND
 MULTI-LATERAL AFFAIRS, AND FOR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. IDEN C
 S ENISE M O U R A D (PEN NAME) THIRD WORLD AFFAIRS EDITOR
 OR LATEST PARIS WEEKLY LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. DOB: CIRCA
 1941. FATHER IS INDIAN NATIONAL. OF SHIA MUSLIM FAITH.
 MOTHER, A TURK, DIED WHEN MOURAD WAS TWO YEARS OLD. MOURAD
 WAS RAISED IN FRANCE AND IS FRENCH NATIONAL. SHE SPEAKS
 FRENCH AND ENGLISH.

2. FILE DEFER. RTW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C1.

S E C R E T

22 SEP 79

13 SEP 79 5 24E

SECRET 121543Z SEP 79 ST FF

OM PARIS 12317

PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR

WMTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER

REF: A. PARIS 12269

B. PARIS 12270

1. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALS IDEN C REF B M IDENTICAL SUBJECT 201-912772 WHO AKA DENIZE FUSSENN. RE HEADQUARTERS REVIEW 201 AND ADVISE PARIS AND TEHRAN PRIORITY ANY INFO PERTINENT TO REF PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ASSESSMENT DATA.

2. FILE DEFER. RVW 12 SEP 89. DRV D9C1.

SECRET

#231

13 SEP 79 5 52Z

SECRET 122105Z SEP 79 STAFF

HCITE DIRECTOR 512138.

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS, TEHRAN.

WMTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER UNPOLO

REF: PARIS 12269

1. IDEN A IS UNPOLO/1. FORMER PARIS STATION RECRUITMENT TARGET WHO WAS UNDER PARALLEL CULTIVATION IN 1973 BY STATION CASE OFFICER CLIDE W. TRICHILO (IDEN B) AND BY UNSQUIB/1 AS POTENTIAL FI AGENT ON CHINA AND NE TARGETS. UNPOLO/1 ACCEPTED RECRUITMENT, INCLUDING SALARY, IN NOVEMBER 1973 BUT RENEGED ON MONTH LATER ON BASIS IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT. IN NOTE TO CASE OFFICER SHE STATED: THE IDEA SEEMED EXCITING, BUT I FINALLY REALIZED IT WAS GOING DEEPLY AGAINST MY FEELINGS....IT WOULD BE A CONSTANT STRUGGLE IN MY MIND. UNPOLO/1 WAS AWARE THAT SHE WAS IN CONTACT WITH RTACTION IN PARIS AND IN ISLAMABAD. OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS CANCELLED IN APRIL 1979.

2. ONLY RECENT INFO IN UNPOLO/1 201 IS SEPTEMBER 1978 DOCUMENT EXTRACT REPORTING UNPOLO MEMBERSHIP IN RADICAL OR TROTSKYIST SECTION OF TUDER PARTY AND HER PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES OF IRANIAN STUDENTS IN PARIS. WE WILL REQUEST FULL TEXT OF DOCUMENT AND ADVISE IF THERE ARE FURTHER DETAILS OF INTEREST TO REPORT. WILL ALSO REVIEW RESTRICTED CI FOLDER ON UNPOLO/1.

3. IN LIGHT ABOVE, STATION MAY WISE REVIEW UNPOLO/1'S OPS BACKGROUND BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH APPROACH TO HER.

4. FILE: 201-912772. RVW 12 SEPT 89. DRV D9C1. SECRET.

SECRET

1112

S E C R E T 122122Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 512146.

TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS, TEHRAN.

WINTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER UNPOLO

REF DIRECTOR 512138

1. IDENTITIES ARE:

A. KENIZE MOURAD AKA KENIZE HUSSEIN (201-912772), BORN CA 1944 IN INDIA. NATURALIZED FRENCH CITIZEN. SHE IS ALLEGED DAUGHTER OF INDIAN MUSLIM MAJARAJA HUSSEIN KOTWARA, AND TURKISH MOTHER. FATHER'S FAMILY MOVED TO PAKISTAN AT TIME OF PARTITION AND TOOK PAKISTANI NATIONALITY. MOTHER LEFT FATHER SOON AFTER MARRIAGE AND MOVED TO PARIS. KENIZE REARED BY CATHOLIC SISTERS FROM EARLY CHILDHOOD AFTER DEATH OF HER MOTHER. AT SOME POINT SHE WAS TAKEN UNDER WING OF SWISS DIPLOMAT WHO AMBASSADOR TO PEKING 1963-64. KENIZE HAS BEEN JOURNALIST FOR "LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR" SINCE 1972. PREVIOUSLY TRAVELLED FOR ONE YEAR IN INDIA TEACHING FRENCH AND WRITING FREE LANCE. PRIOR TO INDIA TRIP WAS STEWARDESS FOR AIR FRANCE FOR TWO YEARS. KENIZE HAS NEPHEW WHO IN LATE 1972 APPOINTED THIRD SECRETARY PAKISTAN EMBASSY IN PARIS. AT THAT TIME SHE ALSO HAD VERY WIDE ACQUAINTANCE AMONG INDIAN, PAKISTANI, AND BANGLADESH COMMUNITIES AND DIPLOMATS AND APPARENTLY SOME CHINESE CONTACTS AS WELL.

B. CHARLES A. MELTON.

2. FILE: 201-912772. RVW 12 SEPT 99. DRY D9C.1. SECRET.

S E C R E T

T

127

15 SEP 79 212

S E C R E T 141536Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12387 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, DIRECTOR

WINTEL RYBAT AJAJA RTWINNER UNPOLO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 512138

B. TEHRAN 54198

C. PARIS 12269

D. PARIS 12272

E. PARIS 12374

1. SUBJECT REFS DEPARTS PARIS 14 SEP. ARRIVING TEHRAN 1400 LOCAL SAME DAY. SHE TRAVELLING ON FRENCH PASSPORT WITHOUT VISA AND WILL NOT SAY SHE JOURNALIST ON ENTERING COUNTRY UNLESS ASKED. HER FIRST MOVE WILL BE TO PHONE PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WHO SHE SAYS IS OLD FRIEND. SHE ALSO KNOWS NASIR M I N A C H I (WHOM SHE PROFFESSES PRIVATELY TO DETEST AND HOPES HE WILL ASSIST IN ASSURING SHE IS ALLOWED TO GATHER NEWS. SHE PLANS RETURN PARIS CIRCA 5 OCTOBER IF SHE IS NOT EXPELLED SOONER. SHE VOLUNTEERED TO BRIEF PARIS C/O ON IRAN WHEN SHE RETURNS.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE TEHRAN STATION REQUESTING THAT MR. GRAVES RECEIVE UNPOLO/1 AND EXTEND WHATEVER COURTESIES MAY BE NORMAL IN DIFFICULT TEHRAN EMBASSY SITUATION. YOU MAY TELL MR. GRAVES THAT UNPOLO/1 IS UNDER ASSESSMENT BY PARIS C/O (AS IDENTIFIED REF D) AS POTENTIAL SOURCE OF INTRODUCTION TO LEFTIST JOURNALISTS AND INTELLECTUALS IN PARIS, AND THAT C/O WOULD LIKE TO GAIN CREDIT WITH SUBJECT FOR WHATEVER COURTESIES MR. GRAVES CAN EXTEND. YOU SHOULD ASSURE MR. GRAVES THAT C/O HAS NOT BROKEN COVER WITH UNPOLO/1. YOU MAY ADD THAT UNPOLO/1 ON SHORT ACQUAINTANCE, DOES NOT SEEM HOSTILE TOWARD UNITED STATES OR OUR INTERESTS. THE MAGAZINE FOR WHICH SHE WRITES IS SOCIALIST, BUT NOT COMMUNIST. AND NOT A KNEE-JERK OPPONENT OF OUR INTERESTS. UNPOLO/1 PLANS TRY TO DO PIECE ON HOW MAN IN STREET IS FEELING IN NEW IRAN. SHE IS, OF COURSE, ALSO ANXIOUS TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO STATE OF MINORITIES, MILITARY, AND LEFT.

PAGE 2 PARIS 12387 S E C R E T

3. FOR DIRECTOR: FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC AND ASSESSMENT DATA OBTAINED AT LUNCH 13 SEPTEMBER:
A. UNPOLO/1 SAID SEE WAS FRENCH BY VIRTUE OF HAVING BEEN BORN IN PARIS, AND COULD LEGITIMATELY OBTAIN PAKISTANI OR INDIAN PASSPORT BUT HAS NOT DONE SO IN ORDER NOT TO PREJUDICE HER FRENCH NATIONALITY. SHE SAID HER FATHER REMAINED IN INDIA AND ASSUMED INDIAN NATIONALITY BECAUSE HE OPPOSED PARTITION AND OWNED LAND IN WHAT BECAME INDIA, WHEREAS THE REST OF HIS FAMILY WENT TO PAKISTAN.

B. UNPOLO/1 SAID SHE WAS CLOSE TO MUHAMMED ALI BHUTTO FAMILY AND REGARDS ZIA AS BOMICIDAL MANIAC WHO WILL FURNISH NUCLEAR BOMB TO SOME ARAB COUNTRY AS SOON AS HE GETS HIS HANDS ON ONE. WERE IT NOT FOR BHUTTO CONNECTION SHE MIGHT HAVE TAKEN UP OPTION FOR DUAL NATIONALITY LAST YEAR BECAUSE SHE SOUGHT AND ALMOST GOT JOB IN U.N. PRESS OFFICE NEW YORK WHICH SEE FEELS SHE MIGHT HAVE HAD IF SEE HAD BEEN CONSIDERED PAK INSTEAD OF FRENCH. SHE MUCH WANTED TO LIVE IN NEW YORK, AND PLANS VACATION THERE AFTER IRAN TRIP.

C. SUBJECT DESCRIBES LUTFALLAH S U L A Y M A N AS HER "BEST FRIEND". SULAYMAN IS AN OLD AND GOOD FRIEND OF TIMKEN WHO HAS NOT, HOWEVER, RECONTACTED SULAYMAN IN PARIS FOR LACK OF AN ADDRESS OR PHONE NUMBER. SHE SAYS SULAYMAN IS NOW WORKING AT PARIS ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE IN PUBLIC RELATIONS CAPACITY, BUT HE HAS AGED AND IS NOT WELL HEART TROUBLE. SULAYMAN, CO-FOUNDER WITH HENRI C U R I E L OF ORIGINAL (HEADITU) EGYPTIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS EXPELLED THEREFROM IN '49 FOR TROTSKYITE DEVIATIONISM. UNPOLO/1 ASSOCIATION WITH SULAYMAN (NOT A TROTSKYITE, BUT TOO COMMUNIST TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY MODERN COMMUNIST PARTY) MIGHT HAVE LED HER INTO ASSOCIATION WITH OTHERS LABELED TROTSKYITES.

D. SUBJECT "COUSIN" (PERHAPS IDENTICAL TO OR FATHER OR NEPHEW CITED REF A) IS IQBAL AHMAD A K H U M D, PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR TO PARIS WHO, SHE SAYS, IS RESIGNING TO TAKE THE TOP UNITED NATIONS JOB CONCERNED WITH THE ARAB ISRAEL PROBLEM.

4. WITH REGARD TO IRANIAN AFFAIRS, UNPOLO/1 MADE THE

PAGE 3 PARIS 12387 S E C R E T

FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

A. BAKH T I A R LEFT IRAN BY HELICOPTER THE DAY KHOMEINY RETURNED. HE IS HOPELESSLY FRENCH, EXCEPT FOR HIS INDULGENCE IN OPIUM, AND WILL NEVER UNDERSTAND THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WELL ENOUGH TO LEAD THEM. HIS POLITICAL REBIRTH IN PARIS IN AUGUST EXCITED NOBODY IN IRAN. HIS NOMINATION OF A DISREPUTABLE FIGURE LIKE JAWADH AL-A M I R AS HIS SPOKESMAN ALLENATED SO MANY EMIGRE IRANIANS THAT BAKH T I A R HAS NOW HAD TO DISOWN AL-A M I R.

B. AL-AMIR IS A FORMER MOVIE AND TELEFILM PRODUCER WHO WAS WIDELY BELIEVED, DURING THE SEAH'S REGIME, TO HAVE EXTENSIVE SAVAK CONNECTIONS. AL-AMIR NOW PRETENDS TO HAVE ENDURED IMPRISONMENT FOR OPPOSING THE SEAH BUT, IN FACT, AL-AMIR WAS SENTENCED TO EIGHT YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR RAPING HIS OWN NIECE, AND WAS RELEASED AFTER SERVING ONLY TWO. HE COMMANDS NO RESPECT. UNPOLO/1 ATTRIBUTED THIS ALLEGATION TO VERY RELIABLE IRANIAN LEGAL SOURCES.

C. THERE ARE CURRENTLY TWO IRANIAN OPPOSITION PERIODICALS PUBLISHED IN PARIS: IRAN LIBRE, PUBLISHED IN FRENCH BY THE MOVARCH STS, AND NAMEH KROUZ (THE DAILY LETTER) PUBLISHED BY AWAD AL-AMIR.

D. KARIM S A J A B I IS IN THE UNITED STATES UNDERGOING MEDICAL TREATMENT. SUBJECT DESCRIBES HIM AS HALF "GA" AND UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY BECAUSE HE FAVORED A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY UNTIL HE AS SURE KHOMEINY WOULD WIN.

E. HIDAYAT MAHIN-D A F T A R I HAS OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL, BUT IS HIDING SOMEWHERE - AFRAID FOR HIS LIFE.

F. WITH THE DEATH OF AYATOLLAH T E L E G H A N I, THE IRANIAN LEFT HAS LOST ITS LAST BUFFER WITH THE REGIME. AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-M A D A R I CAN BE EXPECTED TO URGE REASON ON KHOMEINY, BUT IS A CONSERVATIVE AT HEART AND WILL SPEND HIS POLITICAL CAPITAL ONLY ON BEHALF OF HIS CONSTITUENTS IN AZERBAIJAN. THUS, THE LEFT IS EXPOSED AND IN DISARRAY. ONLY THE GUERRILLA GROUP SURVIVE AND THEY CANNOT SEIZE OR HOLD POWER.

BT
#2387

PAGE 4 PARIS 12387 SECRET

G. UNPOLO/1 OBSERVED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE AN EFFORT ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE LEBANESE SHIA TO ESTABLISH A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION, WHICH SHE DID NOT QUITE UNDERSTAND. (THIS UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS IMPRESSION GIVEN HER BY SDSLIPPERY/1) TO WHOM SHE WAS INTRODUCED ON 4 SEP BY NESSIM KHURRI OF PARIS ARABIC PAPER AL-MUSTAQBAL (L). G/O OBSERVED THAT NATURAL INTERESTS OF LEBANESE SHIA WOULD SEEM TO CALL FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH KHOMEINI REGIME, BUT PERHAPS THIS REFLECTED RESISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN INFLUENCE ON THE PART OF SOME FACTION OF LEBANESE SHITES, PERHAPS ELEMENTS FROM SOUTH (WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE SDSLIPPERY/1) ALIGNED WITH HADDAD FORCES.

5. WE NOTE THAT UNPOLO/1 COMMENT ON DATE OF BAKHTIAR EXFILTRATION FROM IRAN IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT SDSTAT HAS REPORTED AND WHAT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED. WE ALSO NOTE AL-AMIR'S EXPLANATION (PARIS 95324) OF HIS SENTENCE FOR RAPE AND UNSOBER/1'S FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF HIM, AS WELL AS AL-AMIR'S IMPOSSIBLE ASSERTION IN PARA 2 OF SAME MESSAGE THAT BAKHTIAR HAD NO REAL CONTACTS IN PARIS IN JANUARY 79, AND AL-AMIR'S CONFIDANT ASSERTION THAT KHOMEINI HAD ENJOYED PROTECTION OF SAVAK GENERAL TAYMUR BAKHTIAR WHICH MIGHT BE SLANDER OR INDICATION THAT AL-AMIR HAD PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO SAVAK HIMSELF. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LEARN WHAT MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM OPERATIONAL AND RESTRICTED CI FOLDERS ON UNPOLO/1 WHICH BEARS ON ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR HER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION AS POTENTIAL UNWITTING CONDUIT FOR SELECTED LWSHELL MATERIAL.

6. FILE: 221-912772; INDEX: LUTFALLAH SULAYMAN (201-1) IZBAL AHMED AKHUND, PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT RELATED TO UNPOLO/1; LAWAD AL AMIR (PARAS 4 A. AND 6 SHOULD APPEAR ON FICHE); NAMEE RROUZ AND IRAN LIBRE, IRANIAN OPPOSITION PUBLICATIONS FOUNDED IN PARIS IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1979; KARIM SANJABI; HIJABAT MATIN-DASTARI. RVW 14SEP79 DRV D9C11.

SECRET

BT
#2567

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY IRAN UAR YUGOSLAVIA

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT POSSIBLE EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT TITO TO RESTORE IRANIAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. DATE OF REPORT 6 AUGUST 1966

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. EARLY JUNE 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ IRAN, TEHRAN /3 AUGUST 1966/

NIT -7163

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

A LAYMAN WHO IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF MANY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HE IS ALSO CLOSE TO POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SELDOM REPORTED ON POLITICAL OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES, HIS INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES HAS USUALLY BEEN ACCURATE. HE OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION DURING A CONVERSATION WITH AYATOLLAH HAJI MOHAMMAD TAQI QOMI, SHIA SECT REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO CAIRO. QOMI HAD TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABBAS ARAM ON 31 JULY 1966.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ARAM STATED THAT DURING THE SHAH'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT TITO IN YUGOSLAVIA IN EARLY JUNE 1966, THE SHAH HAD COMPLAINED TO TITO THAT IT WAS NOT EASY TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL ABD AL-NASIR. TITO ANSWERED THAT HE WAS SURE HE COULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO RE-ESTABLISH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND EGYPT. /FIELD COMMENT - NIT-7157 REPORTED THAT THE SHAH HAD TOLD QOMI THAT QUIET NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY TO RESTORE IRANIAN-EGYPTIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE SHAH DID NOT SPECIFY, HOWEVER, THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING CONDUCTED./ TITO ADVISED THE SHAH TO EXERCISE MODERATION VIS-A-VIS NASIR.

2. ACCORDING TO ARAM, TITO ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED BOTH IRAN AND PAKISTAN WOULD EVENTUALLY JOIN THE RANKS OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS.

/END/

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS ;INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY: IRAN/EGYPT
DOI : EARLY-MID-DECEMBER 1974
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO ENSURE COOPERATION
OF EGYPTIAN CLERGY DURING SHAH OF IRAN'S STATE
VISIT TO EGYPT

ACQ : IRAN, TEHRAN (2 JANUARY 1975) FIELD NO. NIT-9430
SOURCE : A LAYMAN WHO IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF MANY IRANIAN
RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND FORMER POLITICAL OPPOSITION
LEADERS. HIS OCCASIONAL REPORTING ON POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS HAS USUALLY BEEN ACCURATE, BUT AT
TIMES IS BIASED AGAINST THE PRESENT REGIME. HE
OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SENIOR IRANIAN
RELIGIOUS LEADER.

1. IN MID-DECEMBER 1974, NOTED IRANIAN SHI'A RELIGIOUS
LEADER, AYATOLLAH KHAJ MUHAMMAD TAQI Q U M I, DEPARTED TEHRAN
FOR CAIRO AT THE REQUEST OF EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MUHAMMAD SAMIH A N W A R AND IRANIAN PRIME
MINISTER AMIR ABAS H O V E Y D A TO ASSIST IN WINNING THE
COOPERATION OF EGYPTIAN CLERICAL LEADERS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE UPCOMING STATE VISIT TO EGYPT BY THE SHAH AND EMPRESS
OF IRAN.

2. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1974, QUMI RECEIVED A PERSONAL
LETTER FROM MINISTER OF STATE ANWAR. IN THIS LETTER ANWAR

REQUESTED THAT QUMI VISIT CAIRO BEGINNING IN MID-DECEMBER
1974 IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE 8-12 JANUARY
1975 VISIT TO EGYPT BY THE SHAH AND EMPRESS. QUMI WAS
ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, ESPECIALLY
THOSE AT WHICH MEMBERS OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM CLERGY WOULD
BE PRESENT. ANWAR ALSO ASKED QUMI TO ENCOURAGE THE EGYPTIAN
CLERGY TO ATTEND ALL THE PLANNED ACTIVITIES SO AS TO LEND
THE IMPRESSION THAT EX EGYPTIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD NO
MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SHAH'S POLICIES.

3. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING THE ANWAR LETTER, QUMI
WAS CALLED TO AN INTERVIEW WITH IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER
HOVEYDA. HOVEYDA REVEALED HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTICULARS
OF THE ANWAR LETTER TO QUMI AND REQUESTED THAT QUMI COMPLY
WITH ANWAR'S REQUEST. HE ASKED QUMI TO DO EVERYTHING IN
HIS POWER ^{TO} ENSURE THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE EGYPTIAN
CLERGY ~~IN~~ DURING THE SHAH'S VISIT.

4. QUMI WAS RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE TRIP, BUT HE STATED
TO A CLOSE CONFIDANT THAT THE PRESSURE FOR HIM TO COMPLY
WAS SIMPLY TOO GREAT TO RESIST. QUMI TOLD THE CONFIDANT
THAT HE PLANS TO REMAIN IN CAIRO FOR A FULL TWO MONTHS.

5. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEHRAN: SENT TO CAIRO
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION.

PARIS 031100 MAY 79 STAFF

PARIS 98834

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

TEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

UNTROUT/1 MET WITH SON OF SDFORGIVE/1 ON 2 APRIL
DURING THE MEETING, SDFORGIVE/1 PASSED THE FOLLOW-
ING INFORMATION TO UNTROUT/1.

SOMETIME AROUND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION (15-20 MARCH,
UNTROUT/1), SDFORGIVE/1 WAS ARRESTED AND DETAINED FOR
APPROXIMATELY HALF AN HOUR BY THE KOMITAH. HE WAS NOT
KHALKHALE, A MULLAH (COMMENTARY) UNTROUT/1 WAS NOT
SDFORGIVE/1'S FIRST NAME, BUT STATED THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S
SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE KOMITAH WERE TO SDFORGIVE/1'S
HE REACHED IT AND TOOK SOME PAPERS AND SPORTS BELONGING
TO SDFORGIVE/1 AND HIS DAUGHTER, AND SDFORGIVE/1 HIMSELF. THE
HE ALSO TOOK THE EQUIVALENT OF USD 12,000 BELONGING TO SDFOR-
GIVE/1 AND USD 7,000 BELONGING TO THE SON OF SDFORGIVE/1.
SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING SDFORGIVE/1'S
APPROACHED SDFORGIVE/1 AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE TAKEN
WITH HIM. KHALKHALE WAS STRIPPED OF HIS LEADERSHIP OF
THE REVOLUTION, BUT WAS GIVEN ANOTHER POSITION. UNTROUT/1 DOES NOT
KNOW WHERE SDFORGIVE/1 DID NOT MENTION WHERE HE WENT TO HIM PRIOR
TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN, BUT SPECULATED THAT SDFORGIVE/1
WAS HUMILIATED BY THE INCIDENT AND DID NOT WANT TO TALK
ABOUT IT. HE ADDED THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S SON IS A PRIVATE PERSON
AND ALWAYS OPERATED MORE OR LESS BEHIND THE SCENES AND
THEREFORE, NOT WANT PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF HIS ARREST.

TO DATE, SDFORGIVE/1'S PASSPORT HAS NOT BEEN RETURNED.
SDFORGIVE/1 IS DETERMINED TO LEAVE IRAN AND DO SO SOON.
IF THE PASSPORT IS NOT RETURNED, UNTROUT/1 STATED
THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD OBVIOUSLY NEED SOMEONE TO OBTAINING

3 AUG 79

PARIS 311425Z AUG 79 STAFF

PARIS 12014

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

TEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

RE TEHRAN 54068

DURING 30 AUGUST MEETING WITH UNTROUT/1, MARINOS
BROUGHT UP SDFORGIVE/1. ACCORDING TO UNTROUT/1, SDFORGIVE/1
IS CURRENTLY TEHRAN REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR. THIS POSITION
IS BEING HELD BY AHMAD AZARI-QOMI. FYI: SDFORGIVE/1'S TRUE
NAME IS D. M. T.

UNTROUT/1 REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS COMMENTS ON THE
LACK OF SHIP, OR LACK THEREOF, BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND
SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT KHOMEINI WOULD NEVER
OCCUPY THE POSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR TO SDFOR-
GIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 STATED THAT KHOMEINI WOULD OFFER THE JOB TO
SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 STATED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD, TURN
DOWN THE JOB OFFER.

UNTROUT/1 TOLD MARINOS IN APRIL 1979 THAT
HE HAD TAPPED SDFORGIVE/1'S PHONE HAD BEEN TAPPED. HE BASED
THIS ON THE FACT THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S TELEPHONE SERV-
ICES HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED REPEATEDLY PRIOR TO THE TIME HE WAS
ARRESTED AND DETAINED BY SADEGH KHALKHALE'S KOMITAH ME-
MBERS IN MARCH 1979 (SEE PARIS 98834, BEING RELATED TO
UNTROUT/1). ON THE DAY THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WAS DETAINED, HIS
PHONE WAS OUT OF ORDER FOR THE ENTIRE DAY. IN ADDITION,
SDFORGIVE/1'S SON (WHO WAS IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH HIM
FATHER WHILE HE WAS IN PARIS) TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE DID
NOT CALL HIS FATHER AT HIS HOME. RATHER, HE CALLED A
RELATIVE IN TEHRAN WHO PASSED MESSAGES TO BOTH PARTIES.
UNTROUT/1 ASSUMED THAT THE TAPPING WAS DONE BY PRO-KHOME-
INIS. WHILE ABOVE IS CERTAINLY NOT HARD EVIDENCE
THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S PHONE IS TAPPED, UNTROUT/1 IS FIRMLY
CONVINCED THAT THIS IS THE CASE.

FILE: 201-2279932, RVW 31 AUG 89 DRV 990.1.

S.E.

#20

C R E T 311426Z AUG 79 STAFF
 PARIS 12015
 TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR
 EL AJAJA UNTROUT SDORGIVE
 PARIS 12014
 DE TITY IS: MOHAMAD TAQI
 R I T.

S E C R E T 312220Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 505277.

TO TEHRAN INFO PARIS.

WMINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFO GIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54063
 B. PARIS 11916

1. SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT SDFO GIVE/1 (S/1) WILL BE WILLING TO HAVE ANY SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH SDFORWARD/1 (F/1). HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO DO SO EVEN IN PRESENCE OF UNTROUT/1 (T/1) AND, GIVEN EVENTS OF PAST SIX MONTHS, WILL PROBABLY DO LITTLE MORE THAN RECEIVE F/1. WE CONCUR WITH TEHRAN'S COMMENTS THAT S/1 IS STILL OF HIGH OPS INTEREST, BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH HIM, WE LESS SURE WE ABLE MAKE ARGUMENT FOR MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST THIS TARGET.

2. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH S/1 WAS THROUGH T/1 WHO WOULD, MONTHLY, TRIP FROM PARIS TO TEHRAN TO MAKE MEETINGS, BE DEBRIEFED BY STATION OFFICER, AND RETURN TO PARIS. SUCH TRIPS WERE OBVIOUSLY BURDEN FOR AGING T/1 AND HIS BEING STUCK IN TEHRAN IN AFTERMATH OF FEBRUARY REVOLUTION FURTHER COMPLICATED PROBLEM. FOR ALL OF THAT, WE MUST REALISTICALLY CONCLUDE THAT T/1 REMAINS ONLY VIABLE ROUTE TO S/1 IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND DO NOT BELIEVE S/1 VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. WOULD LIKE SUGGEST PENDING TEHRAN'S CONCURRENCE, PARIS DETERMINE T/1'S WILLINGNESS FOR TRAVEL TEHRAN TO AGAIN SEE S/1. NO COMMITMENT TO SUCH TRAVEL SHOULD BE MADE IF RESULTS SUCH APPROACH T/1 POSITIVE AND TEHRAN CONTINUES VIEW S/1 HIGH PRIORITY TARGET. WE WILL CONSIDER PROPOSAL HAVE T/1 RETURN TEHRAN FOR MEETING WITH AND DEBRIEFING OF S/1. T/1 WOULD, OF COURSE, ATTEMPT DETERMINE S/1'S RECEPTIVITY SUCH MEETING, PRIOR T/1'S DEPARTURE FROM PARIS.

3. HQS DID NOT RECEIVE REF A IDEN. PLEASE RETRANSMIT.

4. FILE: 201-324325; 201-0072932. RVM 31AUG79 DRV D9C

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PARIS 12067

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR

INTEL AJAJA UNTRUT (SDFORGIVE)

5. A. DIRECTOR 506277

B. TEHRAN 541002

1. ALTHOUGH PARIS WILL DETERMINE UNTRUT/1'S WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL TO TEHRAN TO MEET WITH SDFORGIVE/1, WE ARE NOT SURE HE WOULD BE AMENABLE TO SUCH TRIP. IN ADDITION, POINTS MADE IN REF A, UNTRUT/1 MAY BE A BIT RELUCTANT TO CONTACT SDFORGIVE/1 SINCE HE HAS HEARD NOTHING RECENTLY FROM SDFORGIVE/1. UNTRUT/1, FROM POSITION THAT IF SDFORGIVE/1 DESIRED CONTACT WITH HIM, HE WOULD HAVE INITIATED CONTACT.

2. PARIS HAS RECEIVED NO FOLLOW-UP REPORTING ON SECURITY INCIDENT IN TEHRAN IN WHICH DOCUMENTS WERE LEFT IN EMBASSY COMMISSARY. DID REPORT ON THIS INCIDENT CONFIRM STATEMENT IN TEHRAN 52688 THAT "THERE IS NO WAY UNTRUT/1'S IDENTITY WOULD BE DISCERNED FROM COMPROMISED NOTES". IF THIS WAS FINAL CONCLUSION REGARDING THIS INCIDENT, THERE SHOULD BE NO SECURITY PROBLEMS RELATED TO UNTRUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN.

3. BEFORE BRINGING UP SUBJECT OF FUTURE TRAVEL TO TEHRAN WITH UNTRUT/1, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF LOCATION AND POSITION OF SDFORGIVE/1. IT IS UNTRUT/1'S UNDERSTANDING THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN TEHRAN, NOT MAHSAH. UNTRUT/1 TOLD MARINOS ON 30 AUGUST THAT THERE ARE TWO AYATOLLANS WHOSE SURNAMES ARE SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL TO THAT OF SDFORGIVE/1. HE STATED THAT ONE OF THESE MEN WAS IN MAHSAH. BELIEVE THAT IDENTITY, NOT SDFORGIVE/1, IS IN MAHSAH. KIMKEN OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION ON IDENTITY FROM SD SLIPPERY/1. UNLESS SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN A POSITION TO TURNISH SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION, SEE NO MERIT IN UNTRUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN.

4. FILE: 201-0070932. RVN 4 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

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PARIS 12068

TO C TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR

INTEL AJAJA UNTRUT (SDFORGIVE)

REF: PARIS 12067

IDENTITY IS:

MAHSAH Q O M 1, COUSIN OF MAHDI RUHANI
THE IMAN OF THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN
EUROPE. RVN 4 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

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11 SEP 7:

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CITE PARIS 12208

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

MINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

RFS: A. DIRECTOR 509825
B. TEHRAN 54126

MARINOS MET WITH UNTROUT/1 ON 10 SEPTEMBER AND SECURED HIS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO RETURN TO TEHRAN FOR MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1. PRIOR TO MAKING FINAL DECISION, HOWEVER, UNTROUT/1 WOULD APPRECIATE ASSURANCE THAT IRACIATION WOULD BE WILLING AND ABLE TO FACILITATE HIS EXIT FROM IRAN IF HE SHOULD HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN LEAVING.

2. UNTROUT/1 LEARNED 10 SEPTEMBER THAT MINISTRY OF FINANCE HAS CONTINUED TO DEPOSIT HIS BASE SALARY INTO HIS TEHRAN BANK ACCOUNT IN SPITE FACT HE HAS DONE ABSOLUTELY NO WORK SINCE THE REVOLUTION. MINISTRY HAS DEPOSITED ABOUT US \$200 IN UNTROUT/1'S ACCOUNT IN THE LAST FIVE MONTHS. BECAUSE OF THIS, UNTROUT/1 WILL HAVE TO OBTAIN MINISTRY APPROVAL TO AVE TEHRAN. AS ADDRES RECALL, THIS WAS MAJOR PROBLEM COUNTERED DURING UNTROUT/1'S LAST TRY TO TEHRAN AND RETURNED TO PARIS. AS MINISTRY PAYING UNTROUT/1, HE WANTS THERE POSSIBILITY THEY MAY ASK HIM STAY IN TEHRAN WORK AND REFUSE ISSUANCE REQUISITE PAPERS. IN THIS EVENT, UNTROUT/1 WOULD NEED ASSISTANCE IN EXITING THE COUNTRY. THIS SITUATION IS WORST CASE SITUATION, BUT BELIEVE UNTROUT/1'S WANTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

3. UNTROUT/1 HAS ALSO AGAIN ASKED FOR IRACIATION ASSISTANCE IN REMOVING MONEY FROM IRAN. ASSUMING HE TRAVELS IRAN, REQUEST TEHRAN CONCURRENCE AND HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL MAKE ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION OF RIALS EQUIVALENT USD. 20 TO FRENCH FRANCS FOR UNTROUT/1. CONVERSION COULD BE MADE IN SAME MANNER AS PREVIOUS TRANSACTION, I.E., UNTROUT/1 WOULD PASS RIALS TO TEHRAN CASE OFFICER WHO WOULD

PAGE 2 PARIS 12208 S E C R E T
/A AMOUNT (ACCORDING TO EXCHANGE RATE AT THE TIME) TO PARIS. HE WOULD IN TURN PASS CASH TO UNTROUT/1 FOR DEPOSIT IN HIS PARIS ACCOUNT. IF, FOR SOME REASON, UNTROUT/1 UNABLE TRAVEL TEHRAN, WOULD STILL APPRECIATE TEHRAN ASSISTANCE IN MAKING ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION. UNTROUT/1 MENTIONED HE COULD SEND PERSONAL CHECK TO SOMEONE IN TOUCH WITH TEHRAN STATION, SUCH AS SDFORGIVE/1, WHO WOULD THEN PASS CASH TO TEHRAN CASE OFFICER.

4. BELIEVE POSITIVE RESPONSES TO PARA 2 AND 3 ABOVE WILL ENSURE POSITIVE DECISION ON UNTROUT/1'S PART TO TRAVEL TEHRAN. ONE REMAINING PROBLEM IS SDFORGIVE/1'S WILLINGNESS MEET WITH UNTROUT/1. UNTROUT/1 IS WILLING TELEPHONE SDFORGIVE/1 DIRECTLY FROM PARIS TO OBTAIN READING ON HIS FEELINGS ABOUT SUCH MEETINGS. UNTROUT/1 IS CONFIDENT CONVERSATION CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY DOUBLE-TALKED SO AS NOT POSE SECURITY PROBLEM. SECOND OPTION IS HAVE UNTROUT/1 MEET CONTACT SON OF SDFORGIVE/1 IN PARIS WHO WOULD IN TURN ADVISE US LESS CONTROL OVER CONTACT, BELIEVE IT DOES HAVE SOME MERIT, GIVEN THE MORE SECURE MEANS OF CONTACT BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND HIS SON ZEAN BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND UNTROUT/1. WILL INITIATE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SDFORGIVE/1. UNTROUT/1 WANTS COMMENTS ON PREFERRED METHOD OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN UNTROUT/1 AND SDFORGIVE/1.

5. NEXT CONTACT WITH UNTROUT/1 IS 0930 HOURS LOCAL TIME. WOULD APPRECIATE RESPONSES TO ABOVE ITEMS BY 13 SEPTEMBER.

6. FILE: 201-0079932. RWV 10 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1.

12 SEP 79

SECRET 112118Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 511343.

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. PARIS 12208
B. DIRECTOR 529825
C. TEHRAN 54190

1. UNTROUT/1 (T/1) SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE TRIP TO TEHRAN UNLESS HE IS ABLE TO CONFIRM SOME WAY THAT MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1 (T/1) IS POSSIBLE. DEFER TO PARIS AS TO MEANS BY WHICH HE CAN CONFIRM SUCH MEETING.

2. REGRET WE ARE UNABLE COMMIT ACTION TO FACILITATING TRIP FROM TEHRAN IN EVENT HE HAS TROUBLE LEAVING. PRESUME T/1 IN MIND OF INFLUENCE OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER. BELIEVE TEHRAN WILL AGREE THIS IS TOO GREAT AN OBLIGATION TO UNDERTAKE FOR T/1 AT THIS POINT.

3. HQ CAN APPROVE ACCOMMODATION CONVERSION OF RIALS TO EQUIVALENT OF 7,000 TO FRENCH FRANCS IF T/1 WISHES TO TRAVEL TO TEHRAN. OTHERWISE, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER AVOID SUCH CONVERSIONS. WE WOULD OF COURSE PAY T/1'S TRAVEL EXPENSES AND A \$50 DOLLAR PER DAY BONUS.

4. FILE: 201-279932, RYW 11SEP99 DRV 9C. ALL SECRET.

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CITE PARIS 12419

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, LONDON.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54190 (NOT NEEDED LONDON)
B. DIRECTOR 511343 (NOT NEEDED LONDON)

1. UNTROUT/1 WILL NOT MAKE TRIP TO TEHRAN IN CONNECTION WITH SDFORGIVE/1 UNLESS ACTION WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSIST IN THE EVENT HE IS FORCED TO REMAIN IN TEHRAN. UNTROUT/1 BELIEVES THE CHANCES OF BEING FORCED TO REMAIN ARE VERY SLIM, BUT IS UNWILLING TO TAKE THE RISK AT THIS POINT. IF HE COULD LEAVE TEHRAN UNDER HIS TRUE IDENTITY, HE WOULD NEED FALSIFIED IDENTITY DOCUMENTS FOR TRAVEL.

2. QUESTION OF UNTROUT/1 TRAVEL TO TEHRAN MAY BE A POINT AS HE HAS LEARNED FROM SDFORGIVE/1'S SON THAT SDFORGIVE/1 PLANS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE, POSSIBLY WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. SDFORGIVE/1 WILL INITIALLY GO TO LONDON, BUT IS NOT SURE IF HE WILL TRAVEL TO PARIS. SDFORGIVE/1'S SON DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG HIS FATHER WILL BE ABLE TO STAY IN IRAN. UNTROUT/1 CAN TRAVEL TO LONDON FOR MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1, IF LATTER WILL NOT COME TO PARIS.

3. LONDON: WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNTROUT/1 AND SDFORGIVE/1 IN LONDON. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO DECLARE UNTROUT/1 TO BRITISH LIAISON? UNTROUT/1, A NATURALIZED CITIZEN, IS CURRENTLY A PARIS STATION ACCOMMODATION. HE WAS AN ASSET OF TEHRAN STATION FROM 1953 UNTIL 1971, WHEN HE MOVED TO PARIS. UNTROUT/1 WORKED FOR ENGRAPHEE FROM 1941 UNTIL 1946 (TERMINATION OF THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS VERIFIED BY A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION OF UNTROUT/1). SDFORGIVE/1 IS A PROMINENT CLERIC OF OPS INTEREST TO TEHRAN STATION. NOT FORESEE THE NEED FOR UNTROUT/1 TO BE MET IN A LONDON CASE OFFICER, AS HE CAN SIMPLY RETURN TO PARIS FOR BRIEFINGS AFTER MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

AG 2 PARIS 12419 S E C R E T

4. HEADQUARTERS: ASSUME WE ARE AUTHORIZED TO PAY UNTROUT/1'S EXPENSES AND FIFTY DOLLAR PER DAY FOR US IF HE TRAVELS TO LONDON TO MEET SDFORGIVE/1. IF SDFORGIVE/1 COMES TO PARIS, WE WOULD LIKE TO PICK UP ANY OPS. IF SDFORGIVE/1 MIGHT INCUR DURING MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1. THIS IS A SUITABLE BONUS AS HE WILL BE PERFORMING DUTIES WHICH ARE BEYOND HIS NORMAL DUTIES OF ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

5. PLEASE FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR UNTROUT/1 MEETINGS WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

6. FILE: 201-2279932. RVW 17 SEP 99. DEC. 1.
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TE LONE 7858

: PARIS TO DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

INTEL ARI UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

: PARIS 2419

1. WE SEE NO NEED TO DECLARE UNTROUT/1 TO PERSON IN THE COMES
LONDON. MEET WITH SDFORGIVE/1 AND IS THEREIN BRIEFED IN PARIS.

2. IF THE LONDON MEETING BECOMES FIRM, PLEASE ADVISE UNTROUT/1
SDFORGIVE/1 RELATIONSHIP, THEIR TRUE NAMES, IN ADVANCE OF ARRIVAL, AND
ARE THEY WILL BE STAYING.

3. FILE: 201-279932. RVW 18 SEP 99. DEV 1-1.
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S E C R E T 181127Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN 54241

TO : PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REF : PARIS 12419

1. FOLLOWING ARE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS WE HOPE UNTROUT/1 CAN POSE TO SDFORGIVE/1.

A. WHERE IS F/1'S CURRENT RESIDENCE? IF NOT IN QOM, DOES HE VISIT THERE? HOW OFTEN?

B. WHO ARE F/1'S PRINCIPAL CONTACTS IN THE SENIOR CLERGY? THE MILITARY? THE GOVERNMENT? AMONG POLITICIANS NOT IN THE GOVERNMENTS? IN THE ETHNIC MINORITIES?

C. CAN F/1 NOMINATE A FRENCH OR ENGLISH SPEAKER TO SERVE AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN F/1 AND TEHRAN STATION?

2. INTEL REQUIREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. IS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL A FORMALLY ESTABLISHED BODY WITH A LIST OF ESTABLISHED MEMBERS? IF SO, WHO ARE THEY? IF THE COUNCIL OPERATES ON AN HQS BASIS, HOW IS MEMBERSHIP ON IT DETERMINED?

B. WHICH OF HIS ADVISORS EXERCISE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER KHOMEINI? ON WHAT ISSUES?

C. WHAT ARE CLERICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DRIVE FOR THEOCRATIC STATE BEING MANAGED (PRESUMABLY ON KHOMEINI'S BEHALF) BY AYATOLLAH HOSEIN ALI MOTAZERI? IF THIS ISSUE IS DIVIDING THE CLERGY, WHERE ARE THE LINES BEING DRAWN? IS THERE ANY SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE TO THE THEOCRACY AMONG THE CLERGY AT QOM?

D. RELATED TO C ABOVE, WHAT FOLLOWING DOES AYATOLLAH KAZEM

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 54241 S E C R E T

SHARIAT-MADARI HAVE AMONG THE CLERGY? IS THIS FOLLOWING GOING UP OR DECLINING?

E. WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, WILL THE DEATH OF AYATOLLAH TALEGANI HAVE ON KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDES TOWARD AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SECULAR MIDDLE CLASS, THE ETHNIC MINORITIES (ESPECIALLY THE KURDS), AND THE LEFT (INCLUDING THE MUJAHEDIN-H- KHALQ)? WHY DID TALEGANI, IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS BEFORE HIS DEATH, ADOPT A HARDLINE STANCE AGAINST THE LEFT AND AGAINST THE PROPONENTS OF ETHNIC AUTONOMY?

3.. IF F/1 IS WILLING AND ABLE TO NAME AN INTERMEDIARY FOR CONTACT WITH TEHRAN, WE HOPE CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE ON THE SPOT. IF F/1 NOT WILLING TRAVEL PARIS, THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE CONTACT (WITH U/1 IF NOT WITH F/1 HIMSELF) IN LONDON. CAN LONDON ACCOMMODATE THIS?

4. FILE: 201-079832. RVW 18 SEP 99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

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SITE PARIS 12464

TO: DIRECTOR THERAN INFO CENT A.

MINIFL A UNTROUT SDFORCIVE

1. DULAE Q O M I, SON OF AYATOLLAH
TOLD UNTROUT/1 ON 15 SEPTEMBER 19
BROTHER-IN-LAW AND E.H. IS CURR
IN PARIS WORKING WIFE SH POUR BAKHTIAR.
TO COMI, M. ADDE WORKED IN BAKHTIAR'S OFFICE
WAS PRIME AS ET UNTROUT/1 IF HE
TO MEET WITH BAKHTIAR, BUT UNTROUT/1 DECLINED.
DOOR OPEN FUTURE CONTACT.

2. IF THERE IS INTEREST IN FOLLOWING
LEAD, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE YET ANOTHER INSIGHT
IRANIAN C TION GROUPS, STATION WILL BE GLAD
SO. OUR PRESERVATION IS THAT IT MIGHT BE
A USE "FI TO BAKHTIAR DUE TO THE FACT THAT
ABDULAH IS AWARE THAT UNTROUT/1 IS IN CON
USC. SIN HAVE LITTLE CONTROL OVER COMI.
WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT UNTROUT/1 IS PRE
SIMPLY AS INTERESTED PARTY AND NOT AS ANOTHER
USC ELPHR TATIVE, LIKE GUNIO, AND TIMEN WED
(UNDER OF TICAL COVER) WIFE JA ADH AL-AMIN.

3. WELCOME ADDRESSES COMMENTS, IN ADDITION TO
PRELIMINARY TRACES ON MOINZADE

4. FILE: 221-279932. RVW 15 SEP 99 DEC

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SECRET 121017Z SEP 79 STAF

TO: DIRECTOR 517-57.

1. PARIS INFO THERAN, 221-279932.

MINIFL A UNTROUT SDFORCIVE

REF: PARIS 12464

1. AT THIS TIME NO HAS INTEREST IN FOLLOWING
LEAD. WE SHARE PARIS INFORMATION THAT THE
REPORTED AS ANOTHER FELLOW TO BAKHTIAR RESULTING
CUSTOM HIS PART AS TO HOW IN FACT HAPPENED.

2. MOINZADEH IS DJAID MOINZADEH, FORMER VICE
OFFICER WHO WAS SAVIN CHIEF OF STATION LONDON
RECENTLY TRAVELLED TO U.S. TO SEE OFFICIALS
PAGE TO OFFICIALS AND SDFORCIVE/1 (P-1) ALL
SUPPORT THEIR SUPPORT ON BEHALF OF BAKHTIAR
BY BAKHTIAR THAT MOINZADEH HAD CALLED AT
OLD BY THE WAS TRAVELING IN BAKHTIAR'S NAME.
WAS PRESENT BUT FAILED DISSEMINATE IN A

3. FILE: 221-279932. RVW 15 SEP 99 DEC. ALL-

SECRET 202336 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: DIRECTOR 517911

TO : PARIS, LONDON, INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE GNSIGHT

REFS: A LONDON 17825
B TEHRAN 54241
C S 12419

1 MEETING ARE COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENT
EES. WEING ADD TO REF B REQUIREMENTS WHILE
.....

2 APPRECIATE LONDON AND PARIS ASSISTANCE THIS CASE
..... IMPORTANT WINDOW INTO RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

3 FILE: 201-079938 ; 201-243505 RVW 19 SEP 79
ALL SECRET
SECRET

SECRET 211722 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12629

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54241
B. LONDON 17825

1. AS OF 21 SEPTEMBER UNTROUT/1 HAD RECEIVED NO
FURTHER WORD ON THE PART OF SDFORGIVE/1 TO EUROPE. AS SOON
AS PARTICULARS KNOWN WILL ADVISE.

2. UNTROUT PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN
RESPONSE TO REF A REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HE WILL DISCUSS WITH
SDFORGIVE/1 WHEN HE NEXT MEETS LATER. AS UNTROUT/1'S RESPONSES
TO INTEL REQUIREMENTS REPRESENT HIS VIEWS, WE ARE REPORTING
INFORMATION IN OPINION.

3. REGARDING OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT SDFORGIVE:
A. SDFORGIVE/1'S CURRENT RESIDENCE IS TEHRAN. HE OWNS A
FARM BETWEEN TEHRAN AND QOM AND TRAVELS TO THE FARM ABOUT
ONCE A WEEK. TO THE BEST OF UNTROUT/1'S KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
SDFORGIVE/1 DOES NOT TRAVEL TO QOM. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT
ANY SUCH VISITS WOULD BE REPORTED IN THE IRANIAN PRESS
SDFORGIVE/1 DOES NOT TRAVEL TO QOM BECAUSE HE WOULD
BE EXPECTED TO PAY A VISIT ON ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL
RELIGIOUS FIGURES. AS HE DOES NOT WANT TO VISIT
KHOMEINI, HE WOULD BE FORCED TO VISIT SHARIAT-MADANI, THUS
POLITICIZING HIMSELF.

B. SDFORGIVE/1 IS IN TOUCH WITH ALL THE "MAJOR"
MULLAHS, I.E. MEN WHO WERE ACCEPTED AS RELIGIOUS FIGURES
PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION AND WHO WERE NOT SIMPLY INSTALLED
AS MULLAHS BY KHOMEINI. UNTROUT/1 WAS UNAWARE OF ANY CONTACT
SDFORGIVE/1 HAS IN THE PRESENT IRANIAN MILITARY. UNTROUT/1
SAID THAT ALTHOUGH SDFORGIVE KNOWS BAZARGAN, HE DOUBTS
IF HE MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH HIM. HE WAS UNABLE TO ADDRESS
HIMSELF TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT CONTACTS SDFORGIVE/1 HAS.
SDFORGIVE/1 IS FAVORABLE TO SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS
IN IRAN. PER UNTROUT/1, SUNNI MULLAH'S VIEW SDFORGIVE/1
AS THE MOST ACCEPTABLE OF THE SHIA CLERGY.

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C. UNTROUT/1 IS CERTAINLY BRINGING UP THE IDEA OF ANOTHER INTERMEDIARY. HE IS NOT SANGUINE THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BE WILLING OR ABLE TO IDENTIFY SUCH A PERSON. UNTROUT/1 SUGGESTED THAT SDFORGIVE/1'S SON MIGHT BE WILLING TO SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN SDFORGIVE/1 AND TEHRAN STATION, WHEN THE SON IS IN TEHRAN. UNTROUT/1 WILL MENTION THIS POSSIBILITY TO SDFORGIVE/1 PRIOR TO TAKING ANY ACTION ON SUCH A PROPOSAL.

4. UNTROUT/1 RESPONDES TO INTEL REQUIREMENTS:

A. UNTROUT/1 MAINTAINS THAT NO ONE KNOWS THE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. WHILE THERE MAY BE CERTAIN MULLAHS WHO ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS, KHOMEINY HAS THE POWER TO CALL A COUNCIL MEETING AT ANY TIME AND THE COUNCIL WOULD SIMPLY BE CONSTITUTED BY THE MULLAHS WHO ARE PRESENT AT THAT PARTICULAR MEETING. THE COUNCIL HAS LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS, BUT IT IS KHOMEINY HIMSELF WHO HAS THE LAST WORD IN ALL MATTERS.

B. ALTHOUGH UNTROUT/1 DID NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE MEN WHO EXERCISE INFLUENCE OVER KHOMEINY, HE OPINED THAT IT IS KHOMEINY'S FAMILY MEMBERS (HIS SON, SON-IN-LAW AND GRANDSON) WHO HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE OVER HIM.

C. UNTROUT/1 MAINTAINS THAT ALL THE BONA FIDE MAJOR CLERICAL FIGURES ARE OPPOSED TO A THEOCRACY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE A CLEAR S.W.A.C.E. IS IN THE MOSQUE, NOT PARLIAMENT. THE ONLY PERSON WHO ACTIVELY AND VOICIFEROUSLY OPPOSES THE THEOCRACY IS SHARIAT-MADARI. THE MULLAHS THAT KHOMEINY CREATED AND INSTALLED AS MULLAHS SUPPORT HIS CALL FOR A THEOCRACY.

D. SHARIAT-MADARI'S SUPPORTERS AMONG THE CLERGY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. IN QOM: MOLPAYEGANI AND NALAFI.
 2. IN MASHHAD: HASSAN GOMI AND SHIRAZI
 3. IN TEHRAN: KHOSRAI AND SDFORGIVE/1
- FOR THE MOST PART, THESE MEN DO NOT WISH TO MEDDLE IN POLITICS. UNTROUT/1 BELIEVES THAT SHARIAT-MADARI'S FOLLOWING IS GROWING.

E. UNTROUT/1 DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT TALEQANI'S DEATH WILL HAVE ANY EFFECT ON KHOMEINY'S POLICIES. HE BELIEVES THAT TALEQANI TOOK A HARD LINE STANCE AGAINST THE LEFT AND PROPONENTS OF ETHNIC AUTONOMY SIMPLY TO SUPPORT KHOMEINY, NOT BECAUSE OF HIS OWN CONVICTIONS. UNTROUT/1 SAID THAT BARZAGAN AND TALEQANI WERE QUITE CLOSE. TALEQANI'S DEATH WILL GIVE KHOMEINY THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET RID OF BARZAGAN WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT OFFENDING TALEQANI.

4. FILE: 201-199000 RWA 21 SEP 99 DRV D9C

SECRET

30 SEP 79

R E T 291655Z SEP 79 STAFF

UTS PARIS 12643

O: PRIORITY TEHRAN. DIRECTOR INFO LONDON.

ENI EL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

RE: A. DIRECTOR 517941
E. TEHRAN 54241

UNTROUT/1 ADVISED BACKUP STATION OFFICER MILITO ON 25 SEPTEMBER THAT SDFORGIVE/1 HAD ARRIVED IN PARIS 25 SEPTEMBER. UNTROUT/1 HAD SHORT MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1 EVENING 26 SEPTEMBER.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE TIME FOR TALK HAS PASSED AND THAT IT IS NOW TIME FOR ACTION. HE WOULD LIKE UNTROUT/1 TO GET A CLEAR STATEMENT AS TO WHAT U.S. POLICY IS TOWARDS THE KHOMEINI REGIME. IT SEEMS THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS WILLING TO TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN MOVEMENT TO REMOVE KHOMEINI BUT NOT INTERESTED IN SIMPLY PROVIDING US INFORMATION. HIS PROBABLY NOT A FIRM POSITION.

3. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HOW LONG SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BE IN PARIS. HE WILL TRAVEL TO EGYPT FROM PARIS AS HE WAS INVITED TO VISIT SADAT BY AN EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL. UNTROUT/1 STAYED BEFORE THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY CLOSED IN TEHRAN. SDFORGIVE/1 EXPECTS THE EGYPTIANS TO SUGGEST HE HEAD OPPOSITION FROM BASE IN CAIRO. SDFORGIVE/1 PROBABLY NOT WILLING TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT SACRIFICES THIS WOULD MEAN FOR HIM AND FAMILY.

4. SDFORGIVE WILL NOT TRAVEL TO LONDON.

5. UNTROUT/1 SAYS FOLLOWING QUOTE SUMS UP SDFORGIVE/1'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN. AS FAR AS HE KNOWS, IN 25 CENTURIES OF HISTORY, IRAN HAS NEVER CONSIDERED SUCH A SITUATION. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS A FARM NEAR QOM THAT HE VISITS ONCE A WEEK. HE DOES NOT GO INTO THE CITY AND IS AVOIDING CONTACT WITH THE CLERGY. WITHIN LAST FEW WEEKS HE TALKED TO SHARIAT-MADARI, WHO LIVES IN QOM. SHARIAT-MADARI TRAVELED TO TEHRAN

2 PARIS 12844 S E C R E T
 SHEET. SEAFIRT-MATARA SAID THAT ALL REPEAT ALL MULLANS
 AGAINST KHOMEINI AND THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE TO
 RID OF HIM.
 SDFORGIVE/1 HAS BEEN SEEING A SOVIET IN TEHRAN ABOUT 08
 MONTE (UNTRUT/1 SAID SDFORGIVE/1 ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY SOV
 HAD USED A FALSE NAME). THE SOVIET IS
 PUTTING THE LINE THAT UNITED STATES THAT UNITED STATES
 DIET UNION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS THAT UNITED STATES
 HAD PLAYED NO ROLE IN BRINGING KHOMEINI TO POWER. THE SOVIET
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 IN IRAN THAT THE UNITED STATES PUT KHOMEINI IN POWER (SIC.)
 WILL PASS REF B REQUIREMENTS TO UNTRUT/1 ON 29 SEPT
 UNTRUT/1 BELIEVES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD
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 ADVISE IN EC'S OR TEHRAN INTERESTED. WILL USE STANDARD APP
 UNTRUT/1. UNLESS ADVISED OTHERWISE, I.E. THAT POLICY IS NOT
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 SOUND POLICY. HOPEFULLY SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BUY THIS BUT UNTR
 SPECIFIC.

FILE: 201-279932, RVN 208 P09 DRV D90.1. ALL SECRET

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2 PARIS 12844 S E C R E T

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6 OCT 19 1972

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PARIS 13264

SECTOR, TEHRAN.

AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

- A. DIRECTOR 525200
- B. DIRECTOR 525252
- C. TEHRAN 54348
- D. PARIS 12843

UNTROUT/1 VISITED SDFORGIVE/1 AND ATTEMPTED EXPLAIN THAT RTACTION COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY KIND OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM U.S. POLICY LEVELS. SDFORGIVE/1 TOOK THE POSITION THAT IF THIS IS THE CASE, HE SAW NO POINT IN CONTINUING THE CONTACT WITH THIS. UNTROUT/1 TRIED TO SERVICE OUR REQUIREMENT, STATING THAT HE HAD INTENDED TRAVEL TEHRAN TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH SDFORGIVE/1 AND SUGGESTED THEY BE DISCUSSED NOW. SDFORGIVE/1 SIMPLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING. UNTROUT/1 WILL TRY AGAIN USING THE TACTIC THAT IRANIAN PEOPLES INTEREST TO HAVE U.S.G. INFORMED IN ORDER THAT POLICY CAN BE FORMULATED.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 IS CONVINCED THAT RTACTION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KHOMEINI COMING TO POWER. AS PROOF HE TELLS THE TALK HE HAD TWENTY YEARS AGO IN BEIRUT WITH AN RTACTION OFFICER (NAME) WHO SAID IT NOT PRACTICAL TO ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN IRAN. TWO YEARS AGO HE CLAIMS THAT U.S. EMBASSY SET UP A VISIT WITH A RTACTION OFFICER (NAME) IN CAIRO WHO SUGGESTED THAT A POPULAR GOVERNMENT SHOULD REPLACE THE SHAH. RATHER THAN A VILLAGE PRIEST, KHOMEINI, COMES TO POWER. HE COMMENTS THAT RTACTION HAD TO HAVE MADE THIS POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER COOPERATING WITH RTACTION IF HE WAS PRESENTED WITH FACTS PROVING RTACTION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH KHOMEINI COMING TO POWER. HOWEVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT EVEN A MESSAGE FROM HEAVEN WOULD CHANGE SDFORGIVE/1'S VIEW ON RTACTION INVOLVEMENT.

2 PARIS 13264 SECRET

3. SDFORGIVE/1 SIMPLY CANNOT BELIEVE THAT RTACTION CAN DO SOMETHING ABOUT KHOMEINI WHO SDFORGIVE/1 BELIEVES IS TURNING IRANIAN INTO BARBARIANS. HE CITES THE CASE OF GENERAL PAKRAVAN, HEAD OF SAVAK THAT ARRANGED THE OVERMISE ALLOWING KHOMEINI TO GO INTO EXILE IN TURKEY. WHEN KHOMEINI CAME TO POWER PAKRAVAN WAS ASSURED HIS PHYSICAL PERSON NOT IN DANGER. HE WAS ARRESTED FIVE DAYS LATER, TRIED IN A REVOLUTIONARY COURT AND EXECUTED. WHEN HIS BODY WAS WASHED FOR BURIAL AS IS THE CUSTOM, IT WAS NOTICED HE WAS NOT CIRCUMCISED AND THEREFORE NOT A MUSLEM AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE BURIED. THEY BURNED HIS BODY BEHIND A WALL AND DROVE IN LARGE CIRCLES UNTIL IT DISINTEGRATED INTO NOTHING. THIS KIND OF BARBARISM SDFORGIVE/1 CONTENTS, IS WHY KHOMEINI HAS TO GO BEFORE IT BECOMES THE NORM.

4. WILL ADVISE IF UNTROUT/1 IS ABLE TO GET SDFORGIVE/1 TO COMMENT ON REQUIREMENTS. SUSPECT THIS IS A DEAD CASE.

5. NEW SUBJECT: SDJULEP/1 ARRIVED IN PARIS LAST WEEK. HIS WIFE WILL JOIN HIM IN A FEW DAYS AND STAY FOR AT LEAST TEN DAYS. UNTROUT/1 IS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH SDJULEP/1. IT SEEMS THAT SDJULEP/1 IS IN CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF IRANIAN IN PARIS BUT CLAIMS TO NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN POLITICS. UNTROUT/1 WILL CONTINUE TO ASSESS SDJULEP/1 WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF RECOMMENDING HOW BEST TO PUT RTACTION IN TOUCH WITH HIM. HE NOW BELIEVES IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SET UP THE CONTACT BUT WANTS A LITTLE MORE TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT. WILL ADVISE.

6. FILE: 281-243505. RVW 5 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.

SECRET

BT #3054

10 OCT 79 1022

SECRET 092114 OCT 79 STAFF

TELETYPE DIRECTOR 529055

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO TEHRAN

MINTEL AJAJA UNTRUT SDFORGIVE

REF: PARIS 13054

1. REF IS UNFORTUNATE, AND WHILE AS NO THIS MAY BE
INDEED DEAD CASE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE STATION ADVISING UNTRUT/1
(F/1) TRY ONCE MORE TACTIC OF POINTING OUT TO SDFORGIVE/1 (F/1)
THAT IT NOT IN INTEREST OF THOSE LIKE HIMSELF THAT USG RECEIVES
THIS INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY FROM OFFICIAL
PCOI SOURCES MAY LOOSEN THINGS A BIT. MOREOVER HQS PREPARED
SEND SENIOR STAFFER (AND FARSI SPEAKER) MEET WITH F/1 IF STATION
BELIEVES THIS WOULD BE SALUTARY. THIS OFFICER MAY BE IN EUROPE
ON OTHER BUSINESS. CITE 20 OCTOBER. PLS ADVISE.

2. FILE 201-244325; 201-079932. RVM 29019 DRY D9C11 ATUL

SECRET
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528

10 OCT 79 1505E

SECRET 131700Z OCT 79 STAFF

TELETYPE PARIS 13100

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

MINTEL AJAJA UNTRUT SDFORGIVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 529055

B. DIRECTOR 526995

1. MARINOS MET WITH UNTRUT/1 12 OCTOBER, PRIOR RECEIPT
OF UNTRUT/1 AGAIN VOICED OPINION IT WILL BE NECESSARY
TO DISCUSS SOME KIND OF PLAN OF ACTION WITH SDFORGIVE/1
IN ORDER TO MOVE THIS CASE FORWARD. SDFORGIVE/1 IS SIMPLY
HILLING TO BE AN "INFORMANT" UNLESS HE CAN BE CONVINCED
THAT NVBLAZON WILL TAKE ACTION TO "BETTER THE SITUATION" IN
TEHRAN. MARINOS POINTED OUT THAT NVBLAZON WOULD NOT CONSPIRE
WITH SDFORGIVE/1 TO PLOT A COUP AGAINST KHOMEINI. UNTRUT/1
IS WITH US, BUT HE BELIEVES SDFORGIVE/1 WOULD REBUKE
ANYONE WHO WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT NVBLAZON IS IN
THE PROCESS OF "STUDYING HOW THE SITUATION COULD BE
IMPROVED".
2. UNLESS ABOVE TACK IS FOLLOWED IN FUTURE DEALINGS
WITH SDFORGIVE/1, THIS WILL INDEED BE DEAD CASE. SDFORGIVE/1
IS UNPLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY NATURE OF REQUIREMENTS DISCUSSED
WITH HIM; HE TOLD UNTRUT/1 THAT THESE WERE QUESTIONS TO
WHICH ANYONE COULD RESPOND. UNTRUT/1 TRIED IN VAIN TO GET
SDFORGIVE/1 TO DISCUSS REQUIREMENTS, BUT HE ADAMANTLY
REFUSED. (IN VIEW OF SDFORGIVE/1'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS
REQUIREMENTS, REF B REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT PASSED TO UNTRUT/1.
THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM AT A LATER DATE.)

3. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS NOT COMPLETELY CLOSED DOOR TO FUTURE
CONTACTS WITH NVBLAZON. IN FACT, HE TOLD UNTRUT/1 THAT HE
WILL BE WILLING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. AND MEET WITH
APPROPRIATE NVBLAZON OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS COURSE OF ACTION.
UNTRUT/1 STRESSED THESE TALKS WOULD NECESSARILY BE "PLANNING
SESSIONS" AND THAT NO ONE EXPECTS NVBLAZON TO ACT IN THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE. UNTRUT/1 SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT SOME
OF PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS A FIRST

APR 2 PARIS 1319Z S E C R E T
 GIVEN ABOVE, STATION THINKS THERE IS MERIT IN HAVING
 SENIOR FARSI-SPEAKING STAFFER FAMILIAR WITH IRAN MEET WITH
 SDFORGIVE/1. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT MEETING WOULD BE
 COUNTERPRODUCTIVE UNLESS INTERLOCUTOR WILLING TO AT LEAST
 IMPLY THAT RESULTS THESE TALKS MIGHT LEAD TO A CHANGED
 NUBLAZON POLICY TOWARDS IRAN. (FOR THE RECORD, UNTROUT/1
 AS TOLD SDFORGIVE/1 ONLY THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH
 NUBLAZON, NOT ACTION.)

4. SDFORGIVE/1 IS LEAVING PARIS IN NEXT TWO DAYS FOR
 NETHERLAND AND GERMANY. UNTROUT/1 IS UNCERTAIN BUT THINKS
 SDFORGIVE/1 MAY BE AWAY FROM PARIS AS LONG AS ONE MONTH.
 SDFORGIVE/1'S TRIP TO EGYPT IS STILL IN THE PLANNING STAGES
 AND HE HAS NOT INDICATED TO UNTROUT/1 WHEN HE WILL RETURN
 TO THIRAN.

5. SDFORGIVE/1 WAS CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY BY AN
 UNIDENTIFIED PERSON FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PARIS WHO
 REQUESTED A MEETING. SDFORGIVE/1 DECLINED, ON THE GROUNDS
 THAT THERE ARE NO FARSI SPEAKERS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
 PARIS. THE SOVIET OFFERED TO HAVE SDFORGIVE/1'S TEHRAN
 CONTACT COME TO PARIS TO MEET WITH HIM. SDFORGIVE/1 SAID
 HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED
 WHETHER HE WILL MEET THE SOVIET. THE PARIS-BASED SOVIET TOLD
 SDFORGIVE/1 THEY LOCATED HIM THROUGH HIS SON.

6. UNTROUT/1 OPINED SDFORGIVE/1 MIGHT BE WILLING WORK WITH
 CIVILIS IF HE FELT THEY WERE THE ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO
 HOMINIL. SDFORGIVE/1 THINKS IRAN BEING PUSHED INTO THE
 CIVIL ORBIT BY NUBLAZON NON-ACTION. THIS VIEW IS HELD BY
 VIRTUALLY ALL IRANIANS WITH WHOM UNTROUT/1 IS IN CONTACT
 IN PARIS.

7. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS MET WITH BAKETIAR DURING HIS
 STAY IN PARIS. HE BELIEVES THAT BAKETIAR IS BEING SUPPORTED
 BY THE FRENCH. (WILL DISCUSS THIS POINT IN MORE DETAIL
 AT NEXT SESSION WITH UNTROUT/1.)

8. FILE: 201-243505, 201-079932. RYM 10 OCT 99 DRV

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 124032Z OCT 79
 DIRECTOR 530840
 TO: IMMEDIATE PARIS INFO
 UNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT
 REFS: A. PARIS 13190
 DIRECTOR 529053

1. APPRECIATE REF A AND MARINES' EFFORTS THIS CASE. RECORDED
 EVERY GRATEFUL TO PRIOR SDFORGIVE/1 (F/1)'S PRESUMED DEPARTURE
 UNTROUT/1 (F/1) BROUGHT TO HIM POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH SENIOR
 NUBLAZON OFFICER CIRCUMSTANCES OCT 79 AND IF F/1 WILLING ALTER HIS
 SCHEDULE ACCOMMODATE SUCH MEETING.

2. AS ADDRESSEES AWAKE, POLICY QUESTIONS RAISED REF A
 IN AREA WHERE WE HAVE LITTLE LEeway, BUT WILL ATTEMPT TO SEE WHAT
 CAN DO TO IMPROVE SITUATION. WILL ADVISE.

FILE: 201-2243505, 201-0079932. RYM 11 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.

3 OCT 79 03 40Z

S E C R E T 121532Z OCT 79 START

CIT PARIS 13273

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INF TEHRAN

WIN EL AJAJA SOFORGIVE NTHOUT

FM: DIRECTOR 530240

UNTR0UT/1 ADVISED THAT S. FORGIVE DEPARTED FOR
11 OCTOBER. HOWEVER, UNTR0UT/1 WILL ATTEMPT TO CONTACT
11 AND ASK HIM TO RETURN TO PARIS FOR 22 OCTOBER
WITH STATION OFFICER. IF S. FORGIVE/1 UNABLE TO RETURN
UNTR0UT/1 WILL ASCERTAIN IF HE WILLING TO MEET
IN GERMANY.

UNSUB FURTHER TOLD UNTRUT/1 THAT HE COULD BE REACHED
BY PHONE AT 021 44 11 11. UNTRUT/1 STATED THAT JAMARANI
(SIC). ALTHOUGH JAMARANI NOT KNOWN TO UNTRUT/1,
HE IS FAMILIAR WITH JAMARANI ZAMIN. WHICH IS PROMINENT
FAMILY IN IRAN. JAMARANI HIMSELF IS NOT A CLERIC.

UNTHROUT/1 STRESSED THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS NOT A CLINIC
ABOUT ANY DISCUSSIONS TO BE HELD WITH NVBIAZON REPS.
WITH SDFORGIVE/1 CAN BE ARRANGED, SUGGEST THAT
BETWEEN UNTHROUT/1 AND HOS DEREGER WOULD BE MOST
PRIOR FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1.

4. WILL ADVISE RESULTS UNTRUTH/1 CALL TO SDFORCIVE/1

FILE: 221-0243505 RWW 12 OCT 99 DRV DDC.1

S E C R E T 170854Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54583

TO: PRIORITY PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

UNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTRQUT

1. ADLESICK PLANNING LEAVE TEHRAN 19 OCTOBER, ALTHOUGH DEPARTURE MAY BE DELAYED. REQUEST PARIS PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTION.

2. BELIEVE BEST DECIDE ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT MEETING SDFORGIVE/I AFTER CONFERING WITH UNTRUT/I. SINCE ADELSICK MOVING ON TO NEW JOB, HAS MIGHT WISH CONSIDER HAVING SOMEONE ELSE MEET SDFORGIVE/I WHO WILL BE ABLE TO FOLLOW CASE.

3. HQS: PLS HAVE STATE AMEND TRAVEL ORDER.

4. FILED EOI-0243505. RVW 17 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
SECRET

5 E C 1 1 18157 OCT 79 STAL
 CITE DIRECTOR 5-4432
 FOR PRIORITY PARIS, TERRAN
 MARY "CL" JAMES EDORANGE UNPROUD
 PARIS 13320
 FOR PARIS, AGAIN, AFTER STATE MAKING... EFFORTS THIS
 IN RESULT WFF, BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW... MID-NO
 CASE AND... SPORADIC/1 FF/1 UNTIL ITS RETURN...
 AT ENDS HERE... SCHEDULE WILL NOT ALLOW JOSEPH...
 DEWARR... WILL ATTEMPT ARRANGE MEETING WITH...
 TO MEET WITH... WILL ADVISE...
 OFFICE AT LATER DATE...
 FOR TERRAN, BELIEVE IT WOULD STILL BE USEFUL FOR
 WEST... ON HIS... FROM TERRAN IN ORDER DIS-
 THEN, TERRAN SPEAK... PARIS STATION OFFICERS.
 1501 201-85532... 1501 201-85532...

5 E C 1 1 18157 OCT 79 STAL
 CITE DIRECTOR 5-4432
 FOR PRIORITY PARIS, TERRAN
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 TO MEET WITH... WILL ADVISE...
 OFFICE AT LATER DATE...
 FOR TERRAN, BELIEVE IT WOULD STILL BE USEFUL FOR
 WEST... ON HIS... FROM TERRAN IN ORDER DIS-
 THEN, TERRAN SPEAK... PARIS STATION OFFICERS.
 1501 201-85532... 1501 201-85532...

S E C R E T

CITE: DIRECTOR 534834

TO : PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO PARIS

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTROUT

REF: TEHRAN 54505

1- AGREE PARA TWO REF AND WE CONSIDERING
ALTERNATIVES.

2- STATE TRAVEL ORDERS BEING AMENDED.

3- FILE 201 - 243505: 201-079938. RVW 18OCT90 DRV D9C

S E C R E T 020153Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE: DIRECTOR 487315.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL SDJULEP

REF: PARIS 11104

SDJULEP/1 (SUBJECT REF) BECAME A RECRUITED RTACTION
ASSET IN 1959. J/1 WAS TO BE AN FI ASSET FOR EXPLOITATION OF
HIS WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL CONTACTS, AND A CA ASSET FOR THE
WRITING, EDITING, AND PLACEMENT OF ARTICLES FAVORABLE TO USG
INTERESTS. J/1 WAS, AND APPARENTLY REMAINS, A WRITER OF THE
HIGH CALIBRE, AND MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE FINEST EDITOR IN
IRAN. J/1 WAS HANDLED BY UNTROUT/1, EDWARD S. VALERIEUS, AND
JOSEPH W. ADLESICK.

IN 1959, J/1 SIGNED A CONTRACT WITH RTACTION FOR REA
15,000 PER MONTH; HOWEVER, HE SHORTLY THEREAFTER LEFT FOR THE
UNITED STATES AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED. WHILE J/1 WAS
WILLING TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH RTACTION ON CA PROPAGAND
OPS, HE ALSO WAS MOST HESITANT TO UNDERTAKE ANY WORK IN THE FI

ALTHOUGH REQUIRING SOME MEASURABLE DEGREE OF HANDS-ON
POTENTIAL, J/1 WAS CONSTANTLY EVALUATED AS POSSESSING SOLID LONG TERM
POTENTIAL. NOW MAY WELL BE THE TIME TO CAPITALIZE ON THAT
L. WHILE J/1'S VALUE AS AN FI SOURCE IS IN DOUBT (PER
HAPS DUE MORE TO HIS RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE CHANDSELINE ACTIVITY
THAN FOR ANY OTHER REASON), J/1 REMAINS OF HIGH INTEREST TO
RTACTION FOR HIS CA POTENTIAL. TO THIS END, WE ENCOURAGE AND
WELCOMED J/1'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH J
SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO KNOW WHAT J/1 IS AND
WILL BE DOING, WHO HIS CONTACTS ARE, WHAT JOURNALS HE MAY BE
EDITING OR PUBLISHING IN, AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VARIOUS
PERSONALITIES IN IRAN AND THE USG. ADLESICK CURRENTLY AT HQS
AND WILL BE TRYING TO MEET WITH J/1 WHEN/IF NECESSARY. WE APPRECIATE
HIS EFFORTS.

10443 71 AUG 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 488745

IO: PARIS INFO TERRAN, OSLO.

SDJULEP UNTROUT

ATF: PARIS 11230

1. IN REPLY TO REF, FOLLOWING IS FROM 1978 WFO'S WFO IN ARAN.
"BORN 1929, PROFESSION JOURNALIST, EDUCATION: LICENTATE IN LAW
FROM PERMAN UNIVERSITY; M.A. IN JOURNALISM FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
GRADUATED IN AN EDUCATIONAL COURSE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.
STARTED HIS JOURNALISTIC CAREER IN 1949, PARLIAMENTARY REPORTER FOR
ETELA AT, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF ETELA AT PARTICI, EDITOR-IN-
CHIEF OF THE MAGAZINE ROVSHAN, FOUNDER OF THE MAGAZINE
"ZAN-E-RUZ" EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AND TECHNICAL EDITOR OF THE
MAGAZINE "ZAN-E-RUZ".

2. HAS LOOKS FORWARD TO UNTROUT/1'S RETURN AND ADDITIONAL
INFO RE PLANS OF SDJULEP/1.

3. NO INDEX FILE: 201-118671. RVW 3AUG99 DNV DSC-1
ALL SECRET
SECRET
BT
#3554

10615 12 512

DEVELOPMENTS IN SDJULEP/1'S
ACATION IN THE SOUTH
NOT EXPECT THAT WE WILL
EARLY SEPTEMBER.

2. SDJULEP/1, INCLUDING
JOURNALIST CAREER.

3. IF SDJULEP/1 ELECTS TO REMAIN IN OSLO, THERE MAY BE
INTEREST IN CONTACTING HIM THERE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT
DISCUSSED THIS WITH UNTROUT/1, IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THAT HE
WOULD BE WILLING TO EFFECT INTRODUCTION OF SDJULEP/1 TO
OSLO BASED RTACTION OFFICER.

4. DIRECTOR: PLEASE RELAY REF TO OSLO.

5. FILE: 201-118671. RVW 2 AUG 99 DRV D9C1.
SECRET
BT
#1230

200ct79 09 36z

SECRET 191813Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 435739.

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN, OSLO.

WMINTEL AJAJA UNPROUI SIJULEP

REF: PARIS 13195

1. NO EDS TRACES ON PARI SAKANDARY.

2. WHILE DEFERRING TEHRAN, DO NOT BELIEVE SHE REPRESENTS FI OR CA TARGET WITH SUFFICIENT ACCESS OR POTENTIAL WARRANI OUR EFFORTS. APPRECIATE REF.

3. FILE: 41-122-27. RVW 190CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL STAFF.

SECRET

#9042

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975-253-244

SECRET 071500Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 490 PPS.

TO: PRIORITY FRANTECH INFO TEHRAN, DUTCH, AUSTRIAN

WMINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SBLUR AQUATIC

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 435752
B. FRANTECH 37531
C. DIRECTOR 425474

1. PLANNING FOR SDI/RE/1 OPERATION (WHICH UNDERWENT SIGNIFICANT REVIEW FOR PARI A) FOR IN FINAL PHASES (AND RE-ENTRY W. RUTHERFORD (P) WILL TRAVEL TO TEHRAN IN AUGUST 79. RUTHERFORD NOW EQUIPPED WITH FULLY BACKSTOPPED LIVE CORPORA AND TRAVELLING ON ALIAS U.S. REGULAR PASSPORT (IDEM)).

2. REQUEST FRANTECH PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RUTHERFORD IN OBTAINING OF SAFETY/RE/1 HIS TRANS-ATLANTIC AIR TICKETS AND MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION WHILE HE TRAVELLING TO IRAN. RUTHERFORD WILL FOR RUTHERFORD TO STOP OVER FRANKFURT AND CONTACT RZNOVA FOR FRANKFURT AND PARA 5 REF C INSTRUCTIONS. PLS ADVISE SOONEST IF ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE.

3. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE WE NEED FOR ANY OTHER FORM OF IDENTITY ASSISTANCE TO RUTHERFORD WHO WILL ONLY FRANKFURT ONLY FOR AS LONG AS HE TAKES TO EFFECT TURNOVER OF TICKETS (AND REDIRECT THEM ON HIS WAY FROM IRAN).

4. WILL ADVISE RUTHERFORD BY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. FILE: 201-959239. RVW 200CT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL STAFF.

SECRET

SECRET 1700Z AUG 79 ST

CITE DIRECTOR 492219

TO: PRIORITY FOR INFO THER

UNTEL RYBAT APLURE AQUATI

REF: DIRECTOR 4

IDEN: WILLIAM FOSTER.

VW 27 AUG 99 DRV D901 SECRET

SECRET

BT
11

SECRET 1700Z AUG 79 STAF

CITE DIRECTOR 492219

TO: IMMEDIATE THERAN INFO IMMEDIATE FRANTECH, ROUTINE
FRANTECH, ATBTECP, ATHENS, NEW DELHI.

UNTEL RYBAT AJAJA LPGAMIN TIGES OLURE

REF: A. FRANTECH 39042 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, GERMANY
ATHENS, NEW DELHI)
B. THERAN 53781 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, GERMANY,
ATHENS, NEW DELHI)

1. RUTHERFORD PRESENTLY HQS AREA FOR FINAL BRIEFING
TRAVEL TO IRAN. ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS BUT NOTE DATES ARE
TENTATIVE AND SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF AIRLINE SEATS, LEAD
TIME REQUIRED TO ACQUIRE VISAS IN EUROPE, ETC.:

9-12 AUG. WASH D.C. (FINAL BRIEFING)

12-13 AUG. FRANKFURT (DROF OF TRANSATLANTIC AIR T
AND MISC ITEMS)

13-15 AUG. ATHENS (ACQUIRE IND A/IRAN BUSINESSMAN'S

15-18 AUG. DELEN (FOR CORPORATE COVER WORK PURPOSES
19 AUG-1 SEPT. THERAN

2. RUTHERFORD TRAVELLING ON ALIAS (GIVEN) FROM U.S. WHEN
HE INTENDS MAKING RESERVATIONS FOR 2 WEEKS AT THERAN
HOTEL CENTRAL. HE WILL ALSO CALL SDLR 01 AND ADVISE HIM OF
XV-AGE LNA. RUTHERFORD HAS VISITED THERAN 2-3 TIMES AND
IS APPARENTLY FAMILIAR WITH CITY TO MAKE CAR PICK-UPS/PERGO
G8. HE'S PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO HQS (INFO SZWOWA).
RUTHERFORD WILL INITIATE CONTACT WITH STATION NOR
TH. A SUITABLE PERIOD OF TIME HAS PASSED TO ALLOW HIM TO
PLAYING COVER WORK MEETINGS AND OTHERWISE ASSUME ALL
AS A TRAVELLING BUSINESSMAN. IN ANY CASE EXPECT THIS
TO BE NO LONGER THAN 2-3 DAYS. WHO WILL MEET RUTHERFORD?

ON PER PARA 3 REF B REASONING.

492219 S.E. C R Y T

1. ANTICIPATE RUTHERFORD TRAVEL TO
EZNOVA: HE PLANS MAKE OWN ACCOMMODATION PLANS ON ARRIVAL
NUMBER/TIMES NOT YET KNOWN AND WILL CONTACT EZNOVA
ARRANGEMENTS.

2. PLS RELAY TEHRAN CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO RUTHERFORD
FOR NEW DELHI, ATHENS, BONN, GERMANY, GUY, RUTHERFORD
STAFFER AND PRESENTLY ON CONTRACT TO REACTION WILL
BEING IN ALIAS (IDEN) TO YOUR RESPECTIVE AREAS PER PARA
STATION CONTACT OR SUPPORT IS REQUESTED OR ANTICIPATED
INVOLVED IN SENSITIVE IRANIAN CASE. NO OPERATIONAL
PLANNED EXCEPT IN TEHRAN. RNY 26 AUG 69 DRV D9C.1

E.C.R.E. 120025Z AUG 73

DIRECTOR 492248

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO
RCH. ATE ECH. ATHENS, NEW
ED RYBATAJEJA LE AMIN

DIRECTOR 492219

MDEN: WILLIAM A. FOSTER
1999 DRV D9C.1 A.L. SECRET
F T

11 AUG 79 3 3

SECRET 102251Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 493010.

TO: IMMEDIATE GERMANY INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN, FRANTECH, DIRTECH, ATRTCH, ROUTINE BONN, ATHENS, NEW DELHI.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA LPGAMIN TECHS SDLURE

REFS: A. GERMANY 83634
B. DIRECTOR 492243

1. APPRECIATE REF. RUTHERFORD ALREADY HAS COMPLETE ALIAS DOCUMENTATION. NAME SEEMS COMMON ENOUGH, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY EDLURE/1, WHO TARGET IN THIS CASE, HAS ALREADY MET RUTHERFORD IN REF B ALIAS.

2. FILE: 221-959269. RW 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
SECRET
15

EMS. 28 A. 62

SECRET 131029Z AUG 79 STAFF
FRANTECH 39093 (WIADUCK ACTING)
PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, G
INTEL RYBAT AJAJA (SDLURE TECHS)
REF: DIRECTOR 492219

1. RUTHERFORD ARRIVED FRANKFURT
TELEPHONE TEHRAN PROSPECT AFTERNOON
2. FILE: DEVER. RW 13 AUG 99. D
SECRET

S E C R E T 310062 AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 26025.

TO: TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 54004
B. TEHRAN 54003
C. TEHRAN 54002

1. RE REF B. LPM GET INFORMED US MORNING 27 AUGUST RUTHERFORD'S REQUEST FOR HOTEL CREDIT TRANSFER. WE APPROVED THIS ON THE SPOT IN ORDER THAT LPMIGHT COULD ASK INTERCONTINENTAL NY MAIN OFFICE TO EFFECT TRANSFER EXPEDITIOUSLY. TRANSFER SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN MADE BY NOW. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE HOTEL WILL INFORM RUTHERFORD OF THE TRANSFER WHEN RECEIVED. PLS REMIND RUTHERFORD THAT IF HE HAS FURTHER NEED FOR FUNDS, REQUESTS THROUGH LPMIGHT WILL BE HANDLED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND SHOULD TAKE A COUPLE OF DAYS AT THE MOST.

2. LOOK FORWARD TO DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FILE: 221-960203. RVW 31AUG79 DRV D9C.1 ALL S

S E C R E T
BT
#3151

S C R E T 040807Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54117

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

1. FOLLOWING IS RUTHERFORD'S REPORT OF SECOND MEETING HELD WITH SDLURE/1 ON 3 SEPTEMBER. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH RUTHERFORD WAITED FOR SUBJECT ONE HOUR AT LATTER'S RESIDENCE ON 2 SEPTEMBER, SDLURE/1 (L/1) TELEPHONED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE IT AND SUGGESTED CHANGING TO NEXT DAY.)

2. L/1 HAS BEEN MAINTAINING A BUSY SCHEDULE SINCE HIS RETURN TO IRAN LAST FEBRUARY. BETWEEN ATTENDING DAILY SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS, MEETINGS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND PUBLISHING HIS PAPER, HE IS NORMALLY WORKING UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT ON A REGULAR BASIS. HE BROKE AWAY FROM A MEETING ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION TO MEET WITH RUTHERFORD FOR TWO HOURS ON 3 SEP AND PLANNED TO RETURN TO PARLIAMENT IN THE AFTERNOON TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION.

3. SUBJECT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REVISIT PARIS SINCE HIS RETURN IRAN. TWO OF HIS CHILDREN CONTINUE TO STUDY IN PARIS. ASKED ABOUT HIS APARTMENT THERE, HE INDICATED THAT HE STILL RETAINS IT BUT HOPES TO TERMINATE IT BECAUSE OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN. HE AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY IN TEHRAN ARE LIVING WITH THREE MARRIED SISTERS WHO OCCUPY THE THREE APARTMENTS AT CHANAS STREET LOCATION.

4. IN DISCUSSING THE CENTER OF POWER IN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVT OF IRAN, SUBJECT STATED THAT POWER RESIDES IN THE HANDS OF COUNCIL, THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AND IN THE KOMITEHS. ACCORDING TO HIS EXPLANATION, THE KOMITEHS ARE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH LOCAL MATTERS BUT, NONTHELESS, ARE CAPABLE OF PROPOSING SPECIFIC STEPS OR ACTION BY THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF POWER. ALTHOUGH INCLUDING THE PRESENT CABINET AS A HOLDER OF POWER, SUBJECT NOTED ONCE AGAIN THAT IT TAKES ACTION ON RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH AS THOSE CONCERNING EDUCATION, HEALTH, ETC.

5. SUBJECT WAS EITHER UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO NAME A LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO BAZARGAN WHENEVER HE STEPS ASIDE. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT " WE SHALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE."

6. COMMENTING ON HIS OWN ESTIMATE ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION, SUBJECT STATED THAT HE IS SATISFIED BY SOME OF THE PROGRESS MADE TO DATE BUT THAT HE IS FRUSTRATED AND DISCOURAGED BY THE STUMBLING BLOCKS WITHIN THE GOVT ITSELF. NOT SURPRISING, HE EXHIBITED OPTIMISM CONCERNING THE FUTURE.

7. WHILE MENTIONING FORMIN IBRAHIM YAZDI, SUBJECT NOTED THAT HE IS NO LONGER A MEMBER OF THE REV/ COUNCIL SINCE JOINING THE CABINET. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YAZDI ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF KHOMEINI BUT IS NOT INCLINED TO REGARD HIM AS A POWERFUL INDIVIDUAL.

8. IN DISCUSSING THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKS, SUBJ STRESSED THAT THEY WERE DESPARATELY IN NEED OF REFORM MEASURES. FOR EXAMPLE, POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS IN THE BANKING FIELD MANIPULATED THE BANK FUNDS AND ARRANGED 'SWEETHEART' LOANS. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, KHOMEINI WANTED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKING SYSTEM AND THUS APPROVED THE NATIONALIZATION STEP. SUBJ STATED THAT WHEREAS WEALTHY IRANIAN BUSINESSMEN ARE OPPOSED TO NATIONALIZATION, THE SMALL BUSINESSMEN FAVOR IT AS THEY WILL BE ABLE TO.... RECEIVE LOANS MORE EASILY THAN HITHERTO.

9. ALTHOUGH CONCEDING THAT THE KURDESTAN PROBLEM OCCUPA.... THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESENT GOVT, SUBJ STATED THAT A MORE URGENT PROBLEM IS TO SET THE ECONOMY MOVING. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE OIL REVENUES ARE ONLY SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEFENSE PROGRAM AND TO ENABLE THE GOVT TO PAY ITS BIL.... ADDITIONAL FUNDS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED TO STIMULATE THE FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY. ATTACKING THE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES OF THE FORMER REGIME, HE NOTED HOW A SURPLUS ... NUMBER OF AUTOMATIVE FIRMS WERE ESTABLISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LIGHT INDUSTRY AND FARMING.

10. RUTHERFORD COMMENT: ON THE BASIS OF TWO SESSIONS TO DATE INCLINED TO BELIEVE WE CAN INTRODUCE SUBJ A USG OFFICIAL ALTHOUGH CALLED ATTENTION IN PASSING AT THE 3SPT MEETING THAT THE SHAH WAS "THE INSTRUMENT OF THE USG POLICY IN THE AREA" AND THAT US FIRMS WILL BE WELCOME IN IRAN AS LONG AS THEY DO NOTBLE IN THE COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BELIEVE WE CAN GET AROUND THIS

11. FILE: 201-959282 RVW 4SEP99 DRV D9C. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 040807Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54118

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT LPGAMIN SDLURE

REFS: A, TEHRAN 54117
B, TEHRAN 54084
C, TEHRAN 5408?

1. RUTHERFORD'S NEXT MEETING WITH SDLURE/1(L/1) SCHEDULED FOR EVENING 5 SEP. STATION WILL SEE HIM JUST BEFORE IT TO PASS ON LAST MINUTE INSTRUCTIONS.

2. WE THINK THAT, IF RUTHERFORD IS GOING TO SURFACE AN EXTRACURRICULAR INTEREST IN L/1 DURING THIS VISIT, IT WILL HAVE TO BE DONE AT 5 SEP SESSION. REASONS ARE THAT COVER AGENDA WILL HAVE BEEN PRETTY WELL COMPLETED, AND THAT, IF THERE TO BE A RECRUITMENT WITH OR WITHOUT TURNOVER, HE WILL HAVE TO START ARRANGING THE MECHANICS OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP. RUTHERFORD SAID AT OUR 3SEP MEETING HE THINKS THERE 80 PERCENT LIKELIHOOD L/1 WOULD ACCEPT AN OSTENSIBLE PRIVATE COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP, WITH TURNOVER TO STATION OFFICER OSTENSIBLY MOONLIGHTING AS COMMO CHANNEL BETWEEN RUTHERFORD AND L/1.

3. THIS ESTIMATE MAY WELL BE ACCURATE, BUT IS BASED ON L/1'S ACCESSIBILITY AND ON GENERAL TONE OF MEETING, NOT DEMONSTRATED L/1 WILLINGNESS TO SHARE PROTECTED INFORMATION ON EXPRESSION OF INTEREST, EVEN IMPLIED, IN EXTRACURRICULAR RELATIONSHIP. OUR OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT RUTHERFORD HAS NOW SPEND ENOUGH TIME WITH L/1 SO THAT L/1 WOULD NOT GREATE ... OVER A COMMERCIAL PITCH, EVEN IF HE REJECTED IT. WE DO NOT THINK THE ASSESSMENT HAS PROCEEDED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT AN ESTIMATE OF THE PROBABILITY THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT. THERE IS AT PRESENT EVEN LESS BASIS TO PREDICT HIS REACTION TO ::AN... AT FULL RECRUITMENT.

4. GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES WHICH ATTEND THIS THINK IT MAY BE USEFUL TO LAY OUT THE OPTION AS W....
..... THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH:

A, FULL RECRUITMENT WITH TURNOVER TO STATION. ADVANTAGE IS OBVIOUS: WE COULD LEVY REQUIREMENTS WITH REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT L/1 WOULD DO WHAT HE CAN TO SATISFY THEM. THIS APPROACH ALSO HAS THE HIGHEST FLAP POTENTIAL. L/1 COULD YELL, AND FEED RUTHERFORD TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR. A MORE SUBTLE BUT STILL REAL DANGER IS THAT L/1 WOULD COVER HIS .ETS BY ASKING KHOMEINI AND/OR BAZARGAN TO ENDORSE A RELATIONSHIP WHICH HE WOULD DESCRIBE AS SOME KIND OF UNOFFICIAL LIAISON. THIS WOULD SIGNAL TO THEM THAT WE ARE NOT COTENT WITH THE SDPLD/1 CHANNEL, AND SEEK MULTIPLE LINES INTO THE PGOI; IT

WOULD ALSO GIVE THE LIE TO OUR DENIAL TO SDPLOD/1 AND COMPANY OF A RESIDENT RTACTION PRESENCE IN TEHRAN.

B, RUTHERFORD'S HYBRID AN APPROACH WHICH SOLICITS L/1'S COOPERATION AS PERSONAL ADVISOR TO RUTHERFORD AND ENDS WITH INSERTION OF STATION OFFICER AS OBSTENSIBLE COMMO CHANNEL HAS ADVANTAGE THAT, IF SUCCESSFUL, WE WIND UP WITHSTATION OFFICER IN DIRECT CONTACT, WHILE HAVING PRESERVED SOME DEGREE OF DENIABILITY. RUTHERFORD, MEANWHILE, HAS BEEN ABLE TO PROCEED BY DEGREES UNTIL L/1 AGREES TO THE RELATIVELY INNOCUOUS ADVISORY FUNCTION, THE QUESTION OF NVBLAZON INVOLVEMENT NEVER COMES UP. POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES ARE: (1) L/1 MAY AGREE TO THE ADVISORY FUNCTION, IN RETURN FOR SPECIFIED COMPENSATION, BUT BALK AT DEALING WITH INTERMEDIARY, WE THEN GET LITTEL IF ANY QUID FOR OUR QUO. (2) AT THE MENTION OF EMBASSY CUTOFF, L/1 LOSES WHATEVER INNOCENCE HE MAY HAVE HAD ABOUT RUTHERFORD'S REAL PURPOSES. THERE IS LESS FLAP POTENTIAL IN THIS PHASED APPROACH THAN IN PARA 4 SCENARIO, BUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT WILL SEEK APPROVAL FOR THE SDPLOD/1 REALATIONSHIP THUS REMAIN ABOUT THE SAME.

C, OBSTENSIBLE COMMERCIAL RECRUITMENT. IF RUTHERFORD MAINTAINS THE OBSTENSIBLE COMMERCIAL MOTIVATION OF HIS OFFER RELYING ON PERSONAL CONTACT AND OPEN MAIL FOR COMMUNICATION RECRUITMENT RISK IS MINIMIZED. SO IS PRODUCT: THE RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE QUESTIONS IS LIMITED, AND COMMUNICATIONS ARE UNSATISFACTORY.

D, POSTPONEMENT UNTIL L/1 VISITS PARIS, RUTHERFORD'S RISK DECLINES TO ABOUT ZERO, AND L/1 MIGHT WELL BE CEPTIVE TO A PITCH MADE ON A NEUTRAL GROUND. DISADVANTAGES ARE THAT TIMING OF L/1 TRIP TO PARIS IS INDETERMINATE, AND THAT NO GURANTEE TEHRAN CASE OFFICER WOULD BE AVAILABLE WHEN DECIDES TO GO (RUTHERFORD ADVISES THAT RELATIONSHIP MORE TO PROSPER IF CONDUCTED IN FRENCH, BELIEVES COS IS ONLY TEHRAN OFFICER WITH ADEQUATE PROFICIENCY IN THAT LANGUAGE.)

5, AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WE WOULD RATHER SEE A RECRUITMENT PITCH BY NOC OFFICER MADE ON NEUTRAL GROUND, AND WILL ACCORDINGLY INSTRUCT RUTHERFORD TO PROBE FURTHER RE POSSIBLE TIMING OF AN L/1 VISIT TO PARIS. IF THIS IS COMPLETELY INDETERMINATE, WE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE AMONG OTHER OPTIONS, OR ELECT TO WAIT FOR ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY. OF THE FIRST THREE OPTIONS, THE SECOND SEEMS MOST SUCCESSFULLY TO BALANCE THE RISKS VERSOS POTENTIAL BENEFITS,

REVEALING INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS ON A PHASED BASIS AND PRESERVING SOME DENIABILITY. HQS WILL PRESUMABLY WANT TO DEVOTE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE SDPLOD/1 LIAISON IN TAKING ITS RISK/BENEFIT CALCULATION, AS THIS IS AN EQUITY WHOSE EXISTENCE POSTDATES THE INCEPTION OF THE RUTHERFORD APPROACH TO L/1.

6, IF RECRUITMENT IS TO BE ATTEMPTED PER ANY OF FIRST TO THREE OPTIONS, SUGGEST WE OFFER USD ONE THOUSAND MONTHLY FOR TRIAL PERIOD OF THREE TO SIX MONTHS.

7, REQUEST HQS ADVISE BY ITS COB 4 SEPT HOW IT STATION TO PROCEED.

8, FILE: 201-959089. RVW 4 SEP9 DRV D9C.9. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

SECRET 042351Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 50734P

TO: IMMEDIATE TERRAN

WNINTEL RYBAT LEGAMIN SELURF

REFS: A. TERRAN 54113
B. TERRAN 54117

1. FOLLOWING IS RESPONSE TO REF A SCENARIO PROPOSALS:
2. PLANNING AT THIS POINT CENTERS ON RUTHERFORD'S ASSES-
THAT SDLURF/L (L/1) MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO COMMERCIAL CONSULTANT
RECRUITMENT PITCH. CONCUR WITH STATION THAT THIS DESIRABLE BE
IT PROTECTS RUTHERFORD IN IRAN AND COULD OPEN WAY TO MORE FIRM
PITCH ON NEUTRAL TERRITORY (I.E., PARIS) PER PARA 5 REF A PROP
NOTE IN ANY CASE OUR JUDGMENT (WHICH FACTORS IN SDLURF/L DEVEL-
MENTS) THAT INTRODUCTION OF "EMBASSY" OFFICER INADVISABLE AT
TIME.

3. ACCORDINGLY, WE ENVISAGE COMBINATION OF OPTIONS C AND
PARA 4 REF A. CONCUR KEY ELEMENT OF THIS WOULD BE FOR RUTHERF-
TO PROBE INTO L/1'S INTENTIONS TO TRAVEL TO PARIS IN NEAR FUTURE
EXPLORE HIS INTEREST IN ACCEPTING CONSULTANT STATUS; IF HIS PRE-
PLANS INDETERMINATE, SUGGEST RUTHERFORD INVITE L/1 TO PARIS (PA-
BY OFFERING TO PAY HIS AIR FARE) FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. MAINTAIN
INVITATION IN THIS WAY WOULD BE USEFUL TEST OF L/1'S INTEREST IN
PURSUING RUTHERFORD RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD BE TIMELY DISCREET
(CONSPIRATORIAL) CONTACT IN PARIS. RELIEVE PRESENCE OF L/1'S
CHILDREN AND APARTMENT IN PARIS WOULD BE ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE AND
SUFFICIENT REASON FOR L/1 TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO TRAVEL THERE.

4. IF, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS L/1 UNABLE TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF IRAN
OR FORESEEABLE FUTURE BUT HE MANIFESTLY ATTRACTED BY CONSULTANT
CONCEPT, SUGGEST RUTHERFORD PROVIDE L/1 WITH REQUIREMENTS AND MA-
SUBSEQUENT TRIP(S) TO TERRAN TO BRIEF AND DEBRIEF HIM UNTIL MORE
PERMANENT AND SOPHISTICATED ARRANGEMENT CAN BE DEvised. BELIEVE
RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE QUESTIONS NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO THE INSIGNI-
FICANT OR SUPERFICIAL.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 527449 SECRET

5. CONCLUSION STATION COMPENSATION PROPOSAL PARA 3

6. WELL OF STATION COMMENTS.

7. WE HAVE JUST BEEN NOTIFIED, VIA REF A, THAT
SCHEDULED DEPARTURE 11 SEPT. BELIEVE THIS TIME FRAME WILL
ACCOMMODATE OUR PLANNING AND ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME FOR ONE OF
FINAL MEETINGS WITH L/1. IF THIS DOES NOT GIVE RUTHERFORD
TIME, ASSUME HE CAN DEVISE APPROPRIATE REASON FOR DELAYING
DEPARTURE FROM IRAN.

8. FILE #201-959289. RVM 24 SEPT 99 DE 09C.1 ALL

SECRET
BT
#1149

SECRET 120720Z SEP 79 STAFF
DIRECTOR 512703.
MORIT TEHRAN.
INTEL RYBA LPEAMIN SDLURE

S: A. TEHRAN 54174
B. TEHRAN 54173
C. TEHRAN 54165
D. TEHRAN 54154

1. NO TRACES OR OTHER IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON SHANDAR.
2. CONCUR PARA 2 REF C PROPOSAL AS EARLIER AGREED. MI
OBJECTIVE FOR THIS TRIP IS ATTEMPT AT COMMERCIAL CONSULTANT FI
REF A ASSESSMENT OF SDLURE/1'S PRESENT SITUATION AND FRAME OF
REINFORCE ASSESSMENT OF VERY MINIMAL BLOWBACK RISK THIS TYPE
APPROACH GOOD LUCK.

3. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 10 SEP 79 DRV DSC.1 ALL SEC

SECRET
BT
#98198

SECRET 120720Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE TEHRAN 54194
O: DIRECTOR.

INTEL RYBA LPEAMIN SDLURE

1. PLEASE ADVISE RUTHERFORD COVER COMPANY:
 - A. COVER COMPANY CABLE OF 31 AUGUST ARRIVED 10 SEPT.
 - B. \$400 ADVANCE REACHED HOTEL 10 SEPT.
 - C. R UNABLE TO TELEPHONE AS PTI NOT PLACING LONG DISTANCE DURING TALEGHANI MOURNING PERIOD.
2. FILE: 201-959289. RVW 12 SEP 79 DRV DSC.1. ALL
E T

S E 120721Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE 54158

O: F FRANTECH INTC PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

INTL LPGAIA DLURE

RUTHERFORD DEPARTING TEHRAN 13 SEPT VIA LA 601 AT
HANKFURT 1130.

2. TELEPHONE AFTERNOON 13 SEPT AS GEORGE. SUGGEST
AT H QSEE SITE TWO FRT TWO MCLRS EARLIER THAN
AREA TELEPHONE.

3. HQS ADVISE VIA FRANTECH BY 13 SEPT 17 AND
RUTHERFORD PROCEED WASH. RW 12 SEPT 99 DRU DSC. 1
CITE 54158

158:158

CITE 13015 2 SEP 79 STAFF

DIRTECH 113 51.

FRANTECH INFO DIRTECH, ATTECH.

INTL LPGAIA DLURE, ATUATIC

S: A. TEHRAN 4205
B. TEHRAN 4195
C. TEHRAN 4194
D. TEHRAN 4193

WE ARE GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY REF A DEVELOPMENTS AND
INDICATE PROGRESS CAN BE CONSOLIDATED INTO
PRODUCTIVE COME RECRUITMENT IN NEAR FUTURE. WISH EXPRES
PROSECUTION TO RUTHERFORD FOR ADVANCING DLURE/1 (L/1)
SE ALONG TO THE STAGE AND TO STATION FOR ITS SUPPORT AND
IDONE OVER PAST TWO WEEKS.

4. OUR PLANNING WILL NOW FOCUS ON FUTURE HANDLING OF LA
TH VIEW OF EVENTUALLY DRAINING HIM TO PARIS PER PARA 4 REF A.
TE THAT IN THIS STAGE WE ENVISAGE RUTHERFORD'S CONTINUED
VOLUNTARY COOPERATION AND WE SEE IT AS LIKELY ANOTHER
IF RUTHERFORD TO TEHRAN MAY BE IN ORDER TO OFFER AND PAY
1. AT LEAST UNTIL TIME LA/1 FEELS HE ABLE TO BREAK AWAY
OR PARIS. DETAILED PLANNING AND PROPOSALS WILL FOLLOW
THAT WE HAVE FULLY DEBRIEFED RUTHERFORD.

5. FR FRANTECH: APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT DURING THIS
PHASE OF DLURE OPERATION. PLS SUGGEST TO RUTHERFORD THAT
LAST IN WILLING TO HIS HOME ADDRESS FOR REFUND 15-15
EFFECTIVE (DETAILS LINE SCHEDULES PERMIT) AND THEN TDY HQS ARE
7-15 SEPTEMBER FOR DEBRIEFING/PLANNING SESSION. ANTICIPATE
LATER FOR A AGREEMENT WITH THIS TIMETABLE. WE HAVE MADE
CITE 13015 2 SEP 79 STAFF

6. S T: DEPART BOSTON (LOGAN) AT 154 HRS VIA
NORTHWEST-ORIENT FLT 79
ARRIVE DULLES AT 1718 HRS

1-959241, RVN 13 SEP 99 DRV 187.1 ALL SEC

DIRECTOR S. S. 1-18.

EL RYEAT LP IN SOLUTION

DIRECTOR 151

- 211

15 SEP 79

SECRET 41049Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 39582

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ATHI CH, DIRTECH

UNIDENTIFIED LPGA MIN SD LURE TECHS

REF: DIRECTOR 513151

TEHRAN 54195

UNABLE TO PASS ALONG REF A INFORMATION TO
 OTHERS SINCE REF ARRIVED AFTER EZNOVA LAST CONTACT
 WITH RUTHERFORD DEPARTED FRANKFURT FOR NEW YORK 14 SEP
 0000 VIA E 494.

2. E: 201-959289. RVW 14 SEP 89, DRV D9C.1.

E

BT

958

6 OCT 79 09 34Z

SECRET 060119Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 528124.

TO: TEHRAN.

ADMIN FINAN

1. TDY TRAVELER GUY W. RUTHERFORD HAS SUBMITTED ACCOUNTING
 WHICH LISTS \$300.00 ADVANCE RECEIVED FROM TEHRAN STATION ON 12
 SEPTEMBER. PLEASE CONFIRM TYPE OF CURRENCY ADVANCED AND EXACT
 AMOUNT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS OF TEHRAN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER
 ACCOUNTINGS. RVW 50CT99 DRV D9C.3 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT
 #3044

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 - 501-526

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